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Abstract: The present PhD-thesis seeks new definitions of human subjectivity in an age 
of technoscience and a networked, globalized, Information Society. The perspective 
presented relates to Philosophy of Science, which includes the Human, the Natural, the 
Social and the Life Sciences. The project is directed at addressing, and aims to 
participate in, the further development of Philosophy of Science, or rather, the 
philosophy of knowing, which leaves a perspective broader than that of science. 
Methodologically, I combine readings of technoetic artworks, which I approach from a 
hermeneutical-semiotic perspective, with transdisciplinary research into existing theory 
concerning the human subject. These readings form my case studies. I keep a particular 
focus on holistic biophysics (Mae Wan Ho, James Oschman, Marko Bischof). 
Furthermore, Søren Brier's cybersemiotic theory of communication, cognition and 
consciousness, which combines a cybernetic-autopoietic and a Peircean semiotic 
perspective, plays a central role in the project. 
 
The project has three parts. Part one contextualizes the study within philosophy of 
science. It discusses relevant epistemologies, and places the case studies in an art 
categorical context. It further discusses the philosophical problems involved in writing 
an academic thesis in the form of a linear, argumentative, critical style, and how it 
affects the process of meaning making in a way that has consequences to my research. 
The second part consists of four case studies, each under an overall theme, which 
applies to the question of human subjectivity. Here I build the concept Extended 
Sentience, and the concept of an Ideal User. The Ideal User functions as a conceptual 
frame, which allows me to gradually add more elements to a theory of an altered human 
subject and knower. The third part presents new ontologies under three basic themes: 
Time and Relativity, The Life Cycles of Metaphors, and Logos Philosophy and Virtual 
Grids. These ontologies strongly affect ways of interpretation made in part one and two. 
Part Three allows more space to my subjective thought processes, which will take 
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precedence over the literature applied. Thus, I, as a post-objective subject observer, will 
become more transparent. Finally, I will seek an overall conclusion to the project, which 
should clarify areas where it is evident that the human subject must be reconsidered at a 
pre-scientific level. It is my thesis that the foundation for human knowledge generation 
is changing drastically today, and that it has become crucial to reconsider a common 
understanding of what constitutes the human knower. 
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Introduction 
1.0. Thesis problem and theoretical field 
This thesis presents an attempt to create philosophical formulations of the human 
subject in ways that can be considered relevant to scientific practice. The main question 
that forms the thesis problem is: how do we know? And how can we characterise the 
human knower in a way that relates adequately to a contemporary and near future 
socio-cultural situation, where the relationship between cultural-technological 
developments and developments in mind, cognition and social forms is taken actively 
into account? 
 
My motivation for taking up this question lies in the fact that science, in light of second 
order cybernetics and quantum philosophy, and the opposing strong demand on 
objectivity in science in general, no longer accounts realistically for the human subject 
who is involved in the research process, and who produces experiments, theses, 
theories, and new knowledge. The inherent misconception of the human subject that 
often lies implicit in academic work affects the general social semantics concerning 
how we as human knowers understand ourselves, and our inborn abilities to know. But 
why has such a discrepancy occurred, and what are the problems that are necessary to 
take into account? 
One problem concerns the current and rapid change in the identity of the 
human subject that has to do with the increase in technological development, which also 
causes questions of human evolution and the relationship between human and 
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technological tools to arise. Giuseppe Longo, in his article The Epistemological Turn 
(Longo, 2006), claims that the human species will continue to evolve, not physically, 
but culturally through information and communication technologies, where technologies 
are understood to alter cognition, consciousness and intersubjective behaviours. This 
development touches upon ways in which we understand human knowing, and demands 
conceptualisations that are fit with the current and near future condition. Longo’s basic 
assumption, however, that while developing with and through a symbiosis with 
electronic and computational technologies, human beings as a species will not continue 
to develop on a physio-biological scale, does capture my attention. For how can human 
beings evolve cognitively without the physical structure being involved? 
I do not expect cultural and technological developments to happen without 
causing, or even perhaps turning out as the effects of, equivalent physio-biological 
development and inner developments of human consciousness as such. In my view, the 
biggest problem lies in understanding human consciousness in relation to cultural and 
technological developments. In order to know more of the relation between culture, 
technology and the physical body, we are forced to move into further considerations of 
what forms the sub-conscious levels of our awareness, of our basic prerequisites for 
knowing. 
Further from the problem of out-dated models of the human subject and 
versions of conscious versus sub-conscious levels of subjectivity, the problem involves 
questions concerning how the relation between the individual and the social level could 
be characterised in a time of social connectivity effectuated through information 
technologies and social media. So, in this equation we have three fuzzy unknowns: 
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cultural-technological versus biological development, the relationship between 
conscious and sub-conscious levels, and the point of connectivity or discrepancy 
between individual subject and the collective. What is particularly challenging in this 
project is that the implications of our theoretical explorations affect not only the way we 
conceptualise the human subject as a theoretical construct at a third person level. It also 
affects ourselves as researchers, and more profoundly: the philosopher at the first person 
level. The project must therefore consider both positions, and allow them to be informed 
by each other as a central part of the projects textual and methodological structure. 
 
A main point of concern, in order to not let the external and contemporary 
advents of culture and technologies be fully determinate of our main conceptions of the 
human subject, is to re-acquaint the question of inner knowledge, and to ask of the 
relation between the spiritual, the mental and the physiological sides of the human 
subject in the context of this question. As a consequence of asking this question, we are 
forced to reconsider the role of rationality, feeling, brain/cognition and body, and to ask 
how these aspects of the human mind relate to processes of introspection. In order to 
find answers, I will seek new ways in which to define idiosyncratic levels of 
subjectivity, and ask how they influence upon knowledge generation, and how they can 
reach new levels of categorical generalization when it comes to structures of mind. As a 
part of this quest, a further aim is to give priority to convincing research (biosemiotics, 
holistic biophysics, cybersemiotics) that has not been widely accepted within their 
respective fields (biology, medicine and philosophy), in order to test its potential while 
writing new theories of the human subject 
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At this point, it is important to notice that by using the term science, I am not, as in the 
American tradition, referring to the natural sciences, but rather to the German 
understanding of Wissenschaft, which includes the natural and the human sciences. I 
will, consequently, refer to institutionalized knowledge as either academia or science, 
where academia refers to institutional conventions, and science to the actual practice, 
including tacit knowledge, which is understood to be involved in both formations. 
 
The social context that defines the starting point of the thesis, but which will be further 
developed in the course of the project, is best described by Lars Qvortrup's Luhmann 
inspired idea of the hyper complex society (Qvortrup, 2003), together with Helga 
Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael Gibbon's (2001) idea of the Agora. The Agora 
connotes a virtual market place, where different rationalities are taken up for 
negotiation. Here, science has been deprived of its role as the main source of truth, and 
has become but one rationality among others (politics, economy, law, religion, love, 
etc.) that must be negotiated on the terms of the market place, in order to gain effect at 
the social level. Furthermore, the social context includes information technologies 
(including digital screen interfaces and environments of mixed- and augmented reality), 
and their centrality in lifeworlds and academic institutions respectively. For this reason, 
contemporary artworks are understood to refer specifically and often precisely to the 
most central instances in the contemporary situation by bringing together references to 
art, technology, science and the study of consciousness in a condensed and exemplary 
symbolic form. 
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2.0. Methodology 
The method presents a forward directed, creative, and integrative approach, based on 
transdisciplinary strategies, and the ability to economize with relevant theoretical 
resources across disciplines, which will allow me to construct a meta-level, cross-
canonical theoretical semantic syntax.1 The basic point of departure of the project is a 
process oriented approach to reality, where everything is understood to be in constant 
movement, and where the ability to capture the fixed point in space is understood to be 
the exception, rather than the rule;2 this affects our basic ontological understanding of 
the research object as well as of the subject writer. The method has been inspired by a 
number of sources, among which are Professor of Communications, Brian Massumi’s 
book Parables of the Virtual (Massumi, 2002), Holistic Physicist David Peat and 
Professor of Theoretical Physics, David Bohm’s Science, Order and Creativity (Peat & 
Bohm, 1987), David Bohm’s (1980) Wholeness and the Implicate Order, and 
Theoretical Physicist Basarab Nicolescu’s (2002) Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, 
along with John Deely’s (2005) Basics of Semiotics, and Søren Brier’s (2008) 
Cybersemiotics. Except for Deely’s book, all of the mentioned theories take 
philosophical implications of quantum mechanics into account, while simultaneously 
delivering work that could be viewed as contributions to the field of Philosophy of 
Science. 
The goal of the project is, besides from delivering an inventive 
contribution made through the project’s very articulation, to have its formulations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  By this I mean a structure of meaning on the basis of choices of including particular literature, and excluding other 
literature relating to the topic. 	  2	  This	  exact	  formulation	  is	  inspired	  by	  Massumi,	  2005	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further negotiated among peers in philosophy of science, and to inspire the work of 
contemporary technoetic artists. 
 
The process-oriented background of the project connects culture as an emergent 
phenomenon with nature’s emergent properties, which are viewed as mutually linked 
though a reciprocal influence that also has an evolutionary aspect. The human subject 
and society are thus understood to be in a constant state of becoming, mutually 
influencing upon each other, reciprocally linked. Massumi (2002), who has formulated 
a process oriented framework that takes the virtuality of quantum fields actively into 
account, has written how this perspective has consequences in how we think of method: 
‘Prolonging the thought-path of movement, as suggested here, requires 
that techniques of negative critique be used sparingly. The balance has to 
shift to affirmative methods: techniques, which embrace their own 
inventiveness and are not afraid to own up to the fact that they add (if so 
meagerly) to reality.’ (p. 12-13). 
Massumi thinks that critical argumentation through debunking seeks exclusion of reality 
segments, and that this methodology represents a ‘basically descriptive and justificatory 
modus operandi’ (p. 12). He thinks that not only should we adapt to the necessity of a 
constructivist view on academic writing, but he takes it further, and calls for 
productivity, hereby claiming that we produce reality by forming theory. The idea of 
production has a forward directed creative element to it, and views theory as an 
emergent product that also adds to the emergence of culture. Massumi further wants to 
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replace the concept of ontology with the concept of ‘ontogenesis’ (p.8), which changes 
ontology from a static conception into a dynamic eternally changing perspective that 
does, however, relate to us in deep and fundamental ways by setting the limits and 
potentials of our very theoretical and conscious point of departure. I have let myself 
inspire by this approach, while furthermore adding a semiotic point of view (Deely, 
2005). Although Massumi’s idea of emergent reality production is found fruitful, I will 
leave the possibility of a (real) connection between produced cultural reality and nature 
an open question. 
 
From this point of departure, our method, by necessity, becomes unorthodox, 
productive, and explorative. We are moving into yet unknown and therefore uncertain 
territory. The explorative element arises because it represents an approach that has not 
yet been widely tested and therefore has to be further developed as part of the project 
proper. This will show in the project by, further than presenting the present introductory 
chapter on methodology, the methodological foundations for the project will be actively 
explored and developed throughout Part I. But what are the practical implications of the 
methodology established so far? 
Since critical argumentation is not the main strategy, the function of 
academic intertextuality becomes different from established norms surrounding the 
process of academic writing. In this project the function of intertextual navigation (by 
the research subject) is primarily to find literature that can deliver vocabularies, 
conceptualizations, and central authorships that offer what I call loaded terms. Loaded 
terms are terms that have a potential to form 
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different disciplines can inform the same topic, and thereby bridge the enormous 
disciplinary gaps that are typical of contemporary disciplinary divides, in accordance 
with our topic in question. The affirmative approach (rather than negation through 
critical argumentation) allows us to navigate a broad spectrum of literature within 
diverse academic fields, and from there make the choice that will form the basic pillars 
of our production, which should lead to a fallible signification of the human subject. 
This approach is understood to present a genuine potential for the formation of a meta-
level articulation that involves giving words new connotations. The method expresses a 
striving towards signifying the object in question through words and text in a way that is 
as precise as possible. But how can we talk of preciseness when it comes to 
philosophical considerations? 
 
Preciseness, at a preliminary basis must be understood differently than exactness in the 
exact sciences. The project seeks to observe an intangible object (the consciousness of 
the human subject). Our only possibility to observe complex intangible objects is 
through words and language. The criteria of correspondence between the observed and 
its representation is a truth criteria typically used in positivistic science, where the 
ontology of classical positivism presents a material three-dimensional space of tangible 
and measurable objects, and where the symmetrical relation between the x in question, 
and the y that it corresponds to forms the point of departure (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, The Correspondence Theory of Truth, 2002)3. The correspondence theory 
of truth, however, has roots in Greek peripatetic philosophy, where Aristotle’s original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-­‐correspondence/	  (date	  of	  acess:	  April	  5th,	  2014)	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use of the concept “aletheia” was closely connected to a metaphysical realism (Brier, 
2005). In the course of this project, a central effort will be made to further question 
these opposing approaches to the relation between human subject and world, and what it 
means for our understanding of truth. 
 
The integrative method that this project seeks to establish and use, demands a precise 
economical choice of textual resources, central philosophers, theorists and theoretical 
points of reference that will add to the research object in question. It further demands: 
1. A potential in the theories for a higher order articulation that represents the meta-
theoretical order of philosophy of science. 
2: An overlap between theories from different disciplines that, while resting upon 
terminologies and research methods alienated from each other, articulate perspectives 
on the same dynamical object in question. 
3: A strive for precision in the representation of the dynamical object in question 
4: Consistency in the argumentation concerning the main theses proposed in the project, 
especially while in Part III thought experiments are carried out on the basis of the 
implications of central premises proposed in Parts I and II. 
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This strategy demands a combination of the active use of the research subject’s intuition 
combined with academic skill. 4  The method demands that, besides from a clear 
correspondence between articulation and research object in question, and in opposition 
to traditional demands on objectivity, there has to be a correspondence between 
subjective insights of the generative philosopher, and the texts chosen for the textual 
syntax. This is in line with Nicolescu (2002), who writes: 
‘Learning to know also means establishing bridges – between the different 
disciplines, and between these disciplines and meanings and our interior 
capacities’ (p. 133). 
 
2.1. How can we understand the role of theory in the productive approach? 
While trying to understand the use and production of theory in this project, it makes 
sense to look at Aristotle’s original definitions of theory. Broadie (1991) writes of 
Aristotle’s concept of theoria: 
‘Theoria' covers any sort of detached, intelligent, attentive pondering, 
especially when not direct to a practical goal. Thus it can denote the 
intellectual activity or aesthetic exploration of some object, or the 
absorbed following of structures as they unfold when we look and stay 
looking more deeply, whether by means of sensory presentation or 
abstract concepts.’ (p. 401) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  Nicolescu,	  2002,	  pp.	  67-­‐74	  on	  quantum	  reality,	  imagination	  and	  knowledge	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It is obvious that Broadie, with Aristotle, does not only mean looking as in the 
traditional understanding of this term. Looking, then, can also be an internal activity. 
Bohm (1980) writes of theoria: ‘Thus it might be said that theory is primarily a form of 
insight, i.e. a way of looking at the world, and not a form of knowledge of how the 
world is’ (p. 4). Thus, in our understanding, theory is closely related to experience. It 
forms a means by which to explore the world in an intimate relation between thought 
and language, and it is lead by an innate drive towards gaining wisdom (sofia). 
 
In this light, we can understand that Part I of the project does, although named theory5, 
present an exploration through theory that aims to actively change the setting when it 
comes to understanding academic epistemologies as opposed to philosophical 
epistemologies, which, again, allows us to pave the way for the generative philosopher, 
justifying the project’s emphasis on the voice and identity of the first person observer, 
while simultaneously forming a methodological approach to artworks that is based on a 
new way of regarding transdisciplinarity, in part by integrating Nicolescu’s manifesto of 
transdisciplinarity, and, more basically, Brier’s cybersemiotic star and newly developed 
concepts (Brier, 2008). 
 
 
Since this project aims to articulate theory of the human subject at the level of 
philosophy of science, and gradually developing and including the generative 
philosopher that, again, must operate from a perspective of transdisciplinarity, an 
account of the impact of new technologies on the self, and, none the least a process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Please	  recall	  the	  Aristotelian	  definition	  of	  “theoria”	  here	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oriented view upon reality, contemporary philosophers forming theory of subjectivity, 
and of which well known contributors are Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson, and Shaun 
Gallagher, have not presented the level of transdisciplinary integration or integration of 
theoria, strived for in this project. Zahavi’s (2005) theory on subjectivity is deeply 
embedded in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, however, presents an anti-
transcendental approach, and a primary focus on a human science approach, which does 
not take into consideration the importance of integrating theories from other scientific 
fields, and theories of the impact of digital- and information technologies on the human 
subject. He also does not present an elaborated consideration of the philosophical 
implications of quantum mechanics on studies of the human mind. Gallagher (2005) in 
How the Body Shapes the Mind mixes phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience. 
He further presents a wide use of examples that rest upon a pathological approach to the 
psyche, and thereby an implicit division between the sick and the healthy mind, which 
this project seeks to avoid. On the contrary, this project seeks to establish an approach 
that is more in line with positive psychology (Gardner, 2006a; Gardner, 2006b; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Csikszentmihalyi,1996), which forms background reading, but 
not an explicit theoretical point of departure for the project.6 Gallagher, furthermore, 
does not integrate quantum philosophy into his studies. Thompson (2007), in his book 
Mind in Life. Biology, phenomenology and the sciences of mind integrates biological 
levels of the body in his theory of mind and cognition, and furthermore re-works Kant’s 
distinction between the noetic and the noemic, where he presents a dynamical outcome 
that connects both positions within one and the same intellectual frame. He furthermore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Peirce’s	  idea	  of	  ”evolutionary	  love”,	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  ”syntropy”	  (explained	  in	  the	  glossary)	  are	  found	  resonant	  with	  central	  messages	  of	  positive	  psychology,	  and	  are	  explored	  because	  a	  focus	  of	  the	  project	  is	  to	  integrate	  knowledge	  from	  alternative	  branches	  into	  the	  human	  science	  approach.	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inserts an evolutionary perspective, which is not typical for a human science approach, 
and which takes him far in his considerations. He is, however, embedded in a material-
realism that connects his theory very directly to neuroscience, and with a conception of 
cognitive theory that is much in line with information science, which represents a more 
instrumental paradigm. I agree with Thompson’s decision to combine biology and 
philosophy in an evolutionary paradigm, however, in this project I am searching for a 
biological approach that is open to a wider degree of transdisciplinary integration, and 
an ontology that moves beyond the instrumental information science inspiration. 
 
In order to direct the reader further, when it comes to the project’s placement within the 
field of subjectivity theory, we can say that our questioning of the human subject takes 
its primary point of departure in the field of Philosophy of Science, not in theories 
developed as academic practice. This also concerns philosophy of science that has not 
yet been integrated into the established canons representing this field (for instance the 
integration of philosophy of physics into the humanities and social sciences). It 
therefore relates more to the level of philosophical consideration presented in for 
example the historical opposition between philosophical contemplations on the knower, 
such as the well known historical empiricism (John Locke’s human subject as a “tabula 
rasa” and the idea that knowledge primarily stems from sensuous experience of an 
externally given material world), and rationalism (Descartes’ famous words “cogito 
ergo sum” and the idea that knowledge primarily comes from inwards rational activity), 
towards Kant’s famous categorical imperatives (apriori categories and judgments as a 
point of departure of the mind), and, at a more contemporary basis, towards Brier’s 
socio-communicative autopoietic intersubjectivities (Brier, 2008), representing the deep 
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philosophical implications of understanding the knower as either primarily inwards 
directed, or outwards directed, or oscillating between subjective and intersubjective 
levels (the last of which are based on language games), than it does to analytical 
philosophy, cultural, psychological or literary theory concerning the human subject. 
 
2.2. The generative philosopher 
Peat and Bohm (1987) write of creativity in research, where they emphasise the 
importance of thought, and the creativity of play in thought as a part of the academic 
research process (p. 37-41). Here, play of thought is understood to present an important 
potential for a creative, generative process, and is viewed as an important activity; 
especially in times where it is necessary to generate alternative theoretical frameworks 
and to experiment with theoretical possibilities outside of existing frameworks. While 
thought as experience underlines our view upon the first person subject as being in 
constant motion through experience; sometimes even fundamentally changed through 
the experience of theoria; the idea of thought as perception adds to our question 
concerning the correspondence theory of truth: how do we, actually perceive the world 
and of what does the external world consist? We are re-actualizing this question as a 
part of formulating a concept of truth, and the case studies in Part II of the project will 
be centrally preoccupied with this question as a part of questioning the human knower. 
The propositions of Peat and Bohm go well with the process oriented 
view, and the idea of the necessity of accepting the generative nature of the research 
subject, which also demands of her to become an explicit active first person philosopher 
and thinker, where there is a tight connection between the first and the third person 
human subject. And we must make clear that we do not operate with a fixed human 
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subject, neither in the first nor in the third position. They are both developing; as the 
project proper progresses. And each position affects the other in ways both linear and 
non-linear (which again, by necessity, must affect the structure of the academic text). 
But what further characterises our generative philosopher? 
 
The generative philosopher is a practitioner, but a practitioner of thought. She seeks to 
drive thought to its utmost potential. By this act, she is creating; she is producing bits of 
reality, while simultaneously relating to an external reality of a kind. Moving a little 
further on the inside, with Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis theory (Maturana & 
Varela, 1987), it seems only fair to expect that there are autonomous levels in 
generative thought processes that are not equal to the way intellectual awareness is 
consciously and logically directed, the last of which is the position of the traditional 
academic worker. There is, a high level of sub-conscious generative mechanisms that 
form our processes of thought. We want to seek a broader formulation of these 
mechanisms, in order to know more of them. One way of doing this is to let the 
generative creative processes of thought come to the fore through the explicitness of her 
thinking process. 
 
2.3. Writing style 
In line with Nicolesu's (2002) idea of in vivo research, which I will present further in 
Part I, Chapter 3, my research strategy will strive towards a pattern of thought that does 
not constrain itself within implicit directions from the logic of binary oppositions 
(implicit contradictions) and a non-acceptance of paradox, which, sub-consciously, 
colour processes of academic reading and understanding today (Aristotle, 1998; 
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Nicolescu, 2002; Kelsoe & Engstrøm, 2006). Actual contradictions that are sought 
overcome are the distinct opposition between subject and object, the opposition between 
individual and collective, culture and nature, idealism and realism, quantum and particle 
reality, consciousness and matter, and disciplinary oppositions concerning different 
aspects of the human subject.7 The aim is to create a holistic framework, where these 
oppositions form complementary pairs, rather than mutually exclusive opposites. I 
further seek to move beyond the divide between the human and the natural sciences, 
between evolutionary and hermeneutical paradigms, and between print theory and art 
works as validated forms of knowledge. 
 
I must note, already here, that when it comes to my use of theory from the natural 
sciences, including biosemiotics and holistic biophysics, where I creatively and 
philosophically mix these in order to find points of coherence between biological, 
mental and social levels, factual precision concerning how the biological levels, 
involving quantum biology, molecular biology, the connection between micro and 
macro levels of the organism, is not within the scope of this thesis. This thesis aims to 
present conceptual propositions of possible overall connections between emergent 
levels of the biological body, and kinds of thinking and communication that must be 
described by languages other than those of the natural sciences. The conceptual 
integration of areas that have not been expressed academically, as of now, together with 
the integrative vocabularies and texts, are what presents the original proposal of this 
thesis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  instance	  the	  opposition	  between	  biological	  and	  philosophical	  explanations	  
	   29	  
2.4. Reading directions 
It is central for the reader to be aware of places within the text, where the aim is to add 
new in-depth elements that add to the same topic, rather than to seek linear cause and 
effect explanation and vertical progression without horizontal depth. At the 
epistemological level, I will move from transdisciplinarity, into a syncretic approach in 
one case study in Part II, whereas in Part III, I further integrate religious perspectives. 
The reason is that in part III, I seek to establish new ontologies, which typically 
demands metaphysical and religious considerations. Here follows an overview over the 
three parts of the project: 
 
Part I places the problem of human consciousness in the context of philosophy of 
science, and gives a thorough description of the problems and consequences involved 
when trying to redefine human subjectivity at a deep, ontological level. From here, I 
will move into an epistemological context, where I question the idea of superiority of 
contemporary knowledge as opposed to philosophical knowledge of Greek Antiquity, 
by emphasising ontological depth. I will place technoetic arts on the art scene, and in 
the socio-cultural context, and articulate why I find this kind of art to be particularly 
rich in significations extracting the most essential elements of the current socio-cultural 
knowledge situation, and in directing attention to future knowledge when it comes to 
understanding the human subject. In Part I, I will furthermore introduce Søren Brier's 
cybersemiotic theory. I will argue why and how the theory is useful to this project. Part 
I of the project gives a theoretical introduction to the cybersemiotic theory, while part II 
presents its use as a part of my case studies. 
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Part II demonstrates readings of technoetic artworks from a hermeneutical, semiotic 
approach in search of a new, semantic syntax that can be established across paradigms, 
across levels of reality, and across current systems of cultural semiosis, which can 
present new input to the production of creative sketches of the human subject. Each 
chapter will be based on a theme, which is considered central to questions of human 
knowing. 
I will end my case studies by forming an overall conclusion, based on an 
abductive cohesion of central points reached through making the respective case 
studies, and thereby connect bits of meaning into the concept of an ideal user, who 
represents our productive view, and presents a new way of conceptualising the human 
subject. 
Part III consists of three main chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. Each chapter 
aims at constructing ontological positions, which, if taken at face value, cause profound 
alterations in dominating views upon the human subject, which, again, will affect the 
way we read the project proper and how we understand the academic subject writer. 
Part III presents three basic approaches to ontological standpoints, all of which are 
understood as central in forming deep ontological positions. They are presented as 
thought experiments that build upon central theses already presented in the project, 
together with additional literature that can inform the topics in question.  
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Part II of the project, as well as Chapter Three, Part III, are built over a series of articles 
produced and published as a part of my PhD research. These articles have been re-
written in order to make them fit into the overall context of the final thesis. 
I must further point to the fact that I have, during my research process 
encountered the work of Søren Brier, which has come to form a central role in this 
project. This is so in particular, because we share a similar motivation and interest in 
likely problems and their philosophical solutions. I must, however, claim that the 
original conclusions in this project are derived through my personal work with the 
topics involved, even if some conclusions are similar to Brier’s. The cybersemiotic 
theory delivers central terminological “tools” (concepts) for the project. Brier has 
formulated what I have not found in other theories, and what is in line with the aim and 
direction that I was heading towards. He thus supports this project with a foundation 
that allows me to articulate what I have had in mind before I had ever read his theory or 
encountered him in real life! 
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Part I: Theory (theoria) 
 
Chapter 1: Philosophy of Science 
 
3.0. Historical and epistemological perspectives 
The main area to which I connect my studies of human subjectivity is philosophy of 
science. The point of departure of the overall thesis, however, is pre-scientific. I seek to 
develop Philosophy of Science into a Philosophy of Knowing (which is the original 
meaning of science) that also takes technology-assisted art actively into account as 
validated research. But let me commence by shortly explaining the nature of philosophy 
of science, and place it in the context of philosophy at large. After that, I will discuss 
the idea of epistemology at a pre-scientific level, and contextualize this understanding 
with a view on the contemporary situation, using what Edmund Husserl originally 
called “epochè”. Epochè means to approach a topic with an open, naïve horizon, where 
all existing knowledge is placed in a parenthesis. 
 
Philosophy of science is a meta-science. It involves considerations that, in principle, 
concern all existing branches of science, from the natural sciences, the life sciences, and 
the social sciences to the humanities. It is not equal to science. And it is not exclusively 
equal to philosophy either. Philosophy of science is philosophy that considers the nature 
of science and its history. It has not always been certain exactly which processes of 
knowing that can lead to science. Therefore, the meta-discipline that philosophy of 
science is, discusses these issues as knowledge progresses, develops and transforms 
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over historical time in a process where experiences are collected and presented on 
behalf of retrospective causation. In this chapter, I will be preoccupied with the question 
of how epistemologies, based on the practices of academia on the one hand, and on a 
pre-scientific concept of knowing on the other hand, have historically come into form, 
and how their truth value might be understood. On the one hand, Plato and Aristotle 
originally talked of “episteme”, while Foucault (2002) in the 1960’ies formed his 
version of the concept “episteme” that varied from the original connotations of the term. 
But what is the difference between them? 
 
Epistemes are, to Foucault, discourses that form central pillars of knowledge in a 
society. They have primarily been formed by thinkers in philosophical and academic 
communities, and are therefore attached to newer academic practices. Epistemes 
become determinate of discourses and of what can be considered legitimate knowledge 
at a certain point in history. 
The Danish Professor, Lars Qvortrup (2003), uses a Luhmann inspired 
idea while forming his concept of ‘social semantics’, which is inspired by Foucault's 
idea of epistemes, and further involves processes of autopoiesis.8 As a part of the 
inspiration from Luhmann, social communications are understood to be that, which 
forms social systems per se. Therefore, they are central. It is Qvortrup's claim that 
contemporary society is formed by the epistemes that we subscribe to. These epistemes 
affect processes of communication and thinking in looped, cybernetic processes. By 
thinking about epistemologies as a social semantics, from our pre-scientific point of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Social	  communications	  have	  a	  self-­‐regulating	  element	  to	  them	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view, we are able to approach the topic from a combination of the pre-scientific 
speculations of the generative philosopher, while still taking academic knowledge 
seriously into account. The social semantics that Qvortrup characterises is understood 
to, through the discourses involved, refer to an articulation of a collective socio-cultural 
level of experience, which is, however, always more than its linguistic, academic 
expression. In this project, we are taking a realistic approach to the referential value of 
epistemes, while still keeping the element of contingency in mind. Epistemes do refer to 
social and physical realities that are ontologically understood to exist. However, they 
are strongly affected not only by dominating paradigms and the influence of existing 
discourses built on behalf of these paradigms; they are also affected by the very 
particular lines of causation that underlie dominant academic discourses, and which I 
expect to be affected by underlying levels of collective consciousness. So far, we can 
only define such levels by referring to autopoietically generated social communications, 
and in more particularity, to specific discourses. However, the project strives to dive 
further into this collective aspect of consciousness. 
Our position of observation is, according to the project aim and 
methodology, a meta-position. In accordance with the autopoiesis theory that Qvortrup 
subscribes to via Luhmann, a social semantics based on epistemes, would actually leave 
in a level of contingency in the choice of dominating knowledge that characterises our 
cultural era. This means that existing epistemes could also always have been otherwise. 
It is on this basis that I seek to question traditional conceptions of the two 
overall lines in epistemology: cultural epistemes based on an academic background that 
colour conceptions of academic reality on a more general basis, and a broader 
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philosophical epistemological horizon, both of which intertwine, however, distribute 
central qualitative differences, in particular when it comes to ontological depth and 
degrees of incorporated wisdom and human self-acknowledgement. The basic traits of 
the two epistemological lines of experience that I seek to characterise concern: 
1. Recent academic endeavour, including the increase in disciplinary specialization, 
within approximately the past 100-200 years, from the time of increased positivistic 
domination (from Comte’s philosophy of positivism in the mid 1800’s.) 
2. Our philosophical heritage, which I understand to have commenced at a pre-scientific 
level, approximately 2500 years before Christ with Greek Antiquity. 
 
As a part of the aim towards discussing dominating epistemologies, I will reflect on the 
contemporary situation. Peat and Bohm (1989) presented the idea that a fragmentation 
of thought as a historical effect of Western academic practice had been taking place. 
This fragmentation in thought has been caused by an increased degree of disciplinary 
specialization within academic institutions, and in particular within the fields of the 
natural sciences. Peat and Bohm were not opposed to disciplinary divides; however, 
argued that an increase in specialization has alienated researchers in varied fields from 
each other. This alienation, in part, lies within the vocabularies that have arisen from 
highly specialized practices. In opposition to this fragmentation, Greek antiquity 
presented lines of thought that were much less separated, and more holistic by nature. 
We find an equal holistic approach in the European Renaissance, before the institution 
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of science was firmly established at a social level, and where, according to Qvortrup, 
the human subject understood herself to be in the centre of her experiences. 
 
There are several perspectives that one can place upon the presented division into 
epistemes and the philosophical epistemological horizon. By drawing attention to the 
long epistemological line that connects Antiquity with contemporary science and socio-
cultural epistemes more directly, it becomes clearer that knowledge derived in pre-
scientific, esoteric and introspective manners, such as the work presented by Plato, and 
parts of what Aristotle9 and Pythagoras delivered, both contradict currently accepted 
scientific truth values, especially when it comes to methodologies (since the Greeks 
apparently used esoteric approaches), however, simultaneously forms a necessary 
prerequisite for the knowledge that we derive today. This discrepancy points towards 
the fact that we need to take into serious consideration the actuality of a kind of 
knowledge, which is not primarily derived from empirical testing, and which, however, 
has a lasting value and effect at the level of social semantics, even beyond the time 
scales of single generations. The Danish philosopher, Dorthe Jørgensen (2002), talks of 
wisdom. According to Jørgensen, wisdom is part of the socio-cultural horizons that have 
been formed over generations. This is particularly so at the etymological level. 
Therefore, the wisdom presented in Antiquity, and its methods of derivation, cannot be 
de-valued as naïve and romantic, and historical, rather than actual. The methods of 
knowledge derivation presented by original esoteric philosophers must be taken 
seriously into reconsideration. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I am here using Aristotle and Pythagoras as a reference to the overall knowledge cultures presented by our access to 
Greek Antiquity, and pre-Socratic thought with a particular focus upon the fact that large parts of this knowledge was 
derived in esoteric manners.
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The time through which pragmatic use of central concepts of Aristotle have been 
relevant in Western cultures seems to be at least 2500 years. This does not concern 
singular factual claims, such as Aristotle's idea that the laws of the heavens were of a 
different nature than such of the earth.10 It rather concerns central bits of wisdom that 
are carried onwards over historical time by the function of loaded terms. Loaded terms 
are terms that present a basic level of meaning, which can be ontologically expanded, 
and thus continue to be used in processes of meaning making, in spite of the fact that 
concrete, social conditions change over time. This is the reason why I wish to 
emphasize and reconsider the effect of the long epistemological time line. 
 
My suggestion is, in some accordance with the Hegelian line of thought (Hegel, 1977), 
that we must, again, question the contemporary understanding of progress in human 
knowing, which, in much accordance with the philosophy of Auguste Comte (Lenzer, 
ed., 1998) understands the methodologies of the exact sciences to represent a higher 
stage of knowledge than the esoteric practice of wisdom demonstrated in Greek 
Antiquity. And this cannot be done by subscribing to Kuhn’s doubt in Compte’s vision 
of scientific progress as a linear unidirectional development of scientific facts. Thomas 
Kuhn (1996) was preoccupied with pre-scientific metaphysical assumptions that he 
understood to function as an implicit prerequisite for research in the natural sciences. 
He was concerned with institutional science. What we are questioning here, however, is 
rather the level of depth in wisdom, than a linear, material progress in empirical studies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Which	  would	  have	  to	  be	  interpreted	  differently	  if	  our	  ontology	  was	  not	  that	  of	  Comte’s	  hierarchy	  where	  physical	  science	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  very	  basic	  science.	  In	  principle,	  Aristotle	  could	  have	  given	  this	  statement	  meaning	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  deeper	  metaphysical	  point	  of	  departure.	  
	   38	  
and the formation of logical deductive hypotheses. In order to understand this question 
proper, we must view progress rather in line with Hegel, as the gradual progression of 
spirit implementing itself in society and developing through this process. It is our 
expectation that the philosophical epistemological line and the academically derived 
epistemes will tell us different stories, when it comes to the implementation and 
development of collective spirit in society. We will, however, as part of the new 
vocabularies presented in this project, not take the implicit ontological division between 
the ideal and material reality that is understood to be basic in Hegel’s philosophy at face 
value. We will question and seek to overcome the dichotomy between these mutually 
exclusive oppositions, which we also find as an ontological prerequisite in much newer 
philosophy. 11  We must thus localize the implementation of a spiritual collective 
development through an ontology that can encompass both the concrete, material as 
well as the immaterial level. 
 
Since esoteric approaches and metaphysical elements have been widely suppressed 
because of the recent domination of logical positivism and overall instrumental 
approaches in science and technology, due to the actuality of the agora and the market 
place being the most powerful centre of modern global societies, it is my observation 
that we have become blind to the depth of ontology, the value of wisdom, and its wider 
implications for all further insight. It is my expectation that questions of subjectivity 
and consciousness cannot be answered by taking a superficial, and human-centred, 
materialistic and so-called objective ontological position, such as that of much scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  philosophy	  of	  Karl	  Marx	  is	  for	  instance	  understood	  to	  be	  materialistic,	  as	  opposted	  to	  Hegel’s	  philosphy,	  which	  was	  idealistic.	  Plato’s	  philosophy	  was	  ideal,	  whereas	  Aristotle	  aimed	  at	  implementation	  of	  knowledge	  into	  the	  materially	  existing	  social	  world.	  
	   39	  
practice today; it must seek into the depth of new ontological dimensions, and establish 
a humble relation to nature as something bigger than human beings and human 
societies. This is where the re-actualization of the general and abstract ponderings of the 
generative philosopher becomes relevant. 
 
3.1 Epistemes, philosophical epistemologies, and current disciplinary divides 
So what, more concretely, forms the epistemes in academic institutions today? When it 
comes to giving a superficial overview of the most important works and philosophers in 
philosophy of science, we typically begin with the ideal philosophy of Plato. From here, 
we move on to Aristotle, who is understood as a central figure that delivered terms, to 
which we still subscribe today, even in times of paradigm shift, when a shift within 
particular disciplines (like New Media in the human sciences) needs articulation. From 
here, we move onwards to central characters such as Copernicus, Keppler, Galileo, and 
Newton, when it comes to natural philosophy, and Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and 
Heidegger when it comes to philosophy on rational thinking and phenomenology. 
Underlining the essential part of empiricism, the philosophies of Francis Bacon, George 
Berkeley, John Locke and David Hume are typically considered central (Brier, 2005). 
When it comes to the period between approximately 1400-1700, the stride 
between rationalism and empiricism was prevalent. As a footnote to this, it is interesting 
to notice that we find this stride in another form in pre-Socratic thought, where 
philosophers did not agree upon whether knowledge should be primarily empirical, or 
based on pure esoteric speculation. And this might prove the stride to be a basic human 
conflict, rather than historically conditioned. The on-going question has been, whether 
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true knowledge comes first and foremost from reason (inwards directed) or from 
sensuous (outwards directed) experience. Thereby we have a clear subject-object 
dichotomy that is often being pursued in logical causality of explanations underlying 
much current theory of human subjectivity (Zahavi; Gallagher). This question is also 
essential, when we are trying to understand the ontological depth in socio-cultural 
epistemes. But, although we are talking about a general subject-object divide that has 
persisted through historical time, let us not, however, be confuse concepts such as 
‘rationalism’ and ‘esoteric speculation’ with each other, thinking that they form the 
same level of depth in knowing – even if both approaches focus on the inner subjective 
level. As a preliminary thesis, we could say that while reason would rely on the intellect 
and its cognitive capacity based on logic, esoteric speculation would present a wider, 
however, yet undefined potential for inner mind travelling beyond the functions of the 
logical mind. 
 
A recent focus on still more sub-disciplinary specialization within 20th century science 
has led to the contemporary situation, where increased separation between fields, and 
where epistemes have expanded from a point of departure of separation, has resulted in 
a level of complexity and still more advanced vocabularies that cannot meet over the 
borders of disciplinary fields. This divide prevents us from forming the kind of 
vocabularies and discourses that would be adequate in order to grasp something such as 
human consciousness. As I encounter the problem, however, it is exactly in the 
intersection point between physics, biology, human- and social sciences that we must 
find our contemporary human subject. The failure to see commonalities and overlaps 
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between fields is what makes us indifferent to central aspects of our own humanity. 
Simultaneously, however, disciplinary specialization has delivered new research 
techniques and ground-breaking results, in particular when it comes to nanoscience and 
nanotechnology, which has brought new insights, but which do, however, mainly serve 
instrumental and pragmatic goals. Thus, there is a need to re-define and combine the 
two epistemological timelines. 
 
3.2 Historical development of the observer subject 
But let us, shortly, look at the historical line that lies behind the situation of disciplinary 
divides that we see today, with a focus that can enlighten our main point of interest: the 
simultaneous understanding of the observing and knowing human subject as an object 
of research (3rd person perspective) and as a prerequisite for research (1st person 
perspective). We will do so because the disciplinary divide has a history of gradual 
establishment of disciplines over time, which also connects to the historical 
transformation of social structures, according to Qvortrup (2003). All of this affects the 
phenomenology of spirit, and places a perspective on our conception of the human 
subject.12 
 
Qvortrup, while integrating the theory of Luhmann (1988), characterises a shift in social 
structures that moves through three important periods, and which is central in our 
understanding of the human subject: a theocentric-, an anthropocentric-, and a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Here,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  observer,	  however,	  we	  are	  seeking	  a	  conceptualisation	  that	  can	  encompass	  both	  the	  position	  of	  observation,	  knowing	  and	  sensation	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polycentric period. The period of anthropocentrism involves the Renaissance idea that 
the human subject was in the centre. According to Qvortrup there were a belief that the 
human subject had a privileged position as an observer. The Renaissance was also the 
time where there was no clear division between art, science and philosophy, which is 
why the human subject could be viewed from multiple angles. In the polycentric society 
no one observer possesses privileged knowledge. All observers are inside the world that 
they try to observe. Observations become individual, relative and contingent. There is 
no truth, expect that, which serve pragmatic and functional goals. Social systems 
emerge on behalf of contingent self-generative and self-maintaining processes 
(autopoiesis). The deep ontology is that the world is a random place, and that we don’t 
ask ontological questions; autopoietic and emergent systems have no deeper reality 
reference. In Qvortrup's polycentric society, where social systems are functional more 
than stratified (built on hierarchical order), and from a point of view of philosophy of 
science, we can look back and say that we have had a period of domination of the 
natural sciences over the human sciences, and a domination of objectivist paradigms 
that lie close to logical positivism. Furthermore, we have had increased specialisation 
and alienation between researchers of the respective fields. This has, together with the 
formation of the polycentric society, affected the way we implicitly and explicitly 
understand ourselves as knowers, and the role of the human subject in research. Our 
prospect, however, is to localize a human knower who is beyond the position of the 
polycentric vision and positivistic domination, and whose image will appear on a basis 
of transdisciplinary integration, in particular through the vocabularies that we choose. In 
order to connect our meta-level components, however, this post polycentric human 
subject would have to move into a higher order level of subjective centrism, while still 
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being coherent with the intersubjective realm that we call society, having integrated 
experiences from the polycentric era as well. 
 
Academically, it is particularly the paradigmatic break concerning the consequences of 
quantum mechanics that led to the observers problem, which we also see in second 
order cybernetics, along with the problem of representation in the human sciences, 
which appears with post-structuralism and postmodernism, that lead the objective 
foundation of the sciences into serious doubt. Following these lines of development, and 
in particular the implementation of computer- and information technologies at 
practically all levels of society, which has turned the focus of attention towards 
unresolved ontological and practical questions concerning the equality, dichotomy 
and/or symbiosis between machine and human, an increased need to re-consult 
questions of subjectivity, cognition, feeling and mind has arisen. What is complex about 
these developments is that they affect both the inner worlds of the subjects involved, as 
well as the way we can describe them from a third person perspective. It is common in 
academia to think that the third person perspective can be unaffected by the first person 
background. Our claim is that it cannot. If we want to gain a higher degree of self-
understanding, which is here understood as a necessary pre-requisite for knowing per 
se, first person perspectives must be taken into account together with third person 
perspectives. We can no longer hide ourselves behind a veil of assumed objectivity. 
Especially not in disciplines that seek meaning and understanding. However, we do not 
wish to start from scratch in a form of epoché that excludes central academic epistemes. 
We take the present academic horizon actively into account. From this point of 
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departure, we can summarize and define the central characteristics of the two 
epistemological timelines further. 
 
                                            Figure 1: Illustration of the epistemological timelines. 
 
The timelines are viewed in accordance with a degree of stability when it comes to 
ontological depth. Stability in the long term paradigm in spite of the institutionalization 
and institutional revolutions of the short timeline comes from the hypothesis that the 
kind of theoretical thinking produced in the short timeline has not assimilated and 
transgressed the level of ontological depth by which Plato, Aristotle and Pythagoras 
operated, even if Aristotle's stable, organismic cosmos and his strong division between 
the laws of the heavens and the laws of the earth are understood by Brier to have been 
overruled by Newtonian mechanics (Brier, 2005; Brier, 2008). This claim is only 
legitimate if Aristotle by “laws”, “heaven” and “earth” made a concrete, material 
reference. We have no certainty, however, whether Aristotle’s terms could present a 
reference with more ontological depth. What exactly did Aristotle mean by “laws”? And 
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  epistemological	  timeline	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  till	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Short	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  till	  present	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  epistemology	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  divides	  Material,	  positivistic	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  Anti-­‐ontological	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21.	  century	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  through	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what did he mean by “the heavens” and “the Earth” as understood in the original 
context? We experience discrepancies between micro- and macro levels even today? So 
how far did Aristotle’s thought actually reach? Was he solely concerned with a 
materialistic division between the cosmos and the Earth? Or was he referring to deeper 
metaphysical levels and essences? The question is whether adequate interpretations of 
Platonic and Aristotelian concepts within current dominating scientific and 
philosophical paradigms have been reached? When it comes to loaded terms, I am 
referring to the state of ontological depth from which concepts such as the heavens, or 
important terms such as phronesis, techné, aisthesis, and nus have been derived. 
 
Further from characterising a long and a short epistemological timeline, we must take 
into consideration the cultural unconscious of generations, which has influenced on 
interpretations and ontologies dominant in the academic institution. We must take into 
account a possible variability in historico-cultural horizons (to borrow a perspective 
from Gadamer, 2004), which would have formed the foundation for adaptation of these 
loaded terms. It quickly becomes obvious that these variables do not present one easily 
detectable common ontological level that is stable across geographies, cultures or 
historical time. But to summon up once again: what I openly question is whether the 
ontologies behind the wisdom presented in Greek Antiquity would have been deeper 
and wider than their on-going interpretations in the knowledge cultures that were to 
follow, and especially present day Western academia. 
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The polycentric society that Qvortrup describes, is, in my view, characterised not only 
by many rationalities based on self-observation and social negotiation, but also by a 
general lack of ontological depth. Evidence of this can be found in the book The 
Concept of the Network Society: Post-ontological Reflections (Qvortrup, et.al., 2007), 
where Bo Kampmann Walther writes of the current state as a state of “post-ontology”. 
In the introduction, Walther presents to the reader a so-called ‘mundanised’ 
understanding of epistemology, which claims that epistemology can no longer ‘think by 
itself’ (meaning that there is no deeper ontological level to provide a basis for 
epistemological horizons). This is strongly inspired by Luhmann, Bateson and second 
order cybernetics, where information is understood as a difference that makes a 
difference, and where understanding is a function that builds upon meaning as 
complexity reduction, but where there is no deeper foundation behind these 
functionalities. Obviously, the state of post-ontology implies that there is no reason or 
insight that can be prescribed to thought itself, because the observer is always already 
an implied part of what s/he observes. This claim, however, has wide implications, and 
as it might appear, I do not subscribe to the idea of a post-ontological condition. I find it 
to be reductive and inadequate when it comes to capturing the potentials and possible 
discrepancies between human thought and the state of the arts of the social level. And it 
closes the potential for viewing the possible discrepancies between the two positions. In 
a way, one could say that at a level of the network society, this claim would relate to the 
conceptual, and mutually exclusive dichotomies of empiricism (matter) versus 
rationalism (mind), or realism (the objective world) versus idealism (the subjective 
world), where Walther is seeking the dominance of a pragmatic kind of intellectual 
empiricism and/or realism (objective materialism). 
	   47	  
The hypothesis that I seek to articulate is not based on a Postmodern perspective, which 
typically counter poses the idea of irreversible progress as part of an overall 
epistemological pathway in Western cultures, which Lyotard (1984) in his conception 
of postmodernism originally emphasized. Bohm and Peat (1989) wrote of creative 
waves in history, such at those of Ancient Egypt, Greek Antiquity and the Roman 
Empire. These creative waves could be viewed as peak states in the collective 
experiences of human knowing, where academic paradigms would be strongly 
subordinate to such a perspective. The focus upon other central pillars than Compte’s 
idea of science as progress, and Lyotard’s lack of faith in grand narratives, has 
consequences for our perspective on science and knowledge, affecting the causative 
structure of our basic assumptions. 
 
3.3 The contingency of knowledge, cultures and individuals 
In order to accept that science is not all there is to human knowing, we must understand 
the process of collective human experience as operating with more than one level of 
emergence, which means that knowledge is not one easily definable phenomenon that 
either progresses or moves in random directions. I would suggest that human 
epistemological knowledge13 could be regarded as a multiplicity of processes that 
emerge according to more than one basic evolutionary time scale, and where the idea 
that the academic process leads to the highest level of knowledge is becoming 
increasingly uncertain. In addition to this, and somewhat in the spirit of Luhmann, the 
term contingency comes to play a central role in the learning process of our generative 
philosopher; which, as we recall, involves an accumulation of useful vocabularies in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Where	  knowledge	  is	  based	  in	  insight	  and	  experience	  rather	  than	  accumulation	  of	  data	  and	  facts	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strategies of articulation. Contingency is not necessarily anti-realism, however. It only 
takes the relation between the experiencing language based human subject and reality to 
the next level of complexity. I will extend my understanding of constructivist 
contingency with Peircean pragmaticism, when I introduce Brier's cybersemiotic theory 
in chapter 4. 
 
To Luhmann, communication is what forms society, which makes it a central part of 
social evolution. Therefore, Qvortrup finds that knowing and learning play central roles 
in the formation of social systems and sub-systems, a topic that Qvortrup has 
specifically elaborated on. 14  I expect a deep connection between social learning, 
knowing, and epistemes. To both Luhmann and Qvortrup, social systems are emergent 
and autopoietic, however, without a deeper reference to anything in reality. I would like 
to insert Qvortrup’s idea of knowing and learning, but also a degree of inbuilt will and 
direction within the overall social autopoietic and emergent formation. Contingency in 
knowledge structures concerns individuals, but also social systems at large. They are 
not one to one with each other, but they are necessary pre-conditions for each other. 
This way of viewing it makes it possible for each organized system to be observed as a 
potential identity, which is based on learned knowledge. The system identity inheres a 
relative level of freedom and constraint. This identity differs from Foucault’s discourse 
by inhering an inbuilt telos-like function, due to an implicit element of cognition and 
consciousness. By making this suggestion, we have, of course, transgressed the 
theoretical frame of Luhmann, who would have never accredited consciousness to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Det	  Lærende	  Samfund	  (Qvortrup,	  2001)/The	  Learning	  Society	  (my	  translation),	  and	  Det	  Vidende	  Samfund	  –	  
mysteriet	  om	  viden,	  læring	  og	  dannelse	  (Qvortrup,	  2004)/The	  Knowing	  Society	  –	  the	  mystery	  of	  knowledge,	  
learning	  and	  becoming	  (my	  translation)	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system itself. We have thus levelled our epistemes, and have made them part of a larger 
mechanism, which we do not know in total at this point. However, the implication is 
that, both an individual, a minor intersubjective formation, and a social formation can 
represent a stage of experiential knowing. This viewpoint presents an overall and 
abstract way of looking at the process of human knowing, and its relation to socio-
cultural formations. In stratified societies it was enough to look at the process top-down, 
because knowledge was derived by those in power, and learning implied for the less 
powerful to adapt to the knowledge of the powerful; or to not have any knowledge at 
all. In postmodern society theorists such as Bourdieu, Mouffe, Laclau, and Foucault 
were preoccupied with flattened power structures, and power as a mechanism that lies 
behind the dominance of particular discourses and social formations. In the 
hypercomplex, networked society that characterises our social point of departure, and 
with an increased ease in discursive exchange evoked by social media (among other 
elements), the degree by which non-empowered leaders of discourse can affect common 
processes of epistemological horizons is more open for change than ever. The 
hypothesis placed in this paragraph is that levels of consciousness, thereby ontological 
starting points for knowers, are not equal – which affects insights in ways that are, 
however, not made explicit, and not easily definable. In addition, a higher degree of 
access to articles and research material in open libraries and on the internet, together 
with a possibility for skilled exchange in social media, makes it possible for non-
scholars to accumulate epistemic knowledge while simultaneously being freed from the, 
sometime, rigid constraints of academic method. As much as we can imagine the 
possible fallacies that can happen in such a process, we cannot exclude the potential of 
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skilled knowers developing on this basis. Especially taking wisdom as a necessary 
prerequisite into account. 
On this background, it makes sense to ask the question whether we can 
expect today that knowledge developed in the academic system on the basis of 
traditional academic methodology delivers a higher degree of truth than knowledge 
more freely derived? Here, we are thinking primarily of the free act of philosophy, 
accepting philosophy as a generative activity of thought, which leads to deeper insight? 
 
The combination of social systems, communications and individual versus collective 
contingencies, makes the landscape of knowing complex to consider. But the problems 
that lie inherent in these seemingly opposing phenomena also open up towards the 
possibility of taking a constructive path into a higher-order observation that can 
encompass oscillatory positions and that situate the individual human subject in 
accordance with levels of collectiveness in more than one way. 
 
3.4.1. The individual versus the collective 
During the pursuit of the research presented in this thesis, I have found that the problem 
concerning the relationship between individual and collective colours ways in which we 
perceive the human subject, and the way we construct the causalities of academic 
discourses today. This problem needs to be articulated and solved. I have localised it as 
an implicit part of theories concerning network societies (Taylor, 2001), theories of 
digitally virtual societies (Levy, 1998; Levy, 1997), or even such that are understood to 
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be carried mainly by thought (Bohm, 1994). And I have found it to result in reductive 
versions of the human subject, which are not questioned explicitly. I have discovered 
that a central problem concerning observations based on oscillations between individual 
and socio-cultural formations is that it must be possible to talk of knowing at levels of 
the collective, which is not only characterised by discourse and power formations, but 
rather concerns deeper levels of mind. In order to solve this problem, we must 
simultaneously integrate and transgress borders that lie at the level of distributed 
information, negotiation through collective language games, and their cultural 
mediation: the level of collective mind indicates that cognition and consciousness is 
understood to manifest both at individual and at intersubjective levels. Collective 
cognition and collective consciousness are understood to be, by nature, pre-scientific, 
and pre-artefactual. That, however, does not mean that they are not intentionally 
directed, and present character and qualities. This is why we have earlier talked of 
systems identities. It must further be expected that there are multiple levels of 
intersubjective formation, so that it becomes possible to talk of social cognition or 
social consciousness not only as single wholes, but also as multiple identities that are, 
however, not exclusively defined by their social status (politics, science, or something 
such as Bourdieu’s social capitals to mention but a few examples). The idea of social 
polycentrism gives us the first building brick in order to form such a perspective. 
 
On this basis, I find it necessary to move out of a viewpoint that is based on an implicit 
idea that there would be a static separation between object and observer, and between 
human subject and society at the level of consciousness. This is not a critique of the 
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functional, instrumental and positivist approaches that often dominate the social 
sciences, as much as it is a critique of a space-time relationship that I find to be inherent 
in academic theories at large, which is unrecognized, and which has to do with the basic 
premises that lie behind argumentative structures in academic discourses. Again, the 
static subject-object relation must be shifted with a dynamic and process oriented point 
of view, where everything is connected in space and time through different coordinate 
lines that set up a frame for a contingent rhetorical and narrative structure that could 
also always have been otherwise.15 This has as a consequence that the cause-effect 
rationalities that one would operate with must involve an explicit element of relative 
time; and a relative connection to more than one conception of space as well. 
 
3.5. The necessity of a multi-levelled reality 
In order to be able to articulate a difference between one epistemological horizon and 
the other, I have found it necessary to split reality into more than one realm. I have been 
inspired by the social scientist Kate Forbes-Pitt (2011), who in The Assumption of 
Agency Theory establishes five reality levels. Forbes-Pitt herself is inspired by Roy 
Bhaskar’s (2008) critical realism, in which he breaks with the fear of ontology in the 
social sciences, and presents a paradigm with an open ended ontology. The business 
theorist Fleetwood (2005) has worked further on Bhaskar’s ontological domain, and has 
presented four categories of the ontologically real. The levels established by Forbes-Pitt, 
under these inspirations, are: the artefactually real, the socially real, the ideally real, the 
materially real and the virtually real. The idea of dividing reality into several realms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The term coordinate is used metaphorically, as opposed to mechanism, which I found would be close, but 
misleading. The use of metaphor is not completely accurate, however the closest I could find at the given time.	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makes me able to explain some of the problems that arise, when I seek to move deeper 
into my characterization of the main differences between the long and short-term 
epistemological timelines. It, furthermore releases us from having to view the ideal and 
the material as opposites, and is promising in our request to liberate ourselves from 
stiffened subject-object dichotomies. I have, however, found it necessary to change 
Forbes-Pitts definitions of the reality realms, in particular when it comes to the ideally 
real and the virtually real. I have also found it necessary to add more levels. My 
expectation is that the reality levels can work as one of the basic ontological premises 
that can inform the further learning process of the generative philosopher, and thereby 
broaden her potential for meta-articulation. 
 
I will give a short introduction to how I choose to present these ontological levels, and 
further elaborate on them, when I take them into use in the case studies of Part II of the 
project. The first level refers to the physical-material side of the social realm. It is called 
the artefactually real, and it forms the part of the social realm that involves the 
development of cultural artifacts, such as new technologies, which are understood to 
happen on the basis of knowledge as part of a cultural learning process. With an 
Aristotelian term, we could say that it connects to the concept of techné. Today, the 
artefactually real plays a major role in socio-cultural living and knowing, and affects 
many of our intentional interaction patterns. This is also a main thesis of Forbes-Pitt, 
and it forms a pre-requisite for her idea, named ‘assumption of agency’ (assumption of 
agency relates directly to the role of advanced computers and digital technologies by 
which we interact). While additionally having technology based art and design in mind, 
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we could also say that the artefactually real forms the level of reality, which is the most 
direct material expression of human intent, will. It relies on our imagination and inner 
human desires. And it is my subjective, but skilled, observation that the degree by 
which imaginations, desires and knowledge are expressed in cultural artefacts has 
increased. I will mostly use the concept as a reference to cultural material objects; but 
the digital realities of the computer, the underlying logic by algorithmic coding, and the 
virtual realms connected to digital interfaces and the World Wide Web, are also viewed 
as a level of man made materiality. Besides from the artefactually real, I operate with 
the materially real. The materially real, in the way that I use the concept, represents the 
parts of physical Nature that can be sensed by humans, and which are, however, not 
generated by human intentional will.16 The socially real connects to what Brier, in a 
combination of Wittgenstein's language theory as an overall mechanism that steers our 
mind, together with Luhmann's autopioetic systems of communications, defines as 
socio-communicative autopoietic language games. It presents an overall abstract 
understanding of the social realm. It inheres all social actions that are worth taking into 
consideration in any given case. Like Forbes-Pitt, I also operate with the level of the 
ideally real. To Forbes-Pitt, the ideally real concerns human intentionality (an extended 
version of John Searle’s concept of intentionality) and the general cognitive-ideal 
identity upon which this intentionality is based. My version of the ideally real, besides 
from the centrality of intentionality, integrates main points from the area of cognitive 
semantics as presented by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Turner (1996), Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002), Shore (1996). Thus the idea of conceptual blends, blends in time and 
space, and Idealized Cognitive Models are understood as central to the intentional acts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Thus,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  species	  ”dog”	  is	  a	  product	  of	  nature.	  But	  the	  breading	  of	  particular	  races	  is	  a	  product	  of	  man	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  artefactually	  real.	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of any user of technoetic arts. I do not agree, however, with the way Lakoff and Turner 
present their idea of cognitive building blocks, as well as their perception of time and 
space. A critique of their perception of time and space will be given in Part III, chapter 
two. The way I operate with a virtual reality level is also not equal to Forbes-Pitt’s 
concept of the virtually real, which takes its point of departure in a digital virtuality. We 
find an idea of virtuality where the digital realm is understood as a reality realm in itself 
in Pierre Levy (Levy, 1998), and in Ascott's telematic embrace (Ascott, 2003). In this 
project, however, this digital level belongs to the artefactually real. The virtually real 
thus rather connects to Nature. It represents the intangible level of Nature that cannot be 
captured by referring to the materially real. 
All presented levels of reality are inherent parts of Nature, because Nature is always 
grander than human culture and human thought. Here, I must emphasize that the 
distinction into a levelled reality must of course, in itself, be viewed as a language based 
construct, which aims to serve our intellectual purpose. In reality, these levels would be 
closely interconnected due to a dynamic, looped cause and effect relation, which would 
make it hard to place final demarcation lines, although they do present each their 
individual characteristics. And here we must remember that rhetoric and narrative 
structures are never equal to the reality that we seek to describe. 
 
Once we have our ontological reality levels in place, we can return to our 
epistemological timelines. At the level of the superficial ontologies that arise as 
phronesis is practiced and explored as a part of a wider, socio-cultural establishment, 
which involves the development of the artefactually real through techné (skills and 
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technologies proper) and the socially real through institutions and habitual practices, a 
wide range of changes can be observed. These changes are connected to the three-
dimensional level of a physical-material reality. The long epistemological timeline, 
however, is primarily tied to a relation between the virtually real and the ideally real, 
and has a much more lasting range. 
An example that can illustrate the cleft between ontological truth and the 
material and social realities in a given society, could be if we interpret Plato's 
resentment of human art and techné as a consequence of the fact that there was, at the 
time, not equality between the nature of his actual insight, which was formed in a 
relationship between his cognitive properties and (including cognitive-semantic 
idealised models), which represent the level of the ideally real, and objects captured at 
the level of the virtually real. He thus realised that the possibility for expressing these 
insights truthfully through art, techné, and/or phronesis at the level of the artefactually 
real was low. This suggests a discrepancy between Plato's access to objects at the level 
of the virtually real, and the state of the arts of what was possible at the level of the 
socially- or the artefactually real at the time. By presenting the problem this way, I have 
indicated that thought can move from individual and social minds into matter, but also 
that individual minds can be more or less well tuned to levels of the socially and the 
artefactually real at any given time and place. This means that while there will be 
formations of collective consciousness in a society, the human subject cannot always be 
expected to be positively balanced with different collective formations at a level of 
cognition and consciousness. This premise leads to the assumption that there can be a 
variety of types of discrepancies between individual and the socially- and the 
artefactually real, a relation which is relative in the relation between the individual and 
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the given reality realms. This would especially be so because of our starting point in the 
contingent evolutionary and dynamic formation of social knowledge structures in a non-
stratified society. 
The language of knowing is typically developed and negotiated on the 
basis of dominant institutional paradigms and technological tacit knowledge, while pure 
generative philosophy might have a potential to reach virtual objects not yet captured 
and referenced in academic language games, or distributed in technologies. While 
having abandoned first philosophy, transcendence, metaphysics, and first person 
approaches, the situation today is that we do not have an intra-institutional philosophical 
intertextuality that can respond actively to such problems. 
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Chapter 2: The Epistemological Turn 
 
4.0 Epistemological position of the thesis 
From a preoccupation with the question of how academic and philosophical horizons 
have developed over time, and how concrete canons and their implicit lines of 
causation, together with the increase in disciplinary divides and exclusive vocabularies, 
and from a view upon the processes that have separated deep ontology from everyday 
scientific practice, I will turn to the contemporary context, where I wish to position an 
epistemological starting point for my own project. 
 
So we are situated in the midst of a disciplinary fragmentation of thought, which we 
seek to overcome. Further than that, the integration of new media and digital computers 
in science, and in cultural communications at large, has, in itself, led to the necessity of 
new integrative vocabularies when one seeks to theorize the ways in which 
communication happens. Besides from developing at a fast pace, digital technologies 
influence upon practically all academic activities from research strategies to 
methodologies and distribution of results and further communication in the natural and 
the human sciences. The implementation of new technologies in lifeworlds affects ways 
of knowing and how people experience their everyday lives. And it makes new network 
connections possible, which were formerly under physical and geographical constraints. 
As this condition is to be intellectualized and integrated further into our theoretical 
contemplations, there is undoubtedly a demand for vocabularies that can cross fields, 
and allow for an articulation that can take the situation explicitly into account. 
	   59	  
N. Katherine Hayles was one of the first theorists to direct attention to a lack of 
adequate vocabularies when it comes to the intersection area between analogue and 
digital media, and who sought to bring concepts from physical science into the 
humanities, in particular in her reference to chaos and complexity theory (Hayles, 1991; 
Hayles, 2002). She received massive critiques for her attempt at the time. The critiques 
are one example of the difficulties involved as one seeks to bring terminologies from 
one scientific branch to the other. Specialized scientists rarely favour the use of terms 
developed specifically to induce exactness in the language of their field, in what they 
consider a context completely alien to their own. It means that the very same term, 
developed to support exactness, gains another meaning because of its placement within 
a different context. 
 
To get back to the influence of digital technologies on science and distribution of 
scientific results and insights (such as the nano-technology exhibition presented at the 
Los Angeles Museum of Art in 2003. Hayles, (ed., 2004), it is particularly the level of 
augmented- and mixed reality interfaces that form a point of interest in this project, 
mainly because it brings with it new levels of embodiment to the reading process, and it 
complicates our understanding of the constitution of the material world at the level of 
the artefactually real. Lakoff and Johnson's metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) 
took its point of departure in a three-dimensional physical world, with artefactual 
objects; however, digital and electronic augmentation was not taken into account. 
Digital augmentation at socio-cultural levels gives an extra dimension to the interaction 
process between human and world, and inserts extra layers in the experiential process 
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from which metaphors can arise: because embodied interaction now happens in a world 
loaded with digital virtual objects that are in themselves mediated and metaphorical. 
Thus, embodied experience is no longer as simple to understand as if we view it only in 
relation to the body and a world of non-computational, non-virtual, static objects. This 
is also a reason why I do not find the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962; 
1963; 1964) directly applicable, although his work of integrating a wider understanding 
of perception and embodiment, and thereby intentionality is an important movement in 
phenomenology that, to some extend, can address certain issues concerning embodied 
interaction. Furthermore, according to Forbes-Pitt, more advanced stages in the 
development of digital interfaces and Information Technologies for public purposes 
present a general appeal to users that make them act as if technological interfaces 
presented a level of agency. This is what she calls the assumption of agency. 
Embodiment in reading processes, and assumption of agency, all changes the way the 
reader cognitively and intentionally relates to the text. “Text” is one of the central 
concepts in this thesis that allows me to observe installations, organisms and other 
conceptually drawn distinctions and relate them to each other. So already here, we can 
make clear that text is understood as a broad term that encompasses multiple kinds of 
communication. I will write more about the concept of text in chapter three, which 
carries the title Technoetic Arts. 
 
Further than that, digital technologies have offered the possibility for approaches in 
writing and knowledge generation, which are based on advanced modelling, and which 
is generally of a more creative and forward directed kind (such as design), as opposed to 
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the retrospective orientation typically presented in academic print theory. This is so in 
particular when it comes to art-science distributions of new knowledge. Modelling and 
creative integrative solutions brought by through digital technologies forms yet another 
consequence of the new situation that places demand on existing vocabularies to change 
and/or expand. Having this situation in mind, it is fair to say that many research 
questions that could be relevant today, and which are founded on disciplines that 
actively integrate new technologies, demand theoretical conceptualisations that are 
transdisciplinary, and can stretch over the level of forward directed creativity that new 
technologies allow for. 
 
Don Ihde (2009) is one theoretician, who has taken this problem actively into account. 
Ihde has proposed an epistemological point of departure that commences at a point later 
than the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl (1988; 2001), Heidegger (1977) and 
Merleau-Ponty (1962; 1963; 1964). In order to form the post-phenomenological 
position, Ihde integrates philosophy of technology, which changes the basic conception 
of how we, as humans, are situated in the world. Heidegger did consider technologies to 
be a central element in a phenomenological “dasein”. However, he was first and 
foremost critical of new technologies (Heidegger, 1954). To Ihde, perception and 
embodiment is understood as intimately related to the use of technologies, also at a level 
of scientific epistemology. Ihde uses astronomy as a case study, where recent inventions 
of telescopes, satellites and robots that can travel in space, have become central 
instruments for extended perception and conceptualization. With spectral analysis, for 
instance, it becomes possible to perceive light frequencies, and complex patterns of 
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light frequencies, which are then transcribed into chemical formulas for further analysis. 
These chemical analyses decide our understanding of physical conditions on planets, 
stars and galaxies far from us. We cannot come to these results without the technologies 
that allow an extension of the capacity of our senses as of now. Technologies thus 
mediate our realities. The main claim, as opposed to Latour, who focussed mostly on 
processes of scientific practice, is that the immediate, phenomenological experience of 
human beings, also in lifeworlds, is being viewed as augmented by advanced 
technologies, and that this changes our phenomenological point of departure. The 
intimate connection between technology, perception and cognition forms a central 
point, when talking about the epistemological turn as an advent worthy of taking 
seriously into account. 
 
For now we can conclude that we have a two-sided problem, which concerns 
disciplinary fragmentation on the one hand, and a state of the arts that tells of a socio-
cultural condition where digital technologies have become almost symbiotically 
integrated inscriptions (to borrow a term from Bruno Latour, 1979) in experiential 
processes. So there is an overall need to generate frameworks that can bring philosophy 
of science forward into an integrative form that can also take into account the influence 
of new technologies on processes of human knowing. 
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4.1. The four epistemological pathways as background for a new, semiotic starting 
point 
Before I move further into considerations concerning new technologies, I will present 
our epistemological problem in the spirit of chapter one, with the aim to point towards a 
new starting point as opposed to the directions of former epistemological pathways. 
After that, I will return to a treatment of the problem connected to digital technologies, 
and how these affect epistemologies, ways in which we experience and come to know. 
 
Søren Brier (2008) has in his cybersemiotic theory characterised the overall 
development of Western epistemologies in what he calls the cybersemiotic star. The 
cybersemiotic star is a model in which he presents four major epistemological pathways 
that have historically been taken in the knowledge cultures of the Western world. The 
four pathways are: embodiment, coupled to organic evolution (which relates to the life 
sciences and biology), physical nature, coupled to Big Bang cosmology (which relates 
to physics), the other and language, coupled to the history of culture (relates to cultural-, 
social studies, and art studies), and the inner mental world, coupled to existential 
development (which relates mostly to philosophy). A main point in Brier's theory is that 
theoretical speculations ought to take their starting point in the middle of the 
cybersemiotic star, rather than in one arm only; and it is important to not let any one 
arm of the star dominate, when it comes to underlying ontologies, which form a 
foundation for explanations. The starting point, when one begins in the middle of the 
star is overall semiotic, as opposed to the current situation, where physical science and a 
materialistic positivistic world view has generally been viewed as the most basic 
scientific discipline. This has coloured explanations in fields other than those of 
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physics. It is so in particular because the Big Bang theory explains the universe from 
it’s beginning, where human biology, mind and culture are viewed as late appearances. 
If the Big Bang theory is close to truth, then, it follows naturally that physics is the most 
basic science. Before human mind came physical and chemical realities, processes that 
led to the formation of dust, the gradual formation of stars and planets, and, eventually 
the appearance of Earth, and then, eventually, the formation of organic life from simple 
bacteria, and late in that process: the human species. For this reason, all other 
disciplines are dominated by the basic approach of physical science, and this 
domination has been a part of what forms scientific (and philosophical) epistemologies 
today. 
 
Brier proposes a starting point, where questions and solutions are sought in an act of 
careful extrapolation from each of the four arms of the star, working out integrative 
transdisciplinary narratives (use of the word narrative is mine, not Brier's) on this basis. 
This means that physical science and its ontologies and conclusions do not have any 
immediate domination over explanations in any one of the four arms of the star, or over 
the holistic, integrative theories that follow from this approach. When it comes to exact 
methodologies, none follow from the cybersemiotic paradigm as of yet, because the 
theory is still in need of further intersubjective negotiation in relevant academic 
communities in order for actual methodologies to be derived. 
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                                          Figure 2: The Cybersemiotic Star 
 
To start a research process in the middle of the cybersemiotic star involves a state of 
insecurity. It does so, because the semiotic and transdisciplinary ontological starting 
point, which represents an equal value of each four arms, has not yet been tested, not 
even by Brier himself. 
So, we have localised a problem concerning our ontological and 
methodological starting point, which, however, justifies the choice of a forward directed 
exploratory methodology and an emphasis on articulation, words and loaded terms, 
rather than a retrospect orientation built upon analysis through critical argumentation. 
Besides from this, we also have to place our insights concerning the post-
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phenomenological situation in accordance with Brier’s star. The Italian Engineer, 
Giuseppe Longo, takes a slightly different perspective on the problem of how new 
technologies affect the process of human knowing (Longo, 2009). Longo considers the 
problem from a perspective of engineering practice. From this point of departure, he 
writes of the relationship between the role of theory (with Aristotle: theoria) versus the 
role of practice (with Aristotle: phronesis), which he finds to change drastically with the 
central roles of information and communication technologies in science and society at 
large. 
 
4.2. The impact of new technologies and technoscience on human knowing 
Longo has suggested that the development of information technologies, and their role 
and level of complexity in practices of engineering, are causing what he calls an 
empirical turn, which first and foremost relies on the experience and accumulation of 
knowledge that arises from the very process of developing new technologies. In this 
understanding, knowledge is not only derived through theoretical speculation. It is as 
much generated in the course of carrying out practical processes relating directly to the 
invention and use of new technologies (the level of the artefactually real), whereby 
existing technologies and new inventions are mixed in a work form that he calls 
bricolage. Bricolage is a creative forward directed design process, where existing and 
new components are mixed into forms with a new and different potential. Such creative 
processes generate new experiences, which become part of an epistemological horizon. 
This is especially true of engineering processes, but also of processes in the newer 
sciences, such as for example nano science and synthetic biology. This level of 
experience affects the epistemological situation of scientific institutions further. Longo 
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claims that engineering is not just applied science. It has a progressive nature and a 
logic of its own that extends from the knowledge that can be derived in theoretical 
practice. In this way, engineering practices that are preoccupied with developments of 
new technologies gain an epistemological effect. Thus, according to Longo, they 
become part of the knowledge generation process itself. They augment our knowledge, 
and present yet another indication of a shift in epistemological pathway. The pathway 
that integrates developments and creative practises based on new technologies directly 
into the epistemological horizon is not presented as a pathway in itself in Brier's star. 
And the practice of developing new technologies as a part of the generation of new 
knowledge is not made an explicit problem in Brier's cybersemiotic theory (which does, 
however, have a whole section connected to library science and information 
technologies). 
In Longo, technologies and creative design are placed in the center of 
epistemological developments, and this results in a shift in the role of science and 
speculation as the main area in which knowledge has been typically derived. Longo’s 
main claim is that whereas theory has had its legitimation as prior to technological 
development, today, technological development and wisdom in practice overrules 
theoretical practice in fastness and scope. 
In my view, Longo’s article does not form a proposal that rests upon 
fetishism of technology. It rather presents a practical implication of the current 
technological development. Longo's suggestion places engineers, designers, and artists 
in roles, where we must understand their work to deeply affect the overall 
epistemological situation, and question the dominance of theoretical science. The 
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important part of this claim being, as I see it, the fact that creative, forward directed 
processes gain a wide influence, when it comes to attaining new knowledge. 
 
I find that Longo proposes a legitimate claim that is worth taking into consideration, 
when one is trying to understand how knowledge is developed at a level of episteme. If 
Longo is right, then current epistemes would have transformed from mere literal 
discourse to tacit knowledge of inventors and users, negative effects being internet 
protocol (Galloway, 2004), for example. The development of the artefactually real to 
involve so-called intelligent technologies (and the engineering processes of inventing 
new technologies and creative strategies on the basis of specific technologies), does 
make an impact on human experience at both intra- and extra-institutional levels. 
Underlying the idea of an epistemological turn is also the insecurity of the state of the 
arts of institutional divisions into faculties and disciplines, and interferences between 
social sub-systems (science, politics, law, art, all negotiated in the Agora; the market 
place) that seems to be a growing unresolved factor in contemporary, global societies. 
The latter is presented in part by what I referred to in chapter one as power negotiation 
in the Agora, the post-academic situation, and newer discussions concerning the 
relationship between art and science.17 This adds new problems to the problem of 
epistemological pathways presented by Brier's cybersemiotic star. 
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It is the general impact of new technologies on practically all human knowing that, in 
my experience, has left traditional philosophical canons without a genuine potential, 
even if relevant philosophies of technology, embodiment, metaphysics of/and time, and 
linearity as a problem in knowing (Heidegger, Ponty, Bergson, Deleuze, Guattari, et.al.) 
can still add to the overall picture. No single philosophy presented, however, can truly 
encompass the equation that brings together human and technology in a close 
relationship that affects both parts on a mutual basis. This is probably so, because they 
have been thought out at times where the computer and social media did not exist in the 
form that we know it today, and thus in a line of discrepancy between the virtually- and 
ideally real that they reached at the time, and the artefactually real that forms the 
conditions of today. 
By reference to Don Ihde (2009), however, I would like to point out what I 
regard as a change in ontological position of these former philosophies. It is that 
phenomenology as well as philosophy that explicitly considers intuition, metaphysics 
and evolution, is today being implemented at a practical level (phronesis) by conceptual 
inspiration and application into the design of new creative interfaces, or in digital and 
technoetic arts. As central ideas of such philosophies (in particular the ideas of 
embodied phenomenology by Maurice Merleau-Ponty) are expressed, tested and used at 
a level of tangible or digital virtual and electronically (or bioengineered) material bases, 
ways of experiencing them change drastically. It is simply not the same to write of a 
possible biological energetic entity called a bion (Wilhelm Reich's idea of a micro-level, 
bio-energetic entity that operates in living organisms distributed in Adam Brown’s 
artwork, Bion, which will be discussed in Part II, chapter one.), and, on the other hand, 
to test the idea of the bion through a dynamic, kinetic material sculpture that 
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demonstrates the possible behaviour of bions in real life, and which can be experienced 
by embodied interaction. I am not hereby indicating that the exploration of 
philosophical concepts by technoetic art demonstrates a truer version of the concept. I 
am rather suggesting that the testing of ideas in real life processes in the form of cultural 
artefacts present a new level of the artefactually real, and they present, when they are at 
their best, a combination of existing ontologies with new ontologies, presented in 
material forms. I will treat the topic of technoetic arts and its relation to the different 
levels of reality in Part I, chapter three, and in the respective case studies made in Part II 
of the project. 
 
It is today possible to find genuine philosophical speculations relating directly to the 
Natural Sciences (such as David Bohm in physics, and Rupert Sheldrake in biology, 
both of which we must notice, have not formed their philosophies as part of an intra-
institutional, academic practice, because they have both been at odds with contemporary 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion at the level of the scientific matrixes to which 
they have belonged). Recent philosophies which relate to the different branches of 
science, such as for instance philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology and the 
Natural Sciences at large, along with philosophy of art, which implement technology 
and the state of the arts of the information society, have not truly been canonized within 
the field of Philosophy of Science at the present moment. One consequence of this is, I 
find, that philosophy has, at an institutional basis, lost its power to ask and re-ask 
questions of our common ontological and metaphysical foundations in an original way. 
Institutional philosophy today is without a true potential to take up the important and 
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necessary tasks of speculating once more about the deep questions of what truth is, what 
human knowledge is, and how we relate to the universe at large, if we no longer rely on 
the Big Bang theory and physical science as the dominant ontology and epistemology 
upon which all other explanations can rely. And at the same time, such questions have 
been discussed for instance by quantum physicist David Bohm, and in the new fields of 
semiotics and biosemiotics, some of the central questions of Philosophy of Science 
concerning how we know and what constitutes knowledge are being asked again 
(Deely, 2005). This means that one has to look outside the departments of philosophy to 
find theories that are applicable when taking up these questions in a contemporary 
situation. It is necessary to gather these genuine, philosophical contributions at a basis 
that is fully open and does not make a divide between disciplines or intra- or extra-
institutional positions. 
 
4.3. Epistemologies based on print culture and Information Technologies 
It is the transfer of systematised intuition, rationality and overall insight into creative, 
material and social levels of reality that makes the difference, when it comes to moving 
through former philosophies, or seeking a platform from which to think philosophically. 
I am thus not only talking about assimilation and internalization at the level of a socio-
cultural collective state of mind, when it comes to the argument concerning the 
usefulness of philosophies such as those presented by Bergson and Ponty today. I am 
also talking about the time span that exists from the advent of a mental concept to its 
creative expression, where knowledge is assimilated at a material level. This level is an 
important part of the modern, Western semiotic landscape, since artefacts and small 
environments with intelligent and responsive behaviour become still more ubiquitous. 
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Longo claims that human beings develop through intersubjective, socio-cultural 
exchange in symbiosis with technological developments. By taking a semiotic 
perspective, I argue that the developments of cultural artefacts and communicational 
expressions in symbiosis with new technologies must be viewed as a higher degree of 
complexity in the patterns of cultural semiosis. Cultural artefacts and communications 
would involve all from artistic sculptures, robots and new inventive interfaces, to the 
architectural design of public spaces, libraries, educational spaces, and art or science 
museums. 
 
Whether one is opposed to technological developments or not, one thing is for sure: 
creative, technological invention, and the augmentation of everyday situations of 
communication will hardly stop. And the state of the arts is already so that academic 
fields, in particular the social and human sciences, necessarily must take this 
development properly into account. In particular when it comes to ways in which they 
affect, and are affected by, our individual, intersubjective, cognitive and conscious 
minds. If cultural developments will continue to involve still more advanced 
behavioural sculptures, responsive architectures, and face and speech recognition 
interfaces, to place but a few examples, our signification spheres will become 
significantly different from those of our ancestors. I have here used the term, 
signification sphere. The term stems from Brier's cybersemiotic theory. It implies the 
total amount of significations produced by members of a given culture, on the basis of 
their specific umwelts. What is particularly significant of the signification sphere that I 
seek to characterise is that it has a high level of materiality, and a shorter time frame 
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between mental thought and material manifestation of that self-same thought. One 
characteristic of the artefactual level of the signification sphere is, thus, that it is both 
complex and “alive”, full of interaction interfaces that are generated on behalf of human 
experience, mental concepts and accumulated skill. And furthermore, because there is a 
fairly high level of creative expression, it seems fair to expect that we will, continuously 
and to a still higher degree, interact with projections that stem more or less directly from 
us. To a still higher degree will our cultures present an image of our own thoughts, 
imaginations and desires, and we will interact with them as objects external to 
ourselves. For this reason, it is central to increase self-awareness, which concerns being 
aware of the prerequisites for the cultural signification spheres, and the thoughts on 
behalf of which, we create. Therefore, I talk not only of self-observation as presented in 
Qvortrup's hyper complex society, but of extended self-observation. 
A culture of knowledge, which was centrally based upon a culture of print 
book communication, is today being transformed into a culture of knowledge, where 
knowledge is also materially embedded. This extends our ways of communication in 
opposition to a time, where the print text and spoken rhetoric were the main medium. It 
also presents a time where not all knowledge retrieved is written down, or formed in 
accordance with the rhetorical tradition of linear print textuality. 
 
As viewed from a perspective of semiotics, and at the level of the individual, we could 
say that the more creative and expressive freedom individual humans in a society gain, 
the more they are able to not only understand, but to signify on behalf of their own 
umwelts, and their own understanding of such. With a personal interpretation of a 
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concept from biologist Jesper Hoffmeyer, who is a central contributor to the new 
paradigm of biosemiotics, I could say that individuals gain increased semiotic freedom 
with digital technologies, which involves tools for mediated distribution of personal 
communications offered at fairly low costs (book print, video distribution, blogs, social 
media), and free expression through social media. As individuals gain a higher degree 
of mastery over their personal creative expressions and understandings, and over their 
personal access to information, it also becomes necessary to extend the degree of 
reflectivity that is now needed to navigate society and which already increased with 
postmodernism. Taking the constructivist element of the formation of societies through 
language seriously, we could say that with increased semiotic freedom follows 
increased responsibility, because no matter how small you are, and as Massumi argued, 
theoretical formulations become productive of society. This is where the moral 
philosophy of Aristotle, involving philosophy in practice, also called “phronesis”, could 
be reconsidered. Even Qvortrup (2003), through Luhmann, operates with the functional 
necessity love and trust in social communications, although traditionally, these 
phenomena are related to moral and ethical questions. And to Habermas (2001), the 
enactment of Kant’s practical reason in the lifeworld was essential. So, while expecting 
love and trust to form central functional elements that optimise social communications 
in a society with higher degrees of semiotic freedom in the lifeworlds, it is fair to expect 
a necessity of individuals to enact practical reason in order to generate a “good” society; 
which was important to both Aristotle and to Kant, but which, by leaving ethical and 
moral questions out of science, we seem to have forgotten. While the assembly of 
individual nodes in a social network could be said to form an overall living structure, 
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we must expect this living structure to emerge on the basis of the choices made in the 
contingent space of idiosyncratic individuality. 
 
Thinking of Massumi’s (2002) reciprocal relation between the evolution of culture and 
nature, we understand that we cannot separate nature and social networks in any 
definitive ways. After Postmodernism and a domination of constructivist approaches in 
the social sciences, this idea is, however, rarely taken into consideration in social 
network theory18. But we can allow ourselves to hypothesise that in handling individual 
semiotic freedom, as well as combining individual semiotic freedom into common 
signification spheres, the relation to the wider nature in which all these networks are an 
embedded part, does become essential to re-consider. Defining and solving the problem 
of the climate crisis is one example that clearly shows how collaborative, cross-
planetarian solutions are necessary. We can name this kind of action “collective 
intelligence”. If societies over the globe are to seriously cut down CO2 emissions, there 
is a need for collective action, where individuals can perform self-reflectivity (this kind 
of decision demands reflective action in each individual involved), and from here a re-
evaluation of the ontological understanding of human versus nature; because, as we 
have now seen: nature strikes back. Social processes are directly reliant upon processes 
in nature. 
While individuals in Western societies gain higher degrees of increased 
semiotic freedom where they can enact and develop ethical and moral kinds of reason, 
the paradox is that rational and instrumental paradigms still dominate at the institutional 	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level: which includes academia. However, already in 1987, Peat and Bohm wrote of the 
repression of creativity in thought by the academic system. They suggest that creativity 
does not only belong to the genius, but is a potential in the individual if the academic 
system would encourage such strategies in institutional work and education (Peat & 
Bohm, 1987). To regard such a problem, we need not necessarily return to Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s cultural pessimism (1987). Because suppressed creativity might have a 
different face in the networked knowledge society of today, than it had in pre-war, 
industrial societies. 
These are but two examples of why it is important to establish a self-
reflective philosophical meta-consideration. And in a time of deep paradigm shift, this 
consideration needs to be more than science, more than politics, more than economics, 
and more than existing social norm: it needs, in its first instance, to be philosophical. 
 
What I want to suggest, is that even in a time where new technologies become a kind of 
knowledge in themselves, and practical development becomes part of the 
epistemological tradition, philosophy could still be viewed as a way of speculatively 
imagining, before actualizing ideas, or in research, before being able to materially verify 
or pragmatically make use of philosophical thought. As Nicolescu (2002) writes, the 
quantum level of the world penetrates our imagination, and at this reality level connects 
us directly to the external world; just like Massumi (2005), with many others, writes of 
the quantum level as delivering potential that can be actualised. Then we can say, for 
one: if some truth exists merely within the imagination; and if on the other hand 
contemporary developments in academia present us to new disciplines (digital design, 
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nano-technology, synthetic biology, practice based art research) that demand a forward 
directed productive methodology (Massumi), it is necessary to be able to conceptualize 
on behalf of the imagination. Here, I will suggest that there can be a range of 
discrepancies that rest upon our five levels of reality, which will mean more or less 
potential between philosophical thought and the socially and artefactually real, 
however, that a lot of artefactual manifestation is based on human imagination and 
desire (supported here by Punt and Pepperell, 2006). If there were academic research 
aimed to cast light on this topic, there would most probably be a range of new epistemes 
to be formed that cast further light on the relationship between historical speculative 
thought and their later manifestation into social realities. 
 
So not only is there a shift in the relation between the mental substances that have been 
part of the mentioned fragmenting of knowledge, but there are now tendencies of new 
dynamic, cross-disciplinary and cross-institutional interaction patterns. What interests 
me the most here, however, is the transformation of thought from one kind of context, 
namely that of conceptual thinking at the level of the ideally real, into the empirical and 
useful application of the same kind of thought at the level of the artefactually real. 
Thoughts of the same quality, or of similar meaning, are being shared and applied in 
multiple ways of communication: as print theory, or as actual social structures and 
types, or as physical materializations. And in my view, if these lines of communication 
and mutual effect are to become implemented, philosophy is left with new occupations, 
new territories, and new thought geographies (to use a spatial-material metaphor) to 
establish.  
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There is, of course, a problem, which can best be described by the idea of the Agora, 
and the fast, communicational exchange rate between social systems. At concrete social 
levels, technoscience not only works; it is also often established in close cooperation 
with economical and political strategies. Areas such as Nano science, Synthetic Biology 
or Biological Engineering typically address needs for financial growth, which shows a 
tendency to, at times, overrule the humble, fallible goal of research to establish and 
negotiate truth on its own terms. One result of this strive is that philosophy and art gain 
less validation as research in itself. This can result in a closed horizon when it comes to 
understanding more of nature on nature's own premises, so to speak. Thus, the 
resistance to paradigm shift at the deep, institutional level could have a close connection 
to such circumstances. In a time of financial crisis, solutions that can support growth are 
valued over solutions that are less applicable to here and now situations. Thus, at the 
level of the Agora, the deep paradigm shift that this thesis claims is an essential part of 
the contemporary situation has not yet truly shown. And it is my thesis that philosophy 
and art play a role in formulating the first instances of the shift in ontology and general 
mentality that could lie within this paradigm shift. 
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Chapter 3: Technoetic Arts 
 
5.0 Technology assisted art as a contribution to knowledge cultures 
In the first section, I declared that this project is mainly meant as a contribution to the 
field of Philosophy of Science and as an inspiration to art practitioners. Further than 
that, it integrates Technology-assisted art viewed as communications with equal value 
to such of theoretical analysis and theory generation. The background for this choice 
lies mainly in the reasons argued for in the previous chapter, concerning the 
epistemological turn. Technology-assisted art is understood to add significantly to the 
evolutionary formation and development of social signification spheres. Social 
signification spheres are not only the product of human cultures. They also form a realm 
of experience for people who are immersed into them. 
 
In the previous chapter, I chose to characterise signification spheres as being alive. By 
using the term “alive”, I do not mean that they are alive in the biological sense. Rather, 
the term is used as a metaphor that refers to signification spheres as being complex, 
having emerged on behalf of dynamic structures, which are, in themselves, in constant 
motion; something, which is intertwined in networks, and which springs in and out of 
form, much in line with Latour’s (1979) network ontology, except the main actors 
considered here are humans, neither things, nor machines. This leads me to suggest the 
concept “behavioural signification sphere”. In this sense, signification spheres can be 
understood as a formation of any size, which can be characterised by having intentional 
behaviour. These behaviours arise at a supra-individual level. It is my claim that within 
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the overall signification spheres of intercultural, knowledge cultures, technology 
assisted arts would have a central place. They might not be materially, or even 
conceptually obvious as communicational exchange happens in the Agora. However, 
since I choose to keep a focus upon technology assisted arts, it is my aim to demonstrate 
how these communications can be viewed as texts that hold condensed symbolic 
information and reference to a current and near future state of the arts situation, 
concerning the place and character of knowledge in the signification sphere. They 
therefore distribute a kind of knowledge that cannot be found elsewhere. 
If art is viewed as research, and as a contribution to knowledge generation 
at large, however, is not equal to scientific knowledge, it has a range of consequences 
for the overall understanding of the social realm, including the institutional level, to take 
this stance seriously. But before I address this issue further, I must define technoetic 
arts, which is a type of interactive, technology assisted contemporary art. 
 
First of all, technoetic arts, which is the term I will end up using as I move through my 
case studies, is but one category of technology assisted arts in total. There are numerous 
other categories that could be referred to, when addressing contemporary art. Today we 
still talk of literature, painting and sculpture, as were they the first and foremost 
categories of art. But not only have they been challenged by something such as Sol 
LeWitt’s conceptual art, or Nicolas Bourriaud’s relational art; the classical categories 
are also developing and morphing into new shapes based on the active exploration of 
new media and technologies. The recent development does not imply, then, that there is 
no longer something such as painting, theatre or literature. It rather implies that the kind 
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of art that presents an equation where social evolutionary tendencies are in tune with 
natural evolutionary tendencies is not to be found first and foremost within these 
categories. By this I refer to a point of reference, where new dynamical objects come 
into expression in signification spheres, and which expand current experiential realms at 
the levels of the ideally- and artefactually real. I find this kind of expansive art to have 
better footing within the realm of technology-assisted arts than within traditional 
categories of art, because the implementation of new technologies often allow 
experiments with more complex structures, an altered sensuous interface appeal, a 
multisemiotic structure, and a composition that allows a connective and dynamic 
paradigm, also on the material side. This, of course, refers well to the epistemological 
turn, where technologies are understood to be a central part of cultural experience, 
communication, formation of new epistemological narratives, and ways of coming to 
know. On the one hand, there is a movement in art, where existing categories remain, 
but become augmented by the use of new technologies. On the other hand, there are 
categories that emerge directly out of the specificities of new technologies, such as 
mobile phones (telematic art), the Internet (internet art), databases (database art), 
biotechnologies (bio art) and more (Paul, 2003). Furthermore, technology-assisted art 
not only expresses and relates to contemporary developments in technology and 
science. It also, by its experimental approach, demonstrates, tests and produces 
metaphors that we (can) think by. In technology assisted arts, genres are not only 
developed at a rather fast rate, but many times genres overlap, transmute, and are 
combined through existing and new strategies, in still new creative ways. The fast 
categorical escape shows an invigorating sign of non- or meta-categorical creativity, 
when it comes to the institutional levels of knowledge. In this sense, recalling Adorno 
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and Horkheimer, we could claim that contemporary art is emancipatory in the sense that 
it escapes the fragmentation that Bohm and Peat complained of, and, at the symbolic 
level, it also escapes the two cultures of C.P. Snow, which Brier still finds to be a 
problem (Brier, 2008). I must mention that the perspective placed in this thesis is non-
political, and in quest for truth only.19 But I write this to illustrate how new knowledge 
sometimes needs to be emancipatory and anticipatory (pointing towards future 
directions outside existing mind-sets). It is well known that social structures, as 
productive as they might be in one period, can become rigid over time and place a too 
high degree of constraints upon the imaginative horizons that lie as a potential in any 
culture. Technology-assisted arts, when they are at their best, point towards a kind of 
emancipatory and anticipatory qualities. And our main point of interest here, when it 
comes to the social realm, is not to look for so-called innovation, which typically relates 
to instrumental social needs and market economy rationalities. It is to look for 
expansion of consciousness, how this expansion is expressed and can be evoked, and 
how it can lead to new knowledge. 
Technology assisted arts can, in principle, be developed at an institutional 
level, or be funded by private institutions or corporations, and thus develop within 
existing social realms. Or it can be developed in more alternative settings. (Its 
production usually has a high cost, which is why it is necessary for many artists to 
receive grants or funding from corporations or universities). But the fact that funding is 
needed, does not necessarily direct the inherent symbolic value of the art piece; the last 
of which is what I am interested in. At this level, many technology assisted art works, 
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  In	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  Agora,	  inspired	  by	  Luhmann’s	  symbolically	  generalised	  media,	  the	  medium	  of	  science	  is	  truth,	  whereas	  the	  medium	  of	  politics	  is	  power.	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point outside of any given existing system, specialization, or level of fragmentation in 
language. 
 
5.1. Technoesis in the post-human society 
I have chosen to define the kind of art that I use as case studies as technoetic art. Artist 
and professor, Roy Ascott, coined this term. It was coined in relation to a more general 
concept, concerned with new ways of understanding the social realm. In this sense, 
Ascott meant that we were on our way into a kind of societies that were coloured by a 
so-called technoetic condition. Technoesis in society implies a social and individual 
alteration of consciousness, which is mainly derived from the symbiosis between new 
technologies and human consciousness. This is not in the sense of trans-humanism. And 
it is also not equal to the posthuman condition, suggested originally by N. Katherine 
Hayles (1999). Technoesis includes art, but it is more than art art. It concerns all kinds 
of relations, private and public. It is the integration of technological developments with 
studies of the conscious mind as part of an overall individual and social expansion of 
consciousness. The reason Ascott combines the focus on techné with noesis, is that he 
finds that technologies, and in particular technology assisted art, alter human 
consciousness through their very presence and functionality. Because technological 
developments have been so central in Western (and non-Western) societies, the 
connection of techné and noesis has become of increased importance. However, Ascott 
is both early, and outstanding in his vision of the importance of how technologies can 
provoke states of extended mind, or extended cognition, a direction of which we can 
find many signs today. 
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In technoetic arts, there is often an emphasis on provoking common ideas of the five 
senses, proprioception, the reality of synaesthesia, or the borderline between reality and 
imagination; ideas by which we feel most familiar. And there is a main provocation of 
the idea that exosemiotic processes (the body’s interpretations of external input 
understood mainly as a one-way communication) are always a priori in processes of 
experience and knowing. The aim is to both explore the human-artefact relationship, 
and how it expands and affects consciousness, and to explore more of the inner world of 
human consciousness. The noetic part points towards consciousness as an inner 
experience of the human subject. Ranges of theorists have attacked the issue concerning 
the effect of digital technologies on academia and the social realm, from different 
angles. As mentioned, N. Katherine Hayles (1999) gave an important input to the 
general academic discourse with her suggestion that we had entered a post-human 
condition within the humanities, where she came to terms with earlier humanistic 
conceptualizations of human subjectivity, and integrated some of the changes that new 
technologies made on society and academia. 
 
Robert Pepperell (2003) is an example of a theorist who navigates on the edge between 
posthumanism and transhumanism. To some extend, one could say that he forms a 
representative of the concept of the transhuman movement, because he presents an 
image of the human subject that is symbiotically intertwined with technology. In this 
theoretical scope, humans enter the next phase of humanity with a range of 
technological implants that can heighten concentration, cognition, and general skills 
concerning how we know and do. In this thesis, however, the emphasis is not placed 
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upon how technologies alter human consciousness, including perception and cognition. 
I view technologies to play a central role, but my emphasis lies upon nature's creative 
invention: the flesh and blood human subject, and her relation to nature at large. This 
implies technologies, which are part of human signification spheres. However, as much 
as I find it necessary to take technologies centrally into account, I do not find that they 
are all encompassing. They creatively stir innovations in national and transnational 
signification spheres; but when it comes to technologies as knowledge, they can never 
be anything but reductionist versions of inspirations coming to humans from nature in a 
synthesis that relies on a mediated relation between the ideally real and the virtually 
real. Thus, nature's inspirations are of a different kind than human inspirations. 
However, there is a link. This link is based on communication in a semiotic sense 
(Peirce and cybersemiotics). I will move further into this subject in chapter four on 
cybersemiotics, and my reference to the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, and my 
choice of a semiotic, phaneroscopic ontology (in line with Brier). For new knowledge to 
come into formation, it demands openness towards the virtually real. This openness is 
difficult to establish in environments that do not accept the abductive properties of the 
imagination, and the open horizon of a natural non-religious inborn spirituality (where 
“spirituality” is understood in a sense close to what Nicolescu, who will be referenced 
below, has described as an openness towards the excluded middle and “the sacred”) as 
part of what it means to be human. 
 
5.2. In Vivo Research 
One reason that readings of art works could contribute to insights of the knowing, 
human subject is that the kind of art that I refer to, typically represents the quest for 
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knowledge with equal passion as genuine philosophy that seeks truth or questions the 
preconditions for truth anew. And because technoetic art as research is just as up front 
with innovations as is scientific research, and more traditional scholarly approaches, as I 
see it. In fact, technoetic arts often explore territories that have been abandoned by 
mainstream science, because they do not fit into accepted paradigms. In this sense, 
technoetic art has a potential for deriving new knowledge, or to point towards central 
questions that we need to ask, or to say it in the terminology of Donald Rumsfeld: it 
turns our attention towards that which we don't know, and that which we don't know 
that we don't know.20 
 
Thus, as an alternative to the exact sciences and the methods of empiricism, I suggest 
that technology assisted art can be seen as research in line with science. It works in the 
crossover fields of the two cultures (humanities and natural sciences). Its techniques are, 
in part, based on technologically aided simulation, that can symbolically exemplify in 
vivo research based on modelling, experimentation and exploration. One of the main 
materials is, as I view it, not just the aid of new technologies when it comes to 
expressing new thoughts, but rather the concept. Being preoccupied with exploring the 
nature of a concept concerns and touches upon the processes of how we make meaning 
in the signification sphere. And in the installation, concepts and meaningful relations 
are tested in a material realm. Thus, we could say that objects of the ideally real are 
transported into the artefactually real. If the artist is inspired, we could further say that 
the line between the virtual-, the ideally- and the artefactually real, concerning the 
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  This is an inspiration I got from Brier (2008), who cited a poem by Donald Rumsfeld, concerning what we know	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particular concepts in question, are tested by forming the installation, and finding out 
what means and which functionalities are central in demonstrating the concept in a real 
life material form. 
 
To understand the consequences of viewing technoetic arts as research better, we might 
have to alter some prejudices derived from research practices in the exact sciences. 
Basarab Nicolescu (2008), a Hungarian quantum physicist suggests the concept of in 
vivo research, which seems to suit our purpose here. In vivo research is a dynamic 
research process that integrates the subject observer directly in the process of objective 
observation. It does not undermine subjective positions, or the possibility of an explicit 
research subject as part of the creative process. It does not undermine objective 
observation either. Actually, objectivity becomes an implicit part of subjectivity. 
Objectivity, then, becomes one particular way in which the human subject relates to the 
world among others. Furthermore, in vivo research emphasizes understanding rather 
than fact and result, correlations between intellect, feeling and body rather than analytic 
intelligence only, and inclusion rather than exclusion of values. All of which is opposed 
to the positivist domination of large parts of the natural and social sciences. In vivo 
research is creative. It is oriented towards ‘astonishment and sharing, rather than power 
and possession’ (Nicolescu, 2008, p. 3). In this way, Nicolescu presents a set of 
qualities that characterise in vivo research in opposition to in vitro research. In vivo 
research demonstrates a change towards more process oriented, non-reductive 
approaches. In Vivo research is a prerequisite for transdisciplinarity, according to 
Nicolescu, who claims that interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity are not equal to 
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transdisciplinarity. To characterise transdisciplinarity further, Nicolescu operates with 
the concept of the excluded middle, and a partition of reality into different reality levels. 
One level of reality could be material reality based on an atomistic viewpoint that 
morphs into irrevocable paradox, which, in the zone of non-resistance allows for the 
next level of reality to appear. This means that paradox and being stuck within a 
semantics based on binary opposition, where paradox and the upheaval of common 
binary oppositional pairs are banned in classical logic, are, in principle, overcome, and 
this is how the excluded middle is taken back into consideration. At the level of 
quantum reality, the laws are basically different than at the atomistic level, however, the 
two levels of reality co-exist in a complementary way. Nicolescu’s conception of in 
vivo research, further than serving a justification of technoetic art as research, functions 
to justify and explain the quality and role of our generative philosopher. 
 
Even if Nicolescu suggests levels of reality according to physical science (which is his 
major topic as a physicist), I have, as presented in chapter one, chosen the levels of 
reality inspired by Forbes-Pitt, and have extended those with new understandings and 
extra levels as well. Classical positivism and empiricism would typically focus upon 
one level of reality, the relationship between the so-called objective self, and the 
materially real (all three dimensional material objects in Nature). If research takes into 
account several levels of reality, its interpretations of results will be different by nature. 
I will seek to provide the evidence for this through my work with eight artworks under 
five overall themes in Part II. 
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Much technoetic art research inheres qualities that coincide Nicolescu’s conception of 
in vivo research. Technoetic art practice is typically based on a combination of 
subjective intuitions, experience made from fields of empirical science, and the techné 
of engineering. It communicates by the semantics of aesthetics, often integrating both 
informational and semantic properties in interesting relationships. Art research often 
implements and tests central, philosophical questions and spiritual intuitions as part of 
the conceptual background for the work, of which we will meet examples in the case 
studies. But its aim is similar to science: it seeks an expansion of our understanding of 
the world at large, of our placement in it, while simultaneously investigating a creative, 
forward directed, manifesting potential. The true accomplishments of art research, 
however, seem to be more such of raising and directing attention to the best questions, 
rather than seeking the best or most accurate answers. To a certain extend, one could 
claim that one of the tasks of art research is to direct attention. The act of directing 
attention could, reciprocally, become a source of inspiration for theory and for 
empiricism happening in a process based loop of mutual inspiration between art, science 
and philosophy over time (in certain non-linear, causal relations). Now, this approach 
can only be interesting if we realize that knowledge is always provisional, and that we 
are immersed in never ending processes of learning, knowing and creating. We are, in 
these processes, developing our socio-cultural signification spheres, and, hopefully, 
there is a potential for refining the relationship between nature and signification spheres 
into higher degrees of mutual sustainability. However, if we view knowledge as part of 
our relation to nature, and as a non-final process of becoming, then the task of directing 
attention to issues more potent than others by art research, becomes of increased value. 
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5.3 Matter communicates 
-On Research by design of Augmented Realities 
In the common use of the concept augmented reality, inorganic matter and culturally 
produced material can gain dynamic and behavioural functions by becoming augmented 
with electronic and computational properties. If we choose to call the information 
processing elements of large and small-scale digital computation intelligence, then we 
could say that matter becomes augmented with computational intelligence, and gains 
behaviour. But the mere augmentation of matter by the use of new technologies alone is 
not what makes art making a research process. The main characterization of art as 
research, in my view, has to do with the element of exploration, the close tie to science 
in the quest for knowledge, and the interest in the main ontological questions, such as 
what is life, and what is consciousness? What is perception? And what is nature? 
 
As a terminological tool, I choose to call the technoetic art installations that I work with, 
text, also when the installation involves multiple geographic locations that are combined 
via the Internet or the implementation of mobile phones. The art text communicates of 
the artistic explorations made through the process of making the work, which often 
imply levels of ontological, intangible insight that are not usually presented, and 
transferring this insight into the realms of a material kind of cultural semiosis. Because 
this project places value in an estimation of the closeness of the relationship between 
intuition, thought, and material manifestation, this point is important. 
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Now, I am not claiming that all that art does is to make scientific or philosophical 
investigation. But it does seem to be a major part of the process for many artists, and I 
am deliberately choosing artworks, which I consider to deliver new knowledge. 
Furthermore, it is my thesis that although artists may not have made it clear to 
themselves, there are always symbolic levels in the artwork that communicate and refer 
to ways of meaning that the artist themselves might not have thought of, because they 
never sought to interpret their own work at higher, symbolic levels. However, in order 
to interpret technoetic art installations that might be interactive, immersive, ambiguous 
and non-verbal, some further theoretical tools are needed. 
 
All in all, a main part of the project itself is to find and establish vocabularies, and make 
meaning in ways that expand the way we could otherwise understand the contribution of 
the artworks to knowledge generation. As one of my intellectual tools that shall help me 
generate a theory of the human subject, and more concretely to interpret artworks, I will 
seek to characterise an ideal user. The aim is that the ideal user gradually forms 
throughout the project, by combining all three parts of the project. What is useful to say 
at this moment is that the research process concerned with art happens at a practical 
level, much in tune with the idea of bricolage, suggested by Longo. In this sense, terms, 
concepts and functions are tested and explored in their relational form, in a completely 
different text form than for instance if written philosophy explores a concept and an 
idea of dynamic relations. And even if the wet organic matter of living organisms like 
ourselves or like animals, and the dry artificial nature of technology assisted texts will 
always be different in ways that cannot be overlooked, there is still a testing of dynamic 
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functionalities and structural relations, which cannot be made in the same manner in 
ordinary, empirical research within the fields of the exact sciences. In this respect, the 
dynamic aspect of in vivo research is essential, together with the specificity of 
communication across concrete, metaphorical and symbolic levels of the objects 
inherent in the installations. I will return to this aspect in my readings of artworks in 
specific case studies, where I will tie my readings closely to the sign systems of Peirce, 
which I have found to be partially useful when it comes to approaching works from a 
hermeneutical and semiotic perspective. 
 
5.4 Technoetic Art as text 
Why have I chosen to work with a concept of text, when many of the works that are part 
of my case studies are works that use interfaces of augmented  and/or mixed reality, and 
processes that involve users and artist in ways, that can hardly be framed? 
One could argue for the concept of text as belonging more to symbolic 
communicational forms that are connected to traditional print-text, like websites for 
instance. However, to me the concept of text will work as a frame in which to explore 
the communicative potential of the given work. Without a firm frame of communication 
it becomes impossible to name and investigate important issues in the works. It is 
furthermore my opinion that all art works are framed, even when they are process 
based, dynamic, immersive, ambiguous, and, to some extend, provide behaviour that is 
unpredictable. Since I want a reading of text to be both diachronic and synchronic, 
which means that it can be experienced within its topological frame, it cannot be done 
without a clear division between the artwork and the environment in which it is read. I 
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will, however, in a section devoted to this special purpose, make an outline of a theory 
of relativity that is not based on physics, and which can be applied to this project, since 
the issue of spacetime relativity is essential to all my observations. This will play an 
important role, as I read texts. Together with contingency, and the idea of a levelled 
reality, the idea of relativity in narrative and meaning plays a central role in forming 
narratives of the human subject. 
 
5.4.1 The parameters of the work as text 
So what characterises the text that I want to categorize, at the concrete, noemic level? 
Text is a designed property that merges techné and sign. Thereby we are 
operating in both a concrete and an abstract sense, since the techné of design is the 
concrete mastering of technology, and the design strategy and structure comes out as a 
semantic expression, together with the semiotic signs inherent in the interface. Any 
design demands a concept for its construction, and this demand increases when the 
process of techné becomes more skill demanding. The outcome of the design can be 
materially firm, presented in three-dimensional digital virtuality. It can be a text with 
single or multiple pathways. It is interactive in its communication, affecting the user, 
who is in turn affecting the text back in a looped communication process. It 
communicates in multisemiotic and multimodal modes, thereby integrating the semiotic 
system of letter writing with pictures, sounds, haptic and/or kinaesthetic appeal. But it 
also communicates by appeal to the senses, affective and aesthetic appeal. 
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This concept of text does not apply to print text, which has only a low degree of 
physical interactivity, no computer virtual side, and often little multimodal appeal. The 
print-text appeals in what could be called a philosophical virtual (inspired by Roman 
Inngarden, 1973) way to some of the sense-modalities, since the experience is not a full, 
multimodal phenomenological experience that includes a broader, haptic appeal as well. 
We can find likely understandings of the multimodal, digital text in Günther Kress 
(2003), and to some extend in Heibach (2003), and in Pold (2004). Print-text primarily 
communicates by few semiotic modes, whereas this text communicates by multiple 
semiotic modes. Academic interpretive readings of multisemiotic and multimodal texts 
must be made in crossover fields connecting verbal language, pictorial language, sound, 
and haptic appeal that in connection form new, semiotic patterns. Common traits of 
multimedia text are also affective and aesthetic appeal, where aesthetic can be 
understood at both a deeper, philosophical level, as well as a concept of symmetric 
order in otherwise complex or chaotic levels of semiosis. 
 
5.4.2 Text as cognitive framing 
I have now presented one level regarding text. However, there is another one that has to 
do with our nature as expressive human beings. More than the concrete proportions and 
dynamics of the text, one could point to a notion of text, where text becomes a 
cognitive, operational act. I will, at a preliminary basis, describe art as an operational 
mode in which we by techné and mimetike mimic processes in nature by doing and by 
mediating the ways in which we conceptualize the self-same processes. But if this is art, 
then what is text? Then text can be seen as the way in which we give art semiotic 
expression in the communicative style of language. However, style in this context, 
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should not be understood at the noemic level, but at the noetic. This connects the 
concept of style to cognitive processes of the mind. It refers to ways in which we choose 
to structure experience, and communicate it as information. Then we have pointed 
towards two aspects of text that are complementary, and should not be seen as 
incompatible. They connect, as I have shown, to the noemic (naming the world around 
us) and the noetic realm (inner experience). On behalf of these two sides of the text, we 
can operate analytically, when we are examining the technoetic potential of specific 
artworks to point to transformed ways of contemplating at levels of inner mind. We see, 
that there is, first and foremost, the natural, species specific ways in which human 
beings learn and express themselves as specific working modes that can be taken into 
use, and which would be placed, in part, at the level of the ideally real, and secondly the 
ways in which such modes are taken out in a physical-material manner, which would be 
placed at the level of the artefactually real. 
 
The text is also a contextual space, and the word space in this definition can mean both 
a physical, and a computer virtual space. When I choose to read the intelligent art 
installation as a text, and look into its semiotic communication, at the same time I 
seemingly abandon the function of usability implicit in the work. Well, the functional 
use of the work is in my conceptualization integrated as the phenomenological appeal of 
the work that is meant to work in cooperation with the contemplating appeal of the 
work. Again we must see the complementary effect between phenomenological 
experience and contemplation. This complicates matters, as we shall see, because once 
again we have to ask of differentiated levels of establishing external and internal 
	   96	  
attention. But remembering our quest to upheave the divide between subjective and 
objective levels: is this division fair and logic? Can we argue for the existence of such a 
division? 
 
Peter Weibel suggests that the interactive artwork exemplifies the situation of second 
order cybernetics, where the observer is always an implicit part of what he observes. 
Weibel uses a reference to Otto Rössler's concept of endophysics (Weibel, 2001). The 
installation, then, becomes a micro cosmos, symbolizing the endophysical situation 
where the user (and the artist for that matter), establishes an overview over a 
communicational situation, which, in the real world, is too complex to make sense of, in 
part, because one is an immersed element in it. This looks like Qvortrup's hyper 
complex society, where social systems can do nothing but to self-observe, and where a 
privileged overview is not possible. When it comes to the installation, however, the user 
is never completely immersed within an artwork, and rather quickly learns to view it 
from a higher perspective in the situation. It is often possible to grasp the overall 
concept of the work, even if the components of the work are ambiguous. Grasping the 
concept leads to potential contemplation. And as we shall see in the case studies, our 
place in the universe as self-observing insiders could be constructively complicated if 
we gain increased understanding of processes happening at the internal levels, thereby 
gaining increased insight in relations between internal and external worlds. I will 
discuss this aspect of knowing in chapter four on cybersemiotics, and explicitly in case 
studies two, three, four, and five. 
 
	   97	  
So far we can conclude, further than having established some of the central 
terminologies of the thesis, that we are in a process of a creative, forward directed 
attempt to make theoretical sketches of the human subject. We have found that 
communication is essential in the socio-cultural situation as well as in the art 
installation. We have also decided that the human subject is steered by processes far 
more complex and invasive than such of the rational, day conscious mind, which is why 
I will have a particular focus on the mental and psychological processes of the human 
subject that are not steered by day conscious rationality and it is why I am sceptical 
about the idea of the human subject as a confined egotistic entity. In order to become 
able, however, to talk about multiple levels of reality, and ways of communication that 
relate particularly to the five levels of reality, and in order to attack the problem 
presented in Luhmann and Qvortrup concerning the inspiration from functional 
explanations, and more concretely from the paradigm of information science, I will 
introduce the cybersemiotic theory of Søren Brier (2008). 
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Chapter 4: Cybersemiotics 
- A foundation and tool for the development of the Ideal User 
 
6.0. The Ideal User 
Taking a hermeneutical approach to technoetic arts, which allows artworks to function 
as genuine research, evokes the necessity of establishing a firm foundation upon which 
an approach can be made. If artworks are to function as research, their interpretations 
must not be random. When working with technoetic arts, it is obvious that the kind of 
explorations made by art do in no way lead towards fixed or exact explanations. First of 
all, it is a question of meaning and understanding, rather than fact and falsification. And 
it is a question of working with concepts of reality, and to understand how basic 
concepts are to processes of knowing. 
 
I have already mentioned that in order to characterise central signs of communication 
addressed to the reader by artworks, I need to identify an ideal user. Brier's 
cybersemiotic theory seems to deliver an overall complex scheme of conceptualisation 
that can grasp the many aspects of communication typically addressed in technoetic 
artworks. 
I will elaborate on the most central issues presented in the theory of 
cybersemiotics in this chapter. Since cybersemiotics is a complex theory that thoroughly 
goes through a range of theoretical frameworks to reach its goal, I must introduce the 
theory gradually to the reader. When moving into the cybersemiotic paradigm, we 
transgress the theoretical frameworks of Luhmann and Qvortrup, which I introduced in 
	   99	  
chapters two and three, and thereby Brier brings us to a next meta-level of observation. 
However, in Brier, central elements from Luhmann's social systems theory is kept, and 
play a role in defining the human subject and the socio-cultural environment that she 
inhabits. In particular when it comes to the autopoietic socio-communicative language 
games, which I have shortly mentioned in Part I, chapter three, and which will be 
treated as part of the presentation of the theory. Because the theory is so extensive, 
however extremely useful, I will dedicate this chapter to it. 
 
6.1. An introduction to Cybersemiotics – Why Information is not enough 
The cybersemiotic theory weaves together elements of information theory, cybernetics, 
library and information science, ethology, biosemiotics, cognitive semantics, social 
systems theory and language philosophy upon the ontological background of Peircean 
semiotic philosophy. As it does so, it transgresses each framework that it moves into, 
except the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, which is kept intact as an ontological 
background for the project. We must note that Brier's choice of paradigms is in no way 
random. He chooses the theories that are most pervasive and dominant in the current 
theoretical landscape. But he generates a meta-understanding, while viewing these 
theories from a new level. The result is an overall synthesis of the most central and 
useful parts from all of the mentioned paradigms, when it comes to answering questions 
of communication, cognition and meaning. 
 
The integrative method is thus one that generates new levels of meaning. I find this 
essential in a time of information excess, with many contributors, a high degree of 
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availability, and a high degree of redundancy and repetition in available material. The 
only way to avoid an excess of repetition, when it comes to central philosophical points 
about human cognition, communication, meaning and consciousness is to transgress the 
borders of current meaning making, and to move into meta-level observation. 
Cybersemiotics meets the thesis directions in this strive, which makes it a theory 
adequate for dialogue and further development of my own theory. 
 
6.2. Cybernetics and Semiotics in one paradigm 
The essence of the cybersemiotic paradigm is, in my view, the integration of cybernetic 
and semiotic principles into an overall conceptual model in which the two paradigmatic 
frameworks, otherwise divided by institutional specialization, become integrated and 
must be regarded as complementary rather than oppositional. The cybersemiotic theory 
offers a suggestion of a unification of different approaches across the natural, the social, 
and the human sciences. It also offers a vocabulary with new semiotic terms based on 
the inheritance of, among others, the phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, the Umweltslehre of Jacob Von Uexküll as well as Konrad Lorenz' and 
Niko Tinbergen's ethology (biology of motivation). The semiotic terms make it possible 
to regard something such as sensation, processes of thought, and intellectual 
contemplations in an overall integration. Brier does not elaborate on how biological 
processes could be understood to relate to phenomenological processes in any concrete 
manner. But he does deliver a theoretical framework that allows one to do so. 
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As part of the cybersemiotic framework, Brier presents two useful visual models, 
which, in spite of their unavoidable impreciseness, do enlighten his visions concerning 
the multiple kinds of cybernetic autopoiesis and semiosis that work in complementary 
manners as part of the human organism and phenomenological being. In this chapter, I 
present the second model as figure two, which I also discuss shortly here. I presented 
the first model, which is the cybersemiotic star, as figure two, in the previous chapter 
The Epistemological Turn. 
                        
 
               Figure 3: This is Brier's complex model. The cybernetic processes are on the left, and 
               the semiotic processes are on the right. The system of biological autopoiesis contains 
               some of the molecular processes related to the immune system, the nervous system and 
               the hormonal system. Biosemiosis is divided into endosemiotic and exosemiotic  
               processes. It is, according to Brier, interpenetrations between autopoietic systems on the 
               left that leads to the processes of semiosis on the right. It is important to notice that the 
               separate definition of processes and qualities actually forms the ground of an overall 
               integration, where we must see all processes as completely interrelated, co-existing and 
               co-dependent. It is the understanding of the co-dependence of processes, and to be able to grasp 
               these processes within the same overview that gives this model is real potential, in my view. 
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All though the two models present a high range of complexity when it comes to the way 
central aspects of the theories they bring together are integrated, at another level they 
are quite simple. As Brier's model brings together properties of biological semiosis, 
which could for example be processes of protein synthesis, or chemical reactions 
evoked by neuron receptors, with phenomenological processes of immediate being 
based on what we could call pure quality, and intellectualized thought, it is not simple to 
think of such processes in integration if we are referring to the fragmented language of 
scientific specialization. However, at the philosophical level it makes sense, and could 
even be viewed as somewhat banal. Because at a level of common sense, or what we 
could also call first person experience, it is evident that processes of thought, chemical 
processes, signalling processes, self-generative processes of the biological organism, 
cell communication, and something such as sensation, feeling and intellectual thought 
are symbiotically connected. Otherwise we would not function as wholes. Thus, it has 
rather been for intellectual and institutional purposes that these areas were divided, and 
that vocabularies were built up around such divisions. Thus, the simple truth that all 
processes of the human mind are tied to bodily processes and the reverse has become 
buried in the accumulation of terms, based on specialized fragmentation. And today, at 
the philosophical and conceptual level, it is time to present frameworks that can 
integrate, rather than separate. Otherwise we will end up loosing touch with our own 
humanity. 
 
The importance of connecting frameworks and delivering terms which can bring 
together aspects from the natural-, the social-, the life- and the human sciences, is not 
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only that such processes can be conceptualized together in an overall view. It is also that 
these conceptualizations connect directly to institutional developments of knowledge, 
and will thus affect future strategies. Thus, the importance of Brier's concepts lies also 
in the way they connote meaning at deeper levels, which again relates directly to 
epistemological backgrounds at the institutional level. If few concepts bring together 
many frameworks in a useful manner, we no longer need to refer to five different books, 
while using the frameworks. We can use only one concept, and be in relative agreement 
of what this concept connotes. The integrative method that Brier uses shows one way of 
using what still seems scientifically and philosophically fruitful, however 
cybersemiotics condenses essences into an overall framework on behalf of the most 
central meaning that lies within each paradigm. And here, I can point to an aspect of the 
cybersemiotic theory, which is similar to my understanding of technoetic arts: they 
integrate condensed references to the most important and influential issues, 
characteristic of the present situation. So the validity and reliability of the theory lays 
both in the chosen components, as well as in the perspectives that the theory opens up 
for by presenting meaning at new levels. 
 
6.3. Area and subject matter of the cybersemiotic theory 
Further than building upon an overall mechanistic world view, and instrumental 
principles, the disciplines of information science, computer science, second order 
cybernetics, and the cognitive sciences at large, have provoked a range of questions that 
have been difficult to answer within the respective research paradigms themselves. As 
fields such as robotics, weak and strong Artificial Intelligence and Human Computer 
Interaction design have become more and more dominant in research, they have evoked 
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a growing need to define human and machine in relation to one another. In particular, 
questions relating to our self-understandings as human beings that do not seem 
answerable by applying metaphors derived from computers and mechanistic paradigms 
become of increased interest. Such questions are typically concerned with how we 
understand human sensation, cognition, communication, understanding, meaning 
making, and in the end: human consciousness. 
 
Many contemporary approaches to cognition and communication are based upon the 
overall functional and mechanistic information-processing paradigm, according to 
Brier. Cybersemiotics is thus particular in its insistence on emphasizing the question of 
meaning and the importance of first person perspective. Brier (2008) expresses his 
purpose like this: 
‘A basic inquiry of this book is whether the functionalist and cybernetic 
research program of information and cognitive sciences must be viewed as 
complementary to a phenomeno- logical-hermeneutic-semiotic line of 
theorizing on signification and meaning that ignores ontological questions 
outside culture, or whether these might be united into one paradigmatic 
framework through a revision of the ontological and epistemological 
foundation of both classical and modern science, as Peirce attempts.’ 
(p. 37) 
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But how does Brier approach the formation of the meta-scientific syntax? What are the 
basic pillars of the theory? 
 
6.4. Information 
To begin with, he draws a historical background for the information-processing 
paradigm, which has influenced fields related to computer and information 
technologies, and cognitive science. And in the context of this thesis, it makes sense to 
mention that these paradigms have, by large, also inspired technology assisted arts and 
technoetic arts. Ascott himself has been inspired by cybernetics throughout his career as 
an artist. 
 
Brier starts by explaining Shannon's early definition of information. Shannon's work 
was mainly based on instrumental perspectives designed to gain functionality in the 
computer. He defined information as a quantitative property that objectively existed in 
the world. Information could be statistically calculated, and Shannon was not 
preoccupied with the question of meaning. Shannon saw information as entropy, and he 
defined the process of communication as a transfer of information. In this perspective, 
information could, in principle, travel from system to system without being changed on 
the way. The system that received information by the transfer process was not 
understood to alter the quality of the so-called information as a transfer happened. 
Further from here, the Wienerian approach began to understand 
information as negentropy. Negentropy is negative entropy occurring in a complex 
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environment. The concept of entropy was transported into information theory from 
physics and engineering, and relates to the industrial period where the development of 
the steam engine played a huge role. Negentropy was, apart from it's role in physical 
science and engineering, then used as a metaphor that could clarify the meaning of the 
concept of information. In light of entropy and negentropy as metaphors, information 
came to connote a kind of order or pattern that arises in otherwise chaotic or non-
ordered systems. This is where Prigogine and Stenger's suggestion of dissipative 
structures, based on non-equilibrium thermodynamics, becomes influential as well. 
However, dissipative structures cannot form endlessly within the same context. So 
entropy, in the end, leads to decay, which we know from all physical relations, both 
those of artefacts and of organic nature. Information at this stage was still understood as 
something that exists objectively in nature. It could be transferred as pattern and 
structure from nature to the respective system in processes of communication. This 
understanding of information has, according to Brier, had an immense impact on the 
establishment of cognitive science. Cognitive science, as a field, has integrated the idea 
of information as something objectively existing, functioning in both animals, human, 
nature and machine cognition and communication in ways that resemble the algorithmic 
software processes of computers. 
 
As we move into the second order cybernetics of Heinz Von Foerster, the observer 
starts to be taken into account as part of the system. Information, communication and 
systems theory must now be viewed from another level of abstraction. As in the 
Heisenberg relation in physics, the notion of the fact that the observer plays an active 
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part in observation becomes an explicit insight. From this, it also follows that the idea of 
a purely objective position in science must be questioned, because the observer always 
affects the observed. 
 
6. 5. Autopoiesis 
Autopoiesis theory furthers this perspective, and is a central element in Brier's approach 
to second order cybernetics. The term autopoiesis was originally coined by biologist 
Humberto Maturana, who presented a theory of biological autopoiesis together with his 
student, Francisco Varela (Maturana & Varela,1987). A central outcome of Maturana 
and Varela's theory is that cognition is understood as biologically embedded, and 
overall embodied. The autopoietic system is a system that is organizationally closed, but 
open to a flux of matter and energy. It is self-generating and self-maintaining. 
 
With autopoiesis theory, the idea of information transfer becomes more complex. 
Autopoiesis theory is first and foremost a theory of the organism, whereas Shannon's 
original theory of information relied on experiences with the computer. As autopoiesis 
theory is applied, there is no longer a transfer that allows for information to travel 
undisturbed through different systems. Information is, with Gregory Bateson (1972), 
seen as a difference that makes a difference. It comes to be understood more like an 
irritation in the system caused by perturbations, which result in alterations or 
difference, which affects the internal balance of the system. Autopoiesis theory further 
couples biological processes with an understanding of cognition, which places it as co-
dependent on the structural couplings that a species makes during evolution with its 
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fellow species members, and with elements in its particular ecological environment. 
Later, the concept of autopoiesis was generalized from biology into the social systems 
theory of Niklas Luhmann (1984). Here it was used to describe the functionality and 
mechanisms of social communications. The social perspective leads Brier to the use of 
Luhmann's idea of triad autopoiesis, which involves the division, and reintegration, of 
psychological, social and biological systems. The triad autopoietic systems are, 
however, no more separated, than the fact that they constantly interpenetrate each other, 
and thus are mutually co-dependent. They are each a prerequisite for the other systems 
and their internal processes. It is only at the level of organization and self-maintenance 
that they are closed to each other. The complexity and self-organizing properties of each 
system involved must be taken actively into account when we think of processes of 
communication in living systems. 
 
Already as Brier goes through the systems theory of Luhmann, we are moving towards 
an extended understanding of the human subject, because he does not exclusively 
subscribe to Luhmann's paradigm. He distances himself from Luhmann's anti-
subjectivism and overall functionalist viewpoints, and insists on a human subject with 
thinking, feeling and experiential capacities that forms an active part of the process. 
Brier does this by using C.S. Peirce's triad semiotic philosophy as a major part of the 
grounding of a new paradigmatic framework. What is central then, is that Luhmann's 
idea of triad autopoiesis is transported into the cybersemiotic theory as a partial view on 
something that is by nature understood to be much more extensive. In this redefinition, 
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it becomes one of the pillars bearing the overall paradigmatic syntax that Brier is trying 
to establish. 
 
The heritage of cybernetics, information and autopoiesis theory is kept as part of the 
cybersemiotic paradigm as well. But none of the paradigms do, as we shall see, become 
overall decisive, and are integrated with the deep ontology of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
and an overall semiotic approach. Both Maturana, Varela and Luhmann operate with an 
evolutionary paradigm, and because Maturana and Varela couple their theory of the 
organism with ideas of cognition, they are moving towards a human science 
perspective, however, explained from a natural science stance. The inherent 
evolutionary paradigm within the two frameworks is central in cybersemiotics, as well 
as in this thesis. 
 
6.6. Evolution 
As most readers are aware, the evolutionary paradigm has its strongest roots in biology 
and the natural sciences. In particular with the impact of the Darwinian paradigm, 
genetics, and non-equilibrium thermodynamics, the latter of which has functioned as an 
integrative paradigm between physics and biology. But it has not had an equal place 
within the human and social sciences, according to Brier. With biosemiotics and the use 
of Peirce's philosophy, Brier manages to insert an evolutionary paradigm into the 
humanistic and social perspectives. But it is important to mention that Peirce operates 
with three kinds of evolution, of which the Darwinian paradigm would belong to only 
one. Further than Darwinian evolution, which fits with Peirce's concept tychasm, he 
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operates with anacastic (evolution by mechanical necessity, which fits with the 
biological theory of Lamarck) and agapastic evolution (which is evolutionary love). I 
will return to these Peircean concepts as I carry out my readings of artworks in the case 
studies of Part II, the concept of agapastic evolution being particularly important. 
 
Brier further integrates elements from the biological field of Ethology that can account 
for instinct and motivation on a basic, biological level. It is within this background that 
he establishes his term, sign games. From there he moves on to biosemiotics, the latter 
of which also builds on an evolutionary and process oriented paradigm. This is where he 
makes a clear separation between the cybernetic and semiotic processes, and explains 
them according to three different kinds of causation, an ontological distinction that 
originally stems from Aristotle. It is the distinction into efficient cause, formal cause 
and final cause. Peirce operates with these three kinds of causation in his original 
rethinking of Aristotle as part of his evolutionary, semiotic doctrine. Jesper Hoffmeyer 
(2008) integrates this distinction in his version of biosemiotics, because the idea of final 
cause has explanatory potential in relation to the process philosophy of Peirce, which is 
actually a study of relations. The process oriented, relational perspective does transgress 
the Darwinian and neo-Darwinian paradigms that have been dominating in genetics and 
molecular biology, where the idea that biological processes are random, that only the 
fittest survive, where evolution is driven mainly by competition, and where natural 
selection based on these principles are main ingredients. In mainstream biology, 
however, there is no explicit formulation of goal direction, all though central terms used 
imply a kind of goal direction. This is a paradox that led Hoffmeyer (2008) to formulate 
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a theory that could explain more of the biological processes than he thought existing 
theory could do. He calls mainstream biology “immature biosemiotics” (Hoffmeyer, 
2009). 
 
Peircean biosemiotics, thus, rests centrally upon the admittance of a level of final 
causation in nature, in which processes seek towards their own, inbuilt goals, so to 
speak. However, purpose as we know it from human intentional acts, must, according to 
Peirce, be understood as a species specific sub-category of the much more 
encompassing final cause. Brier further elaborates on the connection between 
Aristotelian causation and the threshold between cybernetic, informative and semiotic 
processes. And this is a point where it becomes clearer that a necessary distinction 
between information, sign and meaning must be made. This is because information, 
understood as signal and/or pattern fitting (Brier, 2008, p. 365), can be seen as an 
expression of formal cause, but not of final cause (even if it would be an implicit part of 
final cause). Information is an alteration within the organization of a system. It, thus, is 
not based on triad semiosis, and does not rely on an interpretant, according to Brier. 
What really communicates, then, is not information, but interpretants. And this is a 
central point of the cybersemiotic theory, which I wish to carry further into the project. 
Language games come into the picture in relation to final cause, which also involves 
triad semiosis. This is where meaning becomes relevant for the analysis. 
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The integration of Peircean philosophy at the deeper ontological level is very important 
to take into consideration if one wants to grasp the cybersemiotic theory. It must be seen 
as an accomplishment of Brier to be able to demonstrate and interpret the possible 
correlations between Aristotelian causation, Peircean evolutionary theory, and the most 
central aspects of current, academic theory of something as essential as information, 
communication and meaning, which can relate to both the computational machine, and 
the human being as part of the Information Society! In placing cybernetic processes 
within the same paradigm as semiotics, Brier actually does not dismiss the question of 
human versus machine: he rather complicates its possible answers! 
 
6.7. The extended human subject 
To create a further generalization of social communications, and to implement a human 
subject, that can be seen as an active participator and generator in and of social 
communications, Brier integrates the philosophy of Ludwig Von Wittgenstein's 
language games with biosemiotic and ethological sign games. This is to suggest, that 
there is a game with a certain level of self-generality that, integrated with the pragmatics 
of life forms, also rules the use of language by social players. The language game 
philosophy does not imply language games as relying on mechanisms that are loosened 
from its subjects. It rests upon regularities inherent in linguistic exchange between 
embodied humans who create patterns of action through language. Brier further moves 
on to pick elements from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's embodied cognitive 
semantics (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Lakoff, 1987). Cognitive semantics presents an 
approach that can account for the importance of the full flesh and blood body when it 
comes to metaphor generation or conceptual thinking as part of a cognitively based 
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process. This extends the view of Maturana and Varela's understanding of cognition as a 
biological property, to encompass language, image schemes and so-called ICM 
(Idealized Cognitive Models) also. The centrality of embodiment is another pillar in 
Briers paradigmatic syntax. 
 
It is important to notice, however, that Brier distances himself from the strong element 
of constructivism, which is also an element in Lakoff and Johnson's theory. The point of 
social constructivism is where the Peircean triad of firstness, secondness and thirdness, 
and the overall relational paradigm of his doctrine of signs allows for an understanding 
that places value in the objective existence of phenomena in themselves, and thus 
extends social constructivism. Radical constructivism, as I view it, operates on a non-
explicit philosophy that builds upon a dyad relation, where humans create the world 
through their conceptualizations, and where there is nothing else in the world than 
human perception and conceptualization. 
 
To illustrate the connection points between elements that could otherwise seem too 
complex for integration, Brier created the visual model of human signification, 
communication and meaning generation (Figure two, page two). On the one hand, we 
can see how it integrates the cybernetic processes suggested by Luhmann, which rest 
upon psychic, social and biological autopoiesis. This, then, presents three different 
kinds of autopoiesis and mediumship. And on the other, he integrates the different kinds 
of semiosis that, according to him, emerge from interpenetrations between the different 
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autopoietic systems. Thus, according to Brier, semiosis arises on the basis of cybernetic 
autopoiesis. It is directly connected to autopoiesis, however, by nature qualitatively 
different. The intention is to conceptually and intellectually separate cybernetic and 
semiotic processes as they are expected to have different qualities, however, to 
simultaneously be closely interdependent and symbiotically related. It is a chosen 
distinction. 
 
It is the process of semiosis that is based on and demands the element of meaning. And 
this happens mostly at the level of abstraction and complexity only possible for the 
human species at a later stage of evolution, where language is developing. So as well as 
presenting a (simplified) two dimensional model of different processes that lead to 
communicational exchange and meaning making in and between individuals, there is 
also an inbuilt evolutionary paradigm, that builds on the capacities of the species to 
structurally couple intersubjectively, together with ecological environments through 
irreversible time, and to build up still more complex language games. 
 
6.8 Useful terms in Cybersemiotics 
As I relate this theoretical landscape to my own project, technoetic art communications 
can be viewed as a central part of the externalized signification sphere, where sign 
patterns are exchanged, negotiated and begin to form and colour communications in 
social systems. They are viewed both as signs of and as generative forces that lead to 
new levels of signification, which affect and are affected back again by processes of 
human cognition, communication and meaning making. As one seeks to theoretically 
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define such a landscape, new terms with more encompassing potential become 
necessary, and here Brier's semiotic terms become of use. The most basic semiotic 
terms, derived from Brier's framework, are: endosemiosis (from the biosemiotic 
paradigm, inspired by Thomas Sebeok. It refers to inner, biological processes from the 
molecular level and up), exosemiosis (refers to signs and signals from external 
influences), phenosemiosis (particularly related to the embodied phenomenology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It means pure phenomenological experience), thought semiosis 
(internal, first person processes of thought, conscious as well as sub-conscious), intra-
semiosis (where all internal semiosic processes intersect), and the mutual relationship of 
individual semiotic processes with socio-communicative, autopoietic language games at 
the intersubjective level. A very central part of this model is, in relation to the way it 
becomes useful to the thesis, is the way it makes both inner (noetic) and outer (noemic) 
processes of communication explicit and more complex. And with this new vocabulary, 
we can begin to leave the use of Kant's terms noetic and noemic, and gradually replace 
them with the terms from cybersemiotics. When it comes to understanding the dynamics 
of introspection and exchange with external environments from the outside and in, it is 
central to have the terminological tools to describe internal processes. It is a main thesis 
of this project that knowledge, at the level of the individual, is formed as a dynamic 
between internal and external processes of communication, and that, besides from the 
avoidance of metaphysical and ontological questions, academia at large has not given 
space to investigations of internal processes, and the way they contribute to knowledge 
generation. So, since our perspective does not follow the footprints of something such 
as transhumanism, and since our human subject is, first and foremost a figure that is 
directly related to nature, the changes that are understood to follow when new 
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technologies are implemented in modern worlds, do not rely on technologies to augment 
human cognitive functions, the mental and consciousness at large. There is, of course, a 
mutual effect between information technology and human cognition. But in this thesis, I 
take primacy in the relationship between human and Nature. So, with Brier's model, we 
can suggest an evolutionary extension of the idiosyncratic levels, by referring to the 
complex model on page two. This stance will be elaborated on further, as I precede in 
Part II with my case studies. Here, it suffices to say that this project places a particular 
focus upon internal processes, and how knowledge can, in part, be formed at levels of 
complex idiosyncrasy, and simultaneously have value to knowledge communities. This 
is the point where idiosyncratic knowledge steps out of subjectivity, or, rather, presents 
the knowledge of a post-objective subject. This means that there would be levels of 
idiosyncrasy, based on internal semiosis, which it makes sense to understand in 
generalized forms, in forms that we could expect would be common to a large set of 
individuals, and not just the research subject in question; which, however, are not best 
described by traditional objective points of departure. 
 
Besides from the fact that model two presents original semiotic terms, it allows for 
processes, which were formerly thought of as separated, to be conceptualized and 
observed in their relative relations. We can now see them as processes that are 
somewhat autonomous, however, never out of touch with each other: constantly 
pulsating, exchanging and sensitively moving each other in mutual recursive loops; 
whereas we have been used to thinking of them as separated, static, and non-related. 
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Brier himself does not take us into the detailed properties of each process, but the idea 
of placing the cybernetic properties on the right, and the semiotic properties on the left 
illustrates the important point by which Brier wants to emphasize the difference in 
quality between the processes, and the complexities involved in human communication 
and meaning making as the two kinds of processes are combined. This also involves the 
suggestion, that semiotic properties might not be describable from a structuralist, 
mechanistic or functionalist perspective alone, which further enlightens the debate 
concerning machine versus human intelligence. Phenomenological processes, language 
games, thought processes and overall meaning making might show radically different 
properties than those of the autopoietic-cybernetic process. And those are not processes 
that we have been able to imitate in computational machines as of yet. 
 
When demonstrating the theory by model two, Brier places an overview that allows us 
to think that there could be a way to conceptualize that does not leave mechanics, 
functionality and pure information out, but integrates this understanding into a larger 
scheme that also and simultaneously deals with signification, meaning, and in the end: 
consciousness. It is, however, also when we reach into the topic of consciousness, 
which is central to the subjectivity theory of this project, that I must distinguish myself 
from Brier's theory. This, however, will be made more explicit in the practical part, 
where the case studies per se lead me into explanations that cannot be encompassed by 
Brier's cybersemiotic model, and must, to some extend transgress it, and question 
central elements in it. 
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6.9. The post-objective observer 
Personally, besides from the original concept of uniting cybernetics and autopoiesis 
theory with Peircean deep semiotics, I find the next most potent problem presented in 
the cybersemiotic theory to be the question of the threshold between information, 
signification and meaning on the one hand, and the question of how to possibly define 
consciousness on the other. Brier's work constantly moves in directions of unanswered 
questions concerning human consciousness. However, these questions are not 
articulated and treated as a problem in any explicit way. 
 
In the present thesis, the question of consciousness is essential. And it is this exact focus 
that leads to the necessity of new definitions of human subjectivity. The question of 
consciousness and subjectivity is a bomb under the assumptions leading so-called 
objective scientific research today. The aim of the project, however, is not to dismiss 
objective research forms, or to discourage the necessity of empirical research (which is 
viewed as a way of testing theories against materiality). In the course of the research 
process, I have come to realize that rather than dismissing the ways of current science 
and philosophy, what I am out for is to detect and characterise the contours of a post-
objective human subject, which can travel across the four epistemological pathways 
from the middle of Brier's cybersemiotic star with such ease that this endeavour can, in 
time, be implemented in ordinary learning processes in different kinds of educational 
institutions. The post-objective subject would imply the capacity to navigate through 
different mental positions, and thus oscillate between subject-object, and subject-subject 
positions at multiple levels. The first pathway towards this is to make clear that 
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induction, deduction and abduction are cognitively founded intellectual abilities that 
humans have, and not only scientific method. And to be able to make use of these 
cognitive properties more freely, while, simultaneously, relating to academic 
epistemologies and methodologies. In this sense, at least from the cognitive property of 
abduction, which, according to Peirce is based on a creative, imaginative form of logic, 
where hypotheses or assumptions are made on behalf of already existing insights at a 
subjective level of the individual, the different cognitive positions can become 
complementary, rather than oppositional. And, as we will try in this project, we can 
move into perhaps more cognitive points of departure when it comes to research and the 
process of human knowing. An objective, inductive approach could thus be 
supplemented by a subjective, abductive approach. Furthermore, we are aimed to 
articulate positions of the human subject that is behind objective observation. In the end, 
there can be no objectivity without a subject that forms its very background. This is the 
first notion of the human subject, towards which we are moving in this project. And, as 
I just indicated, the ability to navigate cognitive positions in combination with 
methodologies rests upon the way the researcher uses his mental energy and cognitive 
capacity in the actual research process. 
So, even if Brier's aim is not as such to research the question of human 
consciousness, the question of meaning, and the in depth philosophical speculation of 
how humans learn and know, simply demands renewed propositions and negotiations 
concerning definitions of human consciousness in academic communities. And the 
much deeper approach by semiotics, suggested by Brier and the biosemiotic paradigm at 
large, seems a good opportunity for philosophical speculation concerning this topic. 
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I will explain more of the elements of the cybersemiotic theory in direct relation to the 
case studies of part II of the thesis. The cybersemiotic theory functions as a central 
component in forming my ideal user, which will take its starting point in the model 
presented in this thesis chapter. Thus, we need to keep in mind the two kinds of 
processes, based on cybernetic autopoiesis and semiosis. And we need to further keep in 
mind the new semiotic vocabulary, which will be transferred into part II, and used 
actively in readings of artworks, and the formation of the ideal user. 
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Conclusion, Part I 
The main conclusions that we can bring with us from Part I into parts II and III concern 
the definition of the context of the project as philosophy of knowing, and a meta-
narrative that involves the current epistemes concerning human knowing, however, by 
taking a semiotic point of view, places the basic ontological position at a pre-scientific 
level. This, further, characterises our generative philosopher, who forms the first person 
aspect of this thesis. 
Furthermore, in the epistemological turn, we saw how important it is to re-
think the role of digital technologies in both social and academic communication, as 
communication tools and as, what Latour called scientific inscriptions. The integration 
of computational technologies, based on digital principles, is, at the very moment, part 
of the way that knowledge is formed. It therefore becomes determinate of our 
knowledge. It alters processes of knowledge generation, as well as our ways of being 
cognitive and finding intellectual solutions. Furthermore, knowledge is no longer only 
intellectual and theoretical: inventing and applying new technologies also produces tacit 
knowledge. 
This is the basis of the epistemological turn. It turns away from a 
domination of left-brain intellectualism. And it turns away from regarding theory and 
speculation as primary over practice based research, which has consequences for thesis 
writing. In this air, together with the formulations of Basarab Nicolescu, concerning the 
nature of transdisciplinarity and in vivo research, art gains a transformed role. Where, in 
Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons' Agora, art is regarded as a sub-culture in negotiation with 
other sub-cultures on equal terms, and where in Luhmann art is a social system among 
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other social systems, in this thesis technoetic art is placed in a meta-position to the 
established symbolically generated media of the agora. Art, then, is viewed as a branch 
of research that does not have as a main aim to test hypotheses empirically, and produce 
facts. Rather, it can be viewed as research that locates new dynamical objects, leads to 
the production of new important hypotheses, demonstrating new use of existing 
materials, and, in a sense, produces new material ontologies. Art, regarded as a social 
system, does not produce new in depth ontologies that oppose central social ontologies. 
And in this sense I claim that some technoetic art works could be viewed as 
emancipatory in their inborn symbolic. Since I expect art to be functional at many levels 
of reality, I have sought artworks that particularly are understood to produce new 
ontologies through practice-based research. I have chosen to classify these works by 
Roy Ascott's concept technoetic art, because the concept indicates a particular focus 
upon noetic levels of reality, and thereby the research into human consciousness, and 
because several of the works chosen explore kinds of communication that mainly rest 
upon processes of internal semiosis. A main focus and interest in this thesis is to gain an 
overview over the complexity of processes of internal semiosis, and to ask how they add 
to processes of human knowing. And how they can, possibly be viewed to increase in 
complexity over evolutionary time. The signification sphere is viewed as an expression 
of human, evolutionary development. In this sense, the ways of signification are telling 
of the humans that inhabit the signification spheres. 
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Part II: Case studies 
Chapter 5, Case study 1: On modelling, conceptual 
thinking, and order in Nature 
 
7.0. Introduction 
In the first case study, I will focus upon human modelling and the use of concepts in 
connection to human cognition and art making. As we recall, we have chosen an 
approach where epoché is taken into use. This means that we must institute a naïve state 
in our approach, wherefore we must be careful about the theoretical sources we bring to 
the fore, and we must let the generative philosopher explicitly form her point of 
departure without being dominated by the expectancy of an analytical syntax based on 
use of theory through critical argumentation. 
I view the ability to model and to generate concepts as central aspects of 
how humans know. Model and concept can be viewed as higher-order levels of cultural 
semiosis, which are expressed at levels external to the human subject through signs in 
the cultural signification sphere, and at levels internal to the human subject through 
processes of thought semiosis, relying on the mind’s ability to structure. In accordance 
with much contemporary theory of mind, for instance the cognitive semantics of Lakoff 
& Fauconnier (Turner & Fauconnier, 2002), the neuroscience of Antonio Damasio, 
(Damasio, 1999), and the phenomenology of affect in art philosophy by Brian Massumi 
(Massumi, 2005), it is fair to claim that a large degree of the mind’s ability to structure 
is based on sub-conscious functions. At levels of internal semiosis and brain based 
cognition, modelling and conceptual thought is, in part, based on the ability to generate 
“frames”. I wish to leave the question of what forms a “frame” open, because it presents 
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one of the central quests in articulating the theme of modelling, cognition and art. 
Further than inner cognitive frames, I expect the individual to operate on behalf of 
Idealized Cognitive Models, which are based on image schemes that relate to 
experiences in the world. Idealized cognitive models are models with a high degree of 
referential value, and they are central to cognition. I expect these to be partially stable, 
and partially open for re-arrangement in the cognitive mind. The ideas of idealized 
cognitive models and frames are inspired by Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Turner, 1996; 
Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Shore, 1996, and in part by Thomas Sebeok and Marcel 
Danesi (Sebeok & Danesi, 2000). 
 
Thomas Markussen (2010), a design theorist, has presented a theory that integrates 
cognitive semantics with theory of interaction design. A main point in Markussen is 
that, at a level of cultural communication based on digital interfaces, there are 
continuous blends between a long term cultural memory where cognitive image 
schemas, originally based on the experience of physical objects (desktop, typewriter, 
etc.) form a foundation for understanding metaphors/icons that appear on the graphical 
interface or in the functions of digitally augmented artefacts. 
Markussen uses the example of an augmented reality raincoat, which, in 
the installation Blur Building, is used both as an interface, as well as a regular raincoat. 
This represents a cognitive conceptual cross-categorical blend that is based on 
functionality and interactivity. What interests me here, is the question of how new 
conceptualizations arise on the basis of a socio-cultural reality that is increasingly 
augmented with digital technologies, which places demands on human conceptual 
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thought to move to a higher order cognitive ordering, in order to balance with the 
semiotic complexity presented in the signification sphere. N. Katherine Hayles (2012) is 
convinced that digital technologies alter human cognition radically and permanently. 
Generally, philosophies of the self (Zahavi, Gallagher, Thompson) are not taking the 
effect of cultural artefacts upon human cognition seriously into consideration. This is 
one of the aims of the case studies, however. The general aim of the case studies 
involves an inquiry into the potential of art communication to, in their multiple levels of 
signification, reveal aspects and insight from the (collective and individual) sub-
conscious and of inner human nature in ways, which transcend the current level of the 
prototypic day conscious mind.21 Following this line of thought, there are two aspects of 
modelling, viewed from a context of artistic practice, which catch my particular interest: 
1. The notion that contemporary technology-assisted art delivers a level of compression 
when it comes to the sign reference distributed, including the semantic structure of the 
interface, where signs are understood to be based on complex conceptual blends and 
loaded symbolic meaning that appears at the signifying level of the artwork and in its 
user appeal (possible cognitive models that users operate by). 
2. That an important result of art making can be the presentation of sub-conscious 
insight, which has existed as tacit knowledge (individually and/or culturally), however, 
has been left widely unarticulated at the collective level of the signification sphere. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  This	  request	  involves	  the	  constant	  oscillation	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  signification	  sphere,	  and	  thus	  is	  relating	  to	  an	  imaginary	  norm	  concerning	  mental	  schemes	  and	  the	  day	  conscious	  mind.	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Having made my aim and purpose clear, I will begin the first case study with a 
consideration of Aristotle's basic terms techné and mimetike. I hereby wish to question 
the function of art in the relation between human and Nature as a part of my urge to 
reach new ontological standpoints concerning the knowing human subject. First I need 
to make a preliminary definition of Nature, however: Nature can be understood as 
anything, in any material or non-material form, that works dynamically, that is process 
based, that affects the four dimensional world that we inhabit, and that has not in itself 
been directed by the conscious will of one or more human beings. I have chosen to 
sketch Nature in a way that allows me to ask to what extend a clear intellectual 
distinction between human cognition, socio-communicative autopoietic language games 
and Nature can widen our insight into the process of human learning at an evolutionary 
scale. I will continuously write Nature with a capital N, when I am referring to my own 
concept of Nature only. All other concepts of nature will not be written with a capital N. 
 
7.1. Reconsidering Aristotle's concepts techné and mimetike 
Aristotle's Poetics has been used widely to interpret the role of art, especially when art 
was becoming an autonomous institution in modern society during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Francis Wolf (2007) interprets the meaning of the concepts techné 
and mimetike differently from how they are often used: as descriptions of art and as 
normative directions for how art should be. Wolf claims that none of the terms 
originally meant art, as we know it today. In ancient Greece art was not institutionalized 
and did not exist as a concept. Wolf, then, understands the Aristotelian concept techné 
mimetikai (pulled together he forms a concept, that could in some ways refer to what we 
today know as art) as a modus operandus that Aristotle has observed and judged to be a 
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natural activity in man, and not a normative indication of how art should be. It has thus 
more to do with the nature of man, than with institutionalized demands on art. Techné is 
the action of handicraft where a human being masters a material or subject, and creates 
what she or the local culture has in mind or is in need of, for instance a tool, a logical 
system, a theoretical frame, or an artwork: a systematization of logos22 thereby resulting 
in the pleasure of having mimicked nature both in it's processes of creation (transferring 
ideas into material form), and/or to create specific products that are like products of 
nature, or that follow laws of nature. By techné and mimetike man both imitates and 
refines nature (because he also changes it to suit his own needs). With Forbes-Pitt's 
term, we could say that he begins to form the artefactually real (a category that refers to 
all human made forms, which play a central role as a part of the signification sphere) 
through techné. Viewed upon this background, the artefactually real becomes part of an 
evolutionary paradigm. 
 
What is then the function of mimesis? According to Wolf's interpretation of Aristotle, 
the function of mimesis is to create pleasure as a natural, healthy state of being human. 
Imitating processes in nature, and thereby getting to know them, gives a natural feeling 
of fulfilment. Hereby one could come to think of something light, inspired by 
mainstream Western connotations of the term pleasure. This could easily have roots in 
Freud (2000), who connected pleasure to the lusts of the libido. Even Roland Barthes 
(1975), who wrote about the pleasure of the text, where the idea of pleasure referred to 
an innate urge to move forwards in the text and the feeling of satisfaction by consuming 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Where logos is to be understood as something far wider than language, as in the original, philosophical meaning 
of Heraclitus, to whom it stood for order and knowledge as principles of Nature, not mainly of the human intellect.	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the text, connected the concept of pleasure analogically to that of sexual pleasure. 
However, Aristotle thought that in the nature of man, the state that contributed with the 
highest level of pleasure was the act of learning by contemplation in the process of 
becoming. Connected to this idea, I will hypothesize that the Natural telos of art 
becomes an expression of final cause; and the feeling of pleasure (not desire) an innate 
sign of this process. This understanding of learning and pleasure also shines back on the 
generative philosopher, and forms yet another premise on behalf of which she operates. 
 
7.1.2. What would mimesis be today? 
Today, art theorists have left the concept and idea of mimetike in art. From the time of 
abstract art, one does not expect art to mimic objects in nature. However, whether we 
can truly talk of mimesis or not is an unsettled question. I find that resistance towards 
accepting mimesis in art practice today is caused by the subject-object understanding 
that lies behind the judgment. Contemporary artists might not imitate Nature in 
accordance with a simple perception-material object relation. But what complicates the 
idea of something such as abstract, surreal and expressionist art as being based on 
mimesis is not, in my view, the fact that they do not imitate. It is rather that our concept 
of Nature and of the human subject needs to change, in order to understand the 
connection. This is where our five-levelled reality can help. My suggestion would be 
that rather than ending the process of mimesis, artists take a turn from an outwards to an 
inwards perspective. Furthermore, I suspect newer developments in art practice to rely 
on a development of the cognitive and imaginative capacities in humans that further 
relies on a mutual influence between evolutionary developments in the cultural 
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signification spheres and cognitive minds. In order to define objects in Nature that 
artists could be understood to imitate today, one can ask: are objects that affect human 
sensation and cognition, however, are intangible, Nature? Are cognitive patterns and 
neuron networks Nature? Are qualia? Are complex, semi-autonomous processes, based 
on internal semiosis, Nature? And from here, we can further ask: does the abstract logic 
of mathematics or computational systems show any isomorphism with structures in 
Nature, or are they pure, arbitrary constructs? 
 
7.2. The semi-autonomy of internal semiosis and its importance for knowledge 
generation 
The preliminary concept of Nature leaves two essential realms important for 
investigation: 
a) External input from the physical-material world towards the human senses in 
exosemiotic processes (what we used to call the objective) 
b) The noetic mind as a semi-autonomous realm of experience (what we used to 
call the subjective). 
The semi-autonomy of the noetic mind comes from the autopoietic processes that forms 
the more mechanical part of cognition, integrating Luhmann’s conceptual division 
between mind/psyche and language, together with the self-constituency of 
Wittgenstein’s language games, all connected in a larger scheme by Brier (2008). 
Furthermore, Brier’s concept of phenosemiosis and thought semiosis extends our view 
upon the processes of the mind, and allows us to expect a level of extensive autonomy 
when it comes to processes of thought in the individual. This is the ground material, 
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brought forward from the cybersemiotic theory, and we are, again, letting it change the 
ground premises on behalf of which we work, with deep implications for our 
understanding of the first and third person human subject that we are studying. We are 
not using cybersemiotics in a strategy of analysis by critical argumentation. We have 
consciously chosen the theory as the most potent offer that can form a ground pillar in 
the thought experiment and wide hypothesis that this project aims to present. 
One consequence of the semi-autonomy of the noetic realm would be that 
there are levels of experience that are, to some extend, independent of external input. 
This indicates that there is an inner realm of knowing and being that must be understood 
on its own terms. And we want to investigate the relation between this realm, art and 
Nature. This is somewhat in tune with Immanuel Kant’s original suggestions of 
aesthetic judgment and apriori categories of judgement, however, at our point in history, 
the basic articulation that we are able to formulate concerning apriori knowledge will 
necessarily be changed, because we have a different level of conceptualisation at hand. 
So we must ask: can we argue for the actuality of an inner reality with semi-autonomous 
properties, which actively affects our cognitive and sensitive minds, and comes into 
expression at the level of the artefactually real? And how do we research this inner 
reality? 
There are scientific branches that allow an investigation of inner realms in 
a variety of ways. Neuroscience and cognitive science are fields typically considered 
when considering issues of consciousness. They do, however, basically belong to the 
exact sciences, and rely on objectivism, empiricism, measurement, isolation of single 
phenomena from the whole, methods of falsification, and a reductive approach. They 
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have typically not been able to account for first person experience in adequate ways. A 
method that differs from methods used in neuroscience and the cognitive sciences is the 
study of cultural communications that stand in a particularly expressive and exemplary 
relation to the signification sphere in which they are embedded, and simultaneously 
implement semiosic models that are saying of current understandings of perception, 
cognition, affect and embodiment. 
 
7.2.1. The biobehavioural basis of art 
But let us first ask: how can art be understood as an expression of Nature? Rob Harle 
(2008), an artist from New Zealand, suggests that the ability to create art on the basis of 
conceptual thinking, use of metaphor and symbolic expression has become genetically 
hard wired into the species over evolutionary time. In line with the ground hypothesis of 
this project, which expects evolution of consciousness to have biological equivalences, I 
also suggest that art making and learning by contemplation through art making would 
have biological and/or neurological equivalences. I would, however, argue, in line with 
Brier’s suggestion of the complex model of human cognition and meaning making, that 
theories of gene replication, or biological learning could never tell the full story 
concerning the evolutionary development of art making as a human trait. These 
approaches could, however, deliver important bricks in the puzzle; bricks that extend 
from the computational explanations of neuroscience and the cognitive sciences, and do, 
at the same time, leave a biological perspective that can be integrated into the holistic 
framework that we are trying to establish. 
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When it comes to making sense of viewing art making as a natural trait that has 
developed evolutionarily, we only need a certain critical mass, persistence in time, and a 
pragmatic long term effect of this phenomenon, to make the philosophically inductive 
claim that art making is, in part, a biologically wired inborn human trait. I will thus 
argue that it does not make sense to think of this claim as being falsified as in the spirit 
of Karl Popper (1959), by pointing towards those who are not able to use concepts, 
metaphors and symbols in creative and original ways. A bio-behavioural trait does not 
need to be equally distributed in all 7 billion single individuals for it to be a consistent 
trait of the species, just like neurons are but one kind of specified cells out of many, 
however, are still natural, specialized, and central. 
 
To conclude we can say that, as Wolf suggested, and somewhat in line with Harle, 
techné mimetike, or art, can be viewed as a human modus operandus; a central 
evolutionary trait of our species, which leaves significant traces, with a foundation that 
lies, in part, at the biological level. To conclude, we can say that not only are we 
semiosic beings, and create signification spheres. A central element in the signification 
sphere is the creative and forward directed modus operandus of art making.23 
 
7.3. Technoetic art communication in accordance with a levelled reality 
Now, from defining art making as a central, innate human drive which colours a 
signification sphere significantly, I will move on to ask how art can reveal more about 
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  Which	  could,	  antropologically	  speaking,	  be	  a	  legitimate	  argument	  if	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  that	  most	  human	  cultures	  make	  use	  of	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  art	  making,	  however,	  of	  course,	  in	  multiple	  ways.	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objects that are by nature intangible. And ask how we are able to capture intangible 
objects through structural cognition. 
 
In The Forms of Meaning, Sebeok and Danesi (2000) wrote that a key aspect of 
semiotics is modelling. With Peirce, any case of modelling can have a real object, even 
if the object is intangible. But we cannot detect such objects if we rest in ontologies that 
nail us to a hermetically material and mechanistic worldview. It is therefore necessary 
to establish an ontology that allows a study of intangible and dynamic, process based 
phenomena. But why take an interest in intangible objects? I will answer this question 
by giving an example concerning social realities. 
As we know, many social relations, if we look at them as phenomena in 
themselves, are intangible by nature. They do not involve one homogenous physical 
object that can be observed as an object that we can all agree upon. The referential 
object does exist, nevertheless. The same goes for Shore (2006), who operates with 
cultural cognitive models, which, for example, could be behavioural patterns (for 
example holidays), or concepts that are basically constructs of mind (Santa Claus), but 
which are central in processes of social meaning making and affect the intentional 
agency of individuals and groups. Social relations must be understood as real; the same 
goes for mental concepts. Kate Forbes-Pitt partially solved this problem by establishing 
her levels of reality. I have extended these in order to allow myself to take intangible 
levels seriously into account. Peircean habits of nature are, in most cases, virtual and 
intangible, but they create effects that are (sometimes) detectable (by empiricism, by 
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inductive, deductive and abductive reason, and by intuition). The conclusion is that 
habits in Nature exist. 
 
7.4. Human learning and final cause 
So let us now extend our discourse on semiotic modelling with terms that can broaden 
the view upon the evolutionary perspective on art as a human modus operandus, and a 
bio-behavioural trait based on learning. To suit this purpose, I will present a few 
explanations and terms from the biosemiotic branch of biological science. 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008), as a biosemiotician, inserts an evolutionarily based 
perspective on the processes of living organisms that is based on Aristotle’s concept of 
final cause. Hoffmeyer further inserts a concept of learning, which operates all the way 
down to the molecular level, and is part of what it means to be a living organism. 
Learning, in the biosemiotic sense, is located as an event at cellular and molecular 
levels, as well as at properties that are tied to navigation in the ecological niche. In this 
way of viewing, organisms learn, both in single lives, but also at an evolutionary scale. 
Estonian biosemiotician, Kalevi Kull (2012), from Tartu University, in his reference to 
Hoffmeyer's work, connects the idea of learning in organisms to the concept of semiotic 
scaffolding. Scaffolding is understood to precede the ability of the organism to take 
habits at both onto- and phylogenetic levels. In this way, scaffolding becomes central in 
the process whereby organisms generate further habits, which become characteristic of 
their being and further navigation. 
	   135	  
Inspired by the concept of genetic scaffolding and general biological scaffolding, I will 
transport the term from the biological-philosophical domain to the domain of social 
realities and present the idea that growth in semiotic complexity is a sign of evolution. 
The term is not used as a metaphor, but rather as an attempt to rectify a similarity 
between processes of biological communication and dynamical patterns of 
intersubjective communication. 24  The growth in semiosic complexity, viewed as 
scaffolding, would leave clear traces in complex ways of modelling at the scale of 
single artist or artist groups. This could be based on scaffolding of information and 
signs through instruments such as computers, information technologies, but in principle 
it could also be the composition of architectures and cities built on responsive 
technologies. This viewpoint thus involves processes of refinement at cultural levels as 
well as at inner, cognitive (and perhaps cellular) levels. 
 
In lies with Peirce’s phaneroscopic connection between firstness, secondness and 
thirdness, his connection between the logic of mind and the logic of the universe (based 
on Aristotle) and the extensive autonomy of the sub-conscious mind, it would be 
appropriate to expect that the process of art making is, in part, dominated by cultural- 
and day conscious rationalities, but that the construction of concepts and the creative 
processes involved, are in no way arbitrary when it comes to how works relate to habits 
in Nature. So, at some level, there would be a level of correspondence to take into 
account. The tricky thing is however, that in this context we are investigating 
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  Varela’s	  concept	  of	  autopoisis	  into	  the	  social	  domain	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correspondence in relation to five levels of reality, whereas positivistic reality related 
the materially real with logical aspects of the ideally real, first and foremost. 
 
In classical art, emphasis was placed on observing and representing the relationship 
between a three dimensional physical reality and human visual sensation, without too 
much emphasis upon processes of internal semiosis or the other senses. The level of 
representation, or rather, with Brier and Peirce, the level of interpretation and sign 
value, which would be relevant to formulate and study today, would lie in an 
understanding of the relationship between human subject and world that takes into 
account the increased complexity involved in internal semiosis, and the ongoing 
dynamic oscillations between internal and external input-output relations. This means 
that the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity becomes highly problematic in 
philosophy. When Mark Taylor (2001) wrote the book The Moment of Complexity, he 
wrote of complexity as a social phenomenon. I subscribe to the idea of social 
complexity, however my focus is upon internal semiosis, where the moment of 
complexity appears as an inner phenomenon: the inner accumulation of semiosic25 
complexity. 
 
Besides from levels of the socially real, the intangible would be located at the level of 
the virtually real. The ideally real, on the other hand, is the realm by which individuals 
can become mediators between the virtually real and other reality levels. The relation to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  ”Semiosic”	  is	  here	  used	  as	  an	  adverb	  and	  not	  as	  a	  theoretical	  reference,	  which	  shall	  show	  its	  assimilation	  into	  the	  theory,	  and	  thereby	  into	  the	  thought	  processes	  of	  the	  generative	  philosopher	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reality levels is a dynamic, symbiotic relation of constant flux. We are now interested in 
viewing dynamic, relational, process based, intangible, and/or micro scale objects, and 
to study their schemes of flux in particular spacetimes, and how they evoke 
multisensory (synesthetic), cognitive and conscious behaviours (signs) within ourselves. 
This latter observation gives modelling new connotations. Modelling, then, is our ability 
to structure percepts in cognitive models that become habitual, and which form 
prerequisites for models at the level of the artefactually real. In order to understand how 
and why I find technoetic artworks exemplary, when it comes to defining new semiosic 
complexities at the level of cultural semiosis, I will go through two different works that 
can illustrate some of my points. 
 
7.5. Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau's work Life Writer (2006) 
Life Writer demonstrates an old-style typewriter with properties of a digital computer, 
which can transform users' alphabetic writings into generative, virtual creatures that 
live, eat, reproduce and mutate. This happens in the interface, which is, in part, formed 
by electronic paper, placed like real paper would have been in a classical typewriter. 
When users type, each type transforms into algorithms within the underlying code 
structure of the machine, where the information is restructured. The result is multiple 
small creatures that move around the virtual paper. The creatures inhere both individual 
and common features. They have a relative life span, according to the fitness that they 
obtain by nurture, and the heritage line that is possible to uphold by processes of mating 
and reproduction. If we are to view a work like Life Writer as an expression of 
modelling, the work demonstrates not only a complex way of modelling, but what, with 
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Sebeok and Danesi, we could call a higher order tertiary modelling structure, and what 
with Longo we could say was based on bricolage. The work operates at several 
conceptual levels, and presents themes that diverge in historical time and disciplinary 
reference. 
 
If we begin by looking at the iconic level, the usability of the typewriter is based on a 
central conceptual blend: the mix of the typewriter and the computer. Each concept 
inheres a line of connotations, which can both be taken fairly far. They would be viewed 
as compressed expressions of two eras in Western culture: the print era, and the era of 
the computer. The interesting sign then is the sign that allows a simultaneous distinction 
and pairing of central elements from both eras. The form of the typewriter and its look 
as an object connotes static signs on a piece of paper: linear structure and paper books. 
                             
                   
                          Figure 4: Life Writer. 
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The fact that the object is actually a computer gives it an additional set of connotations: 
computational algorithms behind dynamic signs, digital interfaces and data storage. At 
the paradigmatic level, we find another blend: the concept of Darwinian evolution and 
“survival of the fittest”, where theoretical science is blended with digital design. The 
creatures’ behaviour not only connotes biological evolution, but also a development of 
the computer that involves genetic and/or evolutionary algorithms (algorithms that have 
a higher level of contingency when it comes to development). The two blends present us 
to a new product at the material and concrete level with interesting symbolic potentials. 
Lakoff, Johnson, Fauconnier and Turner were preoccupied with mental blends. Life 
Writer, however, presents an externalized cognitive blend, and lets us imagine a fast, 
dynamic and mutually influential relation between mind and matter, between levels of 
the ideally real and the artefactually real, which is historically unusual. 
 
7.6. New levels of connotation in symbolic reference 
When it comes to the typewriter gaining legitimacy as a symbol that can refer to print 
culture, which is a period in Western culture that started with the Gutenberg Press in the 
1500’s, this reference needs to be understood as a symbol. The main definition of a 
Peircean symbol is that it is agreed upon by convention. One symbolic reference in the 
typewriter could thus be print culture as a historical epoch. The connotations of the 
typewriter as a socio-cultural artefactual type further brings with it the idea that print 
culture is based on social sharing, learning, remembering and developing on the basis of 
the linear print text as a central way of modelling. With The Literary Mind by Mark 
Turner (1999), we understood that linear print text could be viewed as a particular way 
of cognitively structuring knowledge and insight. 
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For our symbol, the typewriter, to rest upon convention, there needs to be a certain 
critical mass, who are well informed of the history of the printing press, and the 
centrality of print text for the building of Western culture and the overall signification 
spheres, and who might also be acquainted with the idea that linear text structure affects 
human cognition. If so, they are prone to make at least some of the connotations made 
in this chapter. In this project it is an aim to add new connotations to new kinds of 
symbols, which takes symbolism into new meta-levels (and levels of the intangible). 
Further than the symbolic value of the typewriter, creatures’ behaviours also gain a 
symbolic value, which, in this case, can be defined as a reference to evolution proper, to 
evolution as a theoretical concept, to evolution as a computational principle, and to the 
intersection point between biological and artificial life. The theoretical concept of 
evolution gains a material and functional existence in Life Writer, and this is a central 
observation. 
 
But the semantics of Life Writer is not as simple as to just present us to conceptual 
blends in a material form. At the symbolic level, the typewriter/computer and 
Darwinian evolution/algorithmic evolution blend is also provoked by another inherent 
symbolic connotation, which is how the typewriter functions. Function becomes 
symbolic. The cutting edge between yesterday (print writing and biological evolution) 
and tomorrow (genetic algorithms and synthetic evolution) becomes part of the 
semantic interface through functionality. 
Functionality presents the point of discrepancy that brings two central 
communicational forms and ways of structuring knowledge together. In relation to the 
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symbolic reference based on the combination of genetic algorithms and interface 
creatures, the overall generative mode of the installation could be understood to 
symbolize processes of emergence as well. And we could expect a reference both to a 
computational principle, but also, perhaps, to habits in Nature. The interface and screen, 
and the concept that lies behind, further bears the potential for anticipatory 
connotations, which lead to contemplations concerning the theme of humans creating 
life, such as in computational Artificial Life at the level of the digitally virtual, or 
bioengineering at the level of the artefactually real. And, it is further suggestive of a 
way of seeing Nature: a possible relation between the habits of Nature and an 
underlying set of algorithms, a relation which we have not, as of yet, defined. 
 
Another important point when considering the transfer of mental concepts into material 
form, is that it appears much more obvious that a paradigm such as Darwinian evolution 
becomes but one concept among others, which has been developed in the fallible road 
of human knowing. We get a different overview when it becomes an object of use and 
functionality, and therefore a single sign in itself, rather than a scientific doctrine that 
we are taught as truth in school. This pattern of transfer from the development of a 
mental concept to its artefactual representation has affinity with the historical 
development of geometry, mathematics, formal logic and quantum mechanics when it 
comes to their applicability in the construction of the electronic and digital computer, 
and in software design and interface semiotics. The point here is that geometry, 
mathematics, formal logic and quantum mechanics were first derived as abstract 
theories, and today they form basic tools for practical application in for instance 
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software tools (drawing programs), and form a central underlying part of the current 
signification sphere. Thus, although the chains of cause and effect between mental 
concepts and their effects at the level of the artefactually real are by no means clear, it 
seems legitimate to talk of a transfer that happens over time, where insight from the 
ideally real is transferred into the artefactually real, gains new status, and provokes new 
insight at the level of the ideally real. 
 
Danish researcher Falk Heinrich (2009) sees the digital art installation as a social, self-
referential kind of communication. Like Florian Cramer (2011), Michael Punt (2006) 
and Christiane Heibach (2000), Heinrich sees digital installations as distributions of 
imagination. Here, I will call into remembrance our concept of Nature, which could be 
understood to work through our imagination. Thereby products of our imagination can 
witness imprints into our structure made by Nature. When it comes to digital 
installations we now have the aid of executable, computational code, electronic tools, 
and sensor technologies to express properties of the imagination. Imprints of Nature on 
the imagination would, as part of the artistic process, appear as cognitively ordered 
intuitive insight, which is then implemented into the artwork. Cognition would, as 
viewed in this context, represent a brain-based ability to structure and create patterns 
from the flux of percepts, qualia and sign input. From here, we are looking for a link 
between human cognitive structures, and objects in Nature. 
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7.7. Adam Brown: Bion (2006) 
Adam Brown’s installation Bion is an artificial life inspired interactive sculpture. It 
represents a text that demonstrates principles of swarm intelligence and emergent 
behaviour based on hundreds of small units and a generative algorithmic system. 
Whereas Life Writer primarily referred to writing systems and sign systems, Bion does 
not use a well-known object to communicate its message. 
Bion represents a solid material form that inheres an overall dynamic 
behaviour and sensitive responsiveness based on electronic, digital and artificial life 
technologies. The programming principles rely on a system of local-global activity that 
leaves each unit with its own level of artificial intelligence. Thereby the global level is 
not dominating single units in any one to one relation. The use of artificial intelligence 
algorithms in single units allow for a higher degree of open probability, when it comes 
to how local-global communicational patterns are generated. But what happens when 
users interact with Bion? 
                          
 
                              Figure 5: Bion. By Adam Brown. Taken from: 
                http://www.cal.msu.edu/files/5213/1039/5329/bion01-sig06.jpg 
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When people move into proximity of the sculpture, existing patterns of communication 
are immediately arrested. For a while, they stay quiet. The presence of a user interrupts 
the sculpture’s internal patterns that had emerged when the sculpture was left without 
external input. Slowly, units start to adapt to the user by picking up information about 
them through the inbuilt sensors. Then new patterns of communication are woven in a 
patchwork of blue light and sound, in which user movement and user presence becomes 
an integrated part, which again allows the sculpture to form global patterns of 
communication at another level of emergence. 
 
7.8. Installation, concept, symbol and Natural object 
When it comes to viewing the installation on behalf of modelling, the idea of distributed 
imagination becomes clearer. The small, blue, interactive units of the installation are, 
according to Brown, exemplifying a kind of quantum energy, called orgones. The idea 
of the bion is a concept originally suggested by psychiatrist Wilhelm Reich (1897-
1957), who believed bions to be biological units that carry energy at sub-atomic levels. 
According to Brown, Reich's theory has been overlooked in the field of classical 
physics and biology. Brown presents his idea by combining the idea of bions with the 
historically newer concept of swarm intelligence. Bions are then representing clusters of 
interactive entities that, in combination, uphold an overall generative order, 
characterizing an on-going development of behavioural patterns. By modelling a 
relationship between humans and imaginative energetic entities at a material level, and 
by using the concept of the swarm, which exemplifies a form of collective intelligence 
as part of the behaviour of the system, Brown has created a work where user and artist 
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can have a phenomenological and contemplative experience of the idea of orgone 
energy, an idea that otherwise has its a priori origin in the noetic landscape of the mind, 
and on paper only. Brown has made the idea accessible to a multi-modal and bodily 
experience. 
 
It is an interesting point that while an idea like orgone theory, or biological entities 
which work in a swarm like kind of intelligence or cognition, is being dismissed as 
naive vitalism within mainstream biology, it proves necessary to integrate functions 
similar to intelligence in the moment one wants to simulate life like behaviour in even 
remotely realistic manners. One simply cannot establish behaviour in a sculpture 
without concepts that move beyond the idea of randomness and pure statistical Shannon 
and Wiener information, even if such might be involved at the level of computational 
algorithms within the sculpture proper. 
 
We can, interestingly, relate this speculative consideration to the propositions of Korean 
Professor of molecular biology, Sungchul Ji. Ji (2012) suggests that an entity called the 
gnergon is responsible for invigoration and information of molecular cell work. Ji 
regards Reich's orgone as a sub-category of his own invention, the gnergon, which he 
proposes to consist of a combination of information and energy (etymologically, the 
word is derived from the Greek words gnosis (knowledge) and ergon (energy). To Ji, it 
is the gnergon that drives semiosic processes in the organism. However, energy is not to 
be reduced to the way in which it is understood in physical science. In this sense, it is 
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not equal to kinetic energy, heat or work. It lies at the level of Peircean firstness, 
according to Ji. Semiosic processes at the biological level demand information, 
however, biological processes cannot be described as informational only, because they, 
according to Ji, and along with most biosemioticians, demand interpretation. 
Furthermore, Ji presents a theory where he likens cellular language (cellese) with 
human language (humanese). Thus, he finds strong parallels between biological and 
human semiosic processes at a structural and analogical level. This consideration of 
what it actually takes to create life like behaviour could also be related to Ji’s insistence 
that information must be a property that leads energy in the biological organism, 
because concepts of energy based on physical science do not explain the actual 
complexity of functions relying on energy in the biological structure. There is obviously 
a missing link, and Ji fills this link out with information combined with energy in the 
gnergon, whereas Hoffmeyer is satisfied by filling it out with cellular molecular 
semiosis and final cause, and where Peirce, whose writings have inspired Ji’s research, 
would say that pure feeling is a pre-requisite for matter, and an innate property of 
organic matter. He would, however, most likely not situate knowledge and energy at a 
level of firstness. 
 
The problem concerning what it takes to create life like behaviours also presents itself 
in the emerging field of synthetic biology.26 Synthetic biology is mainly based on a 
combination of physics and chemistry, combined with theoretical biology, and is carried 
out as forward directed research in laboratories, assisted by varied creative approaches 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Reference:	  Conference,	  Copenhagen	  University:	  January 14th, 2011. 9.00 AM - 18.00 PM: Machine and 
Organism - on Synthetic Biology. 
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based on computer modelling and chemical experiment. In the long run, however, 
depending on the true goals of synthetic biology, we would have to expect that 
researchers run into the same problem: emergent properties do not arise from principles 
of randomness, and they do not create life. The necessity of a telos or of final cause in 
processes that involve interpretants is the main problem in mainstream biology, attacked 
by Biosemiotics. 
In Biosemiotics, the idea of final cause is not equal to anthropomorphism, 
because the discipline is aimed to keep as objective as possible in order to attain 
empirical goals. But even with the acceptance of final cause and interpretation, 
something such as an adequate theory of mind is lacking in biosemiotics, where many 
biosemioticians, in order to place themselves within the realm of the exact sciences, 
must subscribe to a non-minded scientism that does not take Peircean deep ontology 
seriously into account, in spite of simultaneously subscribing to his semiotic categories, 
and parts of his ontology. 
 
Bion can thereby be understood as a piece of mind work that rests upon the ability to 
generate behaviour in a complex system, expressed in the semiosic language of 
augmented reality. The techné of Adam Brown is philosophy, science, and 
technological know-how, but at the level of the ideally real, it is his ability to 
understand properties of complex, adaptive systems, and to use it as a cognitive 
structure that orders his contemplations and insights. He must be able to form complex 
structures at the level of the ideally real in order to express it at the level of the 
artefactually real. 
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The ability to move from a point of departure in linear cognitive structure (practiced in 
print culture), to structures of complexity and process-oriented views at large (practiced 
in the culture of the digital computer), could very likely have brain-based equivalents 
relating perhaps to new activation of yet unused areas in the pre-frontal lobes, and new 
levels of physiological structure at the brain level. Thus, the level of objectification and 
meaning making can be understood so that interpretants connected to intangible objects 
in Nature that are based on structure, are demonstrated in the particular way of 
modelling that Bion represents. This, again, generates interpretants in users, which 
might provoke them to generate new cognitive structures at sub-conscious levels that 
have physiological equivalences. The installation, then, at a philosophical level, 
concerning Peirce's idea of evolution, also becomes a sign of a process that combines 
the evolution of human cognition and cultural semiosic scaffolds in a connective 
learning process, which relies on the ability of humans to imitate objects in Nature by 
the particularity of cognitive patterning. Thus, there is an imitation going on, however, 
the link is not mainly based on a connection between the materially- and the 
artefactually real symbolized by reference to macro scale objects. 
 
As we return to Aristotle and the thesis of learning and scaffolding in cultural semiosis, 
this imitative process can be viewed as purposeful outside of the human rational day 
conscious mind in the way that humans are understood to inhere an innate drive in the 
direction of imitating, and to creatively producing, and growth when it comes to the 
semiotic ability to connect senses, cognition and Natural objects in still more complex 
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and productive ways (combined with a growth in activated yet unused potential in the 
brain). 
But in order to not delude ourselves into thinking that there is a simple line 
of Natural telos, cause and effect, we must emphasize that human and cultural evolution 
might not have a plot and an end purpose likely of that of a romance, a tragedy, or 
another simple linear cause and effect relation. I would rather suggest that inherent in 
human evolution, there could be multiple lines carried by evolutionary purpose (telos) 
that are connected to fairly stable habits in Nature. None of which, however, would be 
overall determinate, or represent potentials that can stand alone. These evolutionary 
lines form a sub-level of Nature. To not work in completely idiosyncratic manners, we 
could relate this idea to Peircean evolution, which is threefold, and captures both 
evolution by chance (tychism), evolution by mechanical necessity (anancasm), and 
evolutionary love (agapism); the latter of which is more constructive and forward 
directed. If these concepts are related to the concept of habits rather than laws in Nature, 
the foundation for a multiplicity of evolutionary lines can be laid. 
 
The complexity of the system presented in Bion can be thought to be much less complex 
than actual enfolded orders of nature, however, much more complex than cultural 
semiosis at an earlier point in history. The degree to which they can apply to external 
processes of nature is thereby limited, but perhaps more inclusive than linear, causal 
structure. As I understand it, such a work is imitating nature by creating a model of 
dynamic relationships that approximates possible enfolded orders concerning cognitive 
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patterns by which we structure noetic experience, and thereby ways in which we 
understand relationships between enfolded structure, and it's outfolded realities27. 
 
7.9. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have accepted to view Aristotle’s concepts techné and mimetike as a 
natural way in which we as human beings purposefully, but often unconsciously, enact 
natural, functional, and perhaps purposeful, learning processes. These learning 
processes happen in an oscillation between the collective and the individual, and they 
cross historical time. At the level of the artefactually real, the modus operandus of 
techné mimetike results in still more complex and/or refined ways of semiotic 
scaffolding, which have equivalences in a similar refinement at cognitive levels. Techné 
mimetike is not bound to a specific institution. Its full reality cannot be understood by 
merely relating it to institutionalized practice, or with Peirce we could say that its object 
exists by itself, in and out of the institution. The art theoretical idea of mimetic art is 
then a retrospective conclusion, based on a cultural heritage concerning art making in a 
very specific historico-cultural period, rather than an observation of the nature of 
mimesis as a natural, innate, species specific way of acting that has been practiced for 
thousands of years. 
 
We can hereby conclude that contemplation of technoetic art installations can bring us 
closer to new, unexplored territories concerning extra-sensory levels of reality, which 
again concern ways in which structures of non-physical levels influence upon physical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  The	  concepts	  of	  enfolded	  and	  outfolded	  orders	  are	  inspired	  by	  Bohm,	  1980	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levels of reality. This happens both because of the creative mimetic aspect of art 
making, and because of the demonstration of ways in which we structure our 
understandings at the noetic realm of experience. The discovery of these reality levels 
involves the imaginative mind, and new ways of understanding the relationship between 
mind and nature. It can potentially further our understandings of how we as humans are 
related to nature, and of our potentials for using our specific, ecological position to 
enhance the world, we inhabit, in accordance with our minds. By externalizing 
developments within our own ways of ordering and structuring experience with the aid 
of electronic and digital technologies, we can learn more of the unexplored territory of 
the noetic mind, and it's relation to processes in Nature. 
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Chapter 6, Case Study 2: The Role of Affect and 
Feeling in Internal Semiosis and in Art Contemplation 
 
8.0. Introduction 
In the previous case study I placed a focus upon cognition as an intellectual and pre-
intellectual ability to structure and order knowledge, and asked of the relation between 
cognition and Nature. On that behalf, I formed a speculation concerning how the 
evolutionary development of cultural sign systems such as verbal language, 
mathematics and other symbolic languages, ending up in complex semiotic 
compositions such as the technoetic artwork, exemplify and provoke further thoughts on 
the relation between human, cognition and Nature. In the present case study, I change 
my focus to speculate about the role of affect and feeling in knowledge generation and 
formation. 
 
The urge to characterise and define the nature of aesthetic experience and its function in 
knowledge generation is ancient. We have met it in Aristotle, Baumgarten, Kant, and 
later on in Adorno and Horkheimer, and Jürgen Habermas. They have, however, 
primarily given philosophical accounts of the phenomenon, and have, except for Kant, 
focussed upon aesthetic experience as a sensational experience. In this case study, 
however, I aim to combine an art philosophical approach with a biophysical approach, 
remembering my goal of asking of biological, neurological and biophysical equivalents 
of the evolution of consciousness and cognition. 
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In the air of epochè, I will begin by formulating my immediate account of the aesthetic 
experience. The aesthetic experience is viewed as a moment that can arise in between 
user and artwork, which effects a significant and persistent inner change of 
consciousness in the user, which is often assisted by anticipatory insights (indicating 
that the aesthetic moment exists outside of regular three to four dimensional spacetime). 
With results gained in Part II, Chapter 5, we could call the aesthetic moment a 
significant situation of learning that happens in the relation between human and Nature 
through the mediation of the artwork, which, again, has a clear reference to objects in 
Nature. The aesthetic experience is here understood as a pre-linguistic experience that 
can, however, be intellectually interpreted. 
 
With Brier’s terms we can already begin to characterise the pre-linguistic part as 
phenosemiosic, and the interpretive part as a process where thought semiosis mixes with 
socio-communicative autopoietic language games at an internal level. However, that 
only leads us to a vague and overall description. Our quest is to ask for a higher degree 
of specificity. If we start by shortly consulting Kant’s philosophy of aesthetic judgment 
(Kant, 2005), we can see that Kant emphasises feeling as an essential part of the 
aesthetic moment. Feeling in the aesthetic moment, to Kant, is non-conceptual. It 
exemplifies a purpose in Nature in a formal way, and it is universal, and thereby 
exemplary. In this sense, aesthetic judgment rests upon feeling before it rests upon the 
intellect. But can we be sure that there is a separation quite so rigid between feeling, 
cognition and language? Can feeling not be cognitive? And how, anyway, can we define 
a concept as vague as feeling, when seeking a deeper understanding of the aesthetic 
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experience? We could start by accepting Peirce’s concept of feeling, where feeling is 
understood as pure quality that exists as firstness in the living organism. This means that 
feeling can also be connected to the physical substance of the organic body. This vague 
appearance of feeling in physiological substance, however, is with Brier characterised 
as qualia and pure potentiality, whereas cognition would rather relate to pattern fitting. 
But what is qualia? And what is potentiality? 
In a time of scientific development where quantum- and nano-scientific 
approaches to physicality continue to provide new vocabularies and new levels of 
conceptualization related to micro- and nano scales level of reality, we will ask if there 
are theories that take these fields into account and that could provide terms or 
metaphors that can allow a more specified articulation of physiological equivalences of 
what Kant and Peirce had to articulate in strictly philosophical terms. 
 
In this case study I will seek to generate a theoretical sketch, where the study of the 
artificial intelligence sculpture, Autopoiesis, by Kenneth Rinaldo from a perspective of 
user interaction, is used to provoke insights that can be assisted by theoretical input 
(mainly by assisting with concepts and vocabularies), which can, in total, result in an 
integrative transdisciplinary text, which can express new sides of the aesthetic moment. 
Besides from reading relevant theory, combined with input from Autopoiesis, I must 
emphasize that I bring my personal phenomenological experience, along with 
abductions made on behalf of my existing academic background with me as a 
background for the overall study. This is what allowed me to have a preliminary idea of 
the moment of aesthetics in the first place, and it is what ensures me as a first 
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hypothesis, that the aesthetic experience is neither based on cultural semiosis, nor on the 
brain or cognitive patterns alone. It is rather fully embodied, and it integrates more than 
one physical kind of semiosis, among which is the feeling of electrified excitation. But 
how can it make sense to talk of electrification as a feeling with real biological and 
phenomenological sign reference value? 
 
8.1. Feeling 
Let us begin by seeking a basic definition of feeling. Antonio Damasio (1999) is a 
neuroscientist who insists that feeling has a central role in rational behaviour as opposed 
to the general understanding at the time. He presents a concept of background emotion, 
which he claims colours all rational decision. And he presents the idea of a kind of 
second order level of emotion, which suggests complex compositions based on a variety 
of simple emotions. Damasio’s research presented a break with positivistic logic in 
neuroscience by claiming that feeling and emotion cannot be overlooked in questions of 
consciousness and cognition. 
 
In order to clearly mark his area of research, Damasio (1999, p. 27) places a distinction 
between mind and consciousness, where mind is understood as mindedness in total, and 
consciousness is based on being aware, of knowing and of being a self. The intellectual 
distinction made between feeling and knowing is well in accordance with Brier's 
distinction between phenosemiosis and thought semiosis. My use of the concept of 
consciousness, however, is not equal to that of Damasio. I find that our primary lack of 
knowledge lies within the domain of understanding feeling as an innate communicating 
	   156	  
property of the physiological and minded body; and not as much in the study of the 
subject-object relation and emphasis on the external material three-dimensional world. 
But how can we move forward then, in our examination of the nature of feeling? 
 
When it comes to the physiology of feeling, I expect a connection between sensation 
and feeling. J. J. Gibson’s (1968) has presented an, at the time, original idea of 
perceptual systems. Gibson’s claim was that perceptual systems emerge at a second 
order level to concrete organs of sensation. Perceptual systems are not organs, but 
systems, based on structure at the next level of emergence. I would suspect that the kind 
of feeling I seek to describe, is, just like perceptions, not based directly on chemical or 
electrical properties of certain areas of the brain or other organs. Rather it would have a 
more global nature. Furthermore, I expect there to be a qualitative difference between 
feeling and cognition, and a relation between feeling and qualia on the one hand, and 
between structure and cognition on the other hand. 
 
8.1.2. Experience and mind alteration 
But aesthetic experience is not just a feeling in itself. It is a deeper, subjective event that 
carries a re-organizational principle. Where this level of re-organization happens, 
however, is yet unclear. The same goes for the level of biological signification that is an 
outcome of feeling. 
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The idea of a type of experience that can alter one's basic conscious point of departure is 
suggested in the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans Georg Gadamer (2004). However, 
where Gadamer emphasized culture and history, and where his conception of the mind 
was purely philosophical and related to the individual subjective mind, and not to an 
embodied mind, we are looking to describe how these alterations can be understood to 
happen at a physiological level, and to integrate our finding from this level with the 
other kinds of semiosis that Brier has presented. 
I must here emphasize, once again, that the human subject is continuously 
viewed as a part of an oscillatory, relative, dynamic relation with the general 
signification sphere, and the social collective realm, which consists of other human 
subjects, networks, social systems and language games. There can be no one to one 
distinction between the individual and the general signification sphere. The thesis is that 
if alterations happen in multiple individuals, it can cause an effect in the signification 
spheres on equal terms as an alteration can happen in the individual (a lasting effect, or 
to give a single example by mentioning Luhmann’s (1994) theory of art: a mutation in 
the evolution of the art system. This thesis further indicates that an individual is not 
necessarily, and at all times, a sub-component of the cognition of the overall system. 
There would be no simple equation placing the individual below or above the level of 
the collective in any stable manner. And I do also, like Kant, expect processes of inner 
alteration happening in the aesthetic moment to have a general, but not necessarily 
universal, character (if by “universal” we mean that the function would be stable at all 
times). This means that they can, potentially, happen to any human being, and that their 
quality of inner signification would have a reference point outside of the single 
individual. 
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8.2. Autopoiesis 
Having cleared an understanding of aesthetic perception and judgement and the concept 
of feeling, we are now ready to examine our third technoetic installation. Autopoiesis by 
Kenneth Rinaldo. Autopoiesis (2000) is already one of the classics of interactive art, and 
it is mentioned as a canonical work in Christiane Paul's (2003) account of digital art. 
I have chosen Autopoiesis as a part of a case study because it tests the 
concept of autopoiesis (self-generation and self-maintenance based on cybernetic feed-
back loops, a term coined by Humberto Maturana and his student Francisco Varela) at 
the level of the artefactually real (demonstrates a physical construction that expresses 
the idea of autopoiesis), rather than merely presenting this idea at the level of the ideally 
real (mental ideas distributed in books). 
It is my thesis that the interactive, embodied experience of an installation 
like Autopoiesis can successfully add to knowledge and insight that already exists as 
theoretical autopoiesis theory (Maturana, Varela, Luhmann, Brier), and that a 
theoretical characterization of what possibly happens in user-installation interaction can 
add to this experience and affect theory (and the ideally real) back. As we know, the 
installation as a text form is not based on a kind of semantics that makes use of semiotic 
precision or exactness for its communicational purpose. Rather, it is based on creative 
conceptual blends and an overall presentation of ambiguity. I have written that 
Autopoiesis tests a concept. But it does more than that: it presents one or more 
alternative approaches, which, as contemplations between theory and practice/ 
phenomenological experience are being made each in their particularity, can make 
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paradigmatic structures of the central topic (autopoiesis) become more evident and 
easier to deconstruct. This experience can potentially provoke new insights. 
 
Autopoiesis consists of fifteen robotic arms that hang down from the ceiling in a 
hardwired structure. The arms are made of cabernet sauvignon grapevines, which are 
intertwined and compressed by a steel wire skeleton. Each arm is augmented with 
infrared sensors that emit light and thereby capture positions of users through 
registration of heat, and make each robotic sculpture user sensitive. This user sensitivity 
happens in a process of local input/output response that results in attraction and 
repulsion behaviours of the sculptural arms. The response to user interaction behaviour 
causes the arms to generate and develop patterns of sound, based on telephone tones. 
Two of the arms carry inbuilt lipstick cameras that capture users on video, so as to 
distribute a sense of observation made on the sculpture’s behalf. The film is shown 
immediately on a wall in the installation space. The exploration on the user’s side, then, 
is to acquaint the behavioural patterns that emerge in the sculpture as users interact with 
it. A central state controller compares input from local devices and gives impulses to the 
collective behaviour of the arms. Rinaldo, however, underlines that local input/output 
behaviour precedes global information handling, and the dominion of local over global 
is a central principle in the installation. 
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                            Figure 6: Autopoiesis by Kenneth Rinaldo. Taken from: 
                   http://www.ylem.org/artists/krinaldo/works/autopoiesis/atp01.html 
 
The programming of the sculpture is based on artificial intelligence algorithms, which 
makes communicational exchange between units, and between units and users resemble 
processes of self-generation and emergence in ways similar to those we saw in Brown's 
Bion. It furthermore adds a theme of evolution to the sculpture, because it develops over 
time in ways that are, in part, unpredictable. Of course, since Autopoiesis is a 
computational system, the artificial life algorithms do not provide 100% unpredictable 
reactions. They rather result in probabilistic contingency, when it comes to the 
communicational acts of individual arms, and the patterns that individual arms create as 
they interfere with each other's level of contingency at a global basis. The functionality 
of the installation is based on feedback loops between local and global communication 
patterns, along with the input given from sensors' reaction to user behaviour. Users do 
not form the internal system of Autopoiesis. They rather “pertubate” its existing internal 
logic. 
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On the basis of the autopoiesis like organizational system of the sculpture, Rinaldo has 
established two overall possible moods in the sculpture, based on the pitch, tone and 
frequency of telephone tones distributed as an overall soundscape. One emotional state 
appears as high tones, organized in chaotic patterns. It symbolizes stress and fear. The 
other appears as calm, harmonic noise, symbolizing equilibrium and satisfaction. The 
idea is that the sculpture oscillates between the two emotional states, and that they are 
an implicit part of the user-interaction communication, and of the overall electronic, 
hard-wired structure of the sculpture. The balance in communication between user 
behaviour and sculptural behaviour continues to change as users move in and out of the 
installation. The landscape of tones and motion, then, symbolically, becomes an 
experiential realm of the sculpture (at a symbolic level), which a user can explore by 
being aware through a focused and interactive immersed presence. 
 
8. 3. The Ideal User 
When seeking to integrate the communication of Autopoiesis into my speculative 
studies, it becomes obvious that it is challenging to study, contemplate and articulate 
user-installation interactions. How can I for instance expect users to engage in 
intellectual academic contemplation of artworks? And is there any general scale on 
which the user can be nailed down and captured? 
 
All though ranges of conceptual images of a user have been theorized, for instance in 
Human Computer Interaction theory and theory of interaction design, I would claim that 
there can be no factual, reductive version of a general user. On the other hand, there are 
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definitely levels of generality in user interaction that can be detected. In art installations, 
as well as in interface design, the design strategy is typically constructed on a 
conceptual background (idealised cognitive models) that brings together design skills 
with academic knowledge. Phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience, 
psychology and/or linguistics are academic areas that influence highly upon design 
strategies. When it comes to art practice there is, of course, a higher degree of 
experimentation involved. However, it is my claim that the idealized cognitive models 
upon which design strategies are made, and which will then form a central part of the 
user appeal, will appear as an implied user in the interface. The implied user is in no 
way explicit, but must be analysed forward. The point is, however, that there are clear 
indications of a specific concept of a user implied in any kind of interaction design, just 
like Wolfgang Iser (1974) originally pointed out that any literary work inheres an 
implied reader. And this is one level of generality that we can attach to the ideal user. 
She will interact with the implied user. The implied user, however, is not identical to the 
ideal user. The implied user is a level in the installation that gives directions for 
interaction. The ideal user, on the other hand, is a theoretical and conceptual modelling 
tool. 
 
Because of the ambiguity of semiotic reference in the interfaces of technoetic artworks, 
which can neither be read in any unidirectional way, nor through any one cultural sign 
system, if I want to succeed in articulating the identity of a hermeneutic-semiotic ideal 
user, I am forced to think of a human subject, who is able to experience new 
connections between sense and reason, between current disciplinary divides, between 
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body and brain, and between imagination and reality. There are thus two overall levels 
of user experience that I wish to examine and implement into the concept of the ideal 
user: Immediate, phenomenological experience, and intellectual-academic, 
contemplative experience. 
The process of interpreting the experience of the installation from a pure 
phenomenological and pre-linguistic experience, to an intellectually articulated 
experience based on meaning making and cognitive models has not been widely 
explored in theoretical studies of contemporary art. Brian Massumi (2005), as well as 
Mark B. N. Hansen (2004), who are both philosophers of art and new media, form 
overall phenomenological approaches that include studies of the body and the 
multimodal aspect of interface interaction. But they avoid taking the discursive sides of 
artworks into account. Qvortrup (2003) characterises interactive art as the art of 
emergence, and claims that intellectual aesthetic judgment is no longer possible, due to 
the non-referential interface and the non-privileged position of the subjective observer. 
 
As a research subject, who is close, but not equal to the ideal user, I will speculate and 
treat the situation at an academic, higher-order meta level that, by its very nature, 
reaches further than that of the ideal user. Had I not a privileged position beyond the 
moment of immersion and contemplation of the artwork, I would not be able to observe 
the ideal user and articulate my findings. This gives me already two positions: that of 
the research subject (which is equal to the generative philosopher), and that of the ideal 
user. I will ask the reader to note, once again, that I am connecting the act of writing 
theory to the act of observation. Thus, construction and observation are not opposites. 
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A semantic construction relates directly to an act of observation, which again relates to 
one or more dynamical objects. But let us look further into Autopoiesis. 
 
8.4. Internal semiosis: symbolized and actualized 
So user-installation interaction in Autopoiesis involves two sensitive systems with each 
their level of dynamic, internal communication that integrates function and emotion, 
and that is central in the communication process; at least in principle. Autopoiesis is, of 
course, a simulation of autopoiesis. The sculpture is, as art theorist Falk Heinrich has 
pointed out, based on as-if-autopoiesis (Heinrich, 2009). It can, however, as it is 
arranged in a confined space, and demonstrates functional and relational principles 
understood to be central nodal points in what forms a system of biological-intelligent 
communication (the inspiration from the autopoietic system), which, furthermore, take 
their points of departure in central contemporary paradigms, provoke new ideas of the 
processes of communication involved in inner excitation and feeling, which are possibly 
happening in the user. By pointing towards computational processes, matter, and 
emotion, the sculpture directs our attention towards central aspects of bio-
phenomenological communication, which are not based on intellectual properties, as we 
generally understand them, but do, however, demonstrate levels of intelligence at the 
global level. The level of intelligence that keeps nodal points, functions and 
communications together, relates to what I understand as organizational structure in 
relation to full-body, global cognition. The level of feeling would be its unstructured 
counterpoint. The two would most likely oscillate in a constant dynamic exchange, and 
their partition would be only intellectual on my side. 
	   165	  
If the ideal user chooses to give the experience her full, immersive attention, we could 
expect it to become an experience that potentially moves her, involving local and global 
semiosic processes, and global levels of feeling, which we have still not adequately 
defined. 
 
Symbolically, we can extract from the overall experience that the sculpture 
communicates about principles of intelligence viewed as a global phenomenon. The 
idea that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, and that emotions stem from 
brain functions would demand a demonstration of sculptural “sensitivity” based on a 
system that relies on a local and central processor; not a global system. In Autopoiesis, 
electronics, sound, and mechanical functions are all based on distributed intelligence 
similar to that of Bion. 
 
8.5. The post-phenomenological experience of the user 
If we move back to the manner in which post-phenomenological experience mingles 
with semiotic reading, we have to also contemplate the relation between the semiotic 
level of the interface, and the post-phenomenological position of the ideal user. Not 
only does the installation offer the potential for the user to create multiple narrative 
lines on behalf of the ambiguous semantics it demonstrates, when it comes to symbolic 
reference to existing knowledge (autopoiesis, homeostasis, equilibrium, emotion, 
connectivity, responsiveness). But it also offers an embodied intuitive interaction with 
the semiotic interface that is based on the use of technologies. A part of the signification 
that leads to meaning generation would thus be technology itself, and the relational 
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interaction between user and technological functions of the installation. A synthesis of 
embodied phenomenological interaction with technology based functionality, as well as 
intellectual interpretations of technologies would be the result. The point being that 
technology is not without a load of meaning in itself. As has been stated in Part I, 
chapter two, technological developments represent an epistemological heritage. 
Technologies demonstrate, in part, what we know, how we have come to know, and 
how we have come to signify. Part of the meaning loaded in technologies is not theory, 
but tacit knowledge from engineering processes. These levels have a legitimized 
signifying value to the post-phenomenological user. 
 
So what kind of meaning construction could the ideal user make? At the intellectual-
conceptual level, where we begin to read the signs in the interface, one could 
contemplate the relation between autopoietic processes based on the hard wired and 
computational construction (the skeleton and digital-electronic functional structures), 
the centrality of electronic circuits and electron conduction organized through nodal 
points and wired structures. One could contemplate the relationship between local and 
global sound patterns and the information concerning user activity received from 
proximity sensors distributed in single arms. From here we can ask: is the connectivity 
presented in the sculpture an outcome of the very particular electronic and digital 
grammar of a specific artificial text form, and therefore completely text specific? Or do 
the presented relations between nodes and units that have been necessary in order to 
demonstrate principles of autopoiesis and emergence, share any reference to relational 
functionalities and communication patterns in our own biological structures, when they 
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are exited by feeling in the moment of aesthetics? Are they an instance of Peircean 
secondness that represents itself in the formation of physiological substance per se? 
 
When we derive meaning on the basis of post-phenomenology, we are taking the 
concept of technologies as “inscriptions”, originally suggested by Bruno Latour, one 
step further. Latour’s (1979) original contribution was to make the institution of 
academia aware that inscriptions direct and form part of what we had understood as the 
so-called scientific fact. Later on, in actor-network theory, Latour inscribed 
technologies as agents in the actor-network on equal terms with human agents. In post-
phenomenology technologies are not agents, and they do not appear in line with human 
agency. They are, however, an implemented part of a general socio-cultural experience. 
With Ihde, we could say that technologies become assimilated in the lifeworld and in 
processes of sensation. On the basis of post-phenomenology, we can claim that the 
integration of technologies comes to lie implicit in the semantic structure of Autopoiesis 
as a text (which represents the level of the artefactually real that is readable as text) as 
well as in the cognitive and phenosemiosic reception of it. 
 
We have now seen some of the processes that form (symbolic) autopoiesis through 
electronic and computational power, and interface communication through sound 
patterns in the sculpture. But what might form the processes of internal semiosis in our 
ideal user? With Brier and Rinaldo, we can hold on to the idea of autopoiesis with a 
semiotic outcast as main principles. But since the bio-text is not a robotic sculpture, we 
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would have to assume that there is much more to the picture, when it comes to the ideal 
user? Cell biologist, James Oschman (2005), offers a biophysical framework that asks 
actively of the relation between biology, feeling and consciousness, and brings the topic 
of bio-electromagnetism into the picture. But how can we move from robotic 
autopoiesis, and the concept of feeling to biophysics? Is there any relation? 
 
Massumi suggests a connection between the biological body and quantum potential 
from the realm that he called “the virtual”. He suggests an oscillation and 
communication between the body and the virtual that happened through affects. He thus 
brought an idea of a non-physical, counter-intuitive physical realm in play as a 
legitimate level of reality, and connected this reality level to the biological body by 
addressing the physiological level that produces affects. Massumi’s approach is art 
philosophical. Massumi, however, understood the affective body philosophically and 
connected “the virtual” directly to central theories of quantum mechanics (physical 
science). 
 
8.6. Biological equivalents of feeling and affect – holistic biophysics 
I find myself inspired to look for answers that relate to Massumi's idea of a virtual space 
that reaches the organic body through affects. In order to find vocabularies that can help 
in this quest, I have consulted the frameworks of pharmacologist Candace Pert (1997) 
and cell biologist James Oschman. Albert László-Barabásí et.al. (2002), as an example 
of recent inventions in systems biology, present approaches to the idea of global 
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systems in biology through the network metaphor, however, this approach is not 
oriented towards understanding the global energy pathways in the body from a more 
holistic perspective. Because Oschman and Ho both present alternative research that is, 
however, empirically validated, I wish to test the explanatory potential of their theories 
in relation to our expectation of a physiological global equivalent of “feeling” related to 
the aesthetic experience. They are therefore chosen as pillars in my theoretical 
framework. 
 
Before I move into Oschman’s complex framework, I will give a short account of a 
thesis presented by pharmacologist, Candace Pert. In the book Molecules of Emotion – 
why you feel the way you feel (1997), Pert interestingly suggests that emotions are 
primarily based on chemistry, and that chemical communication processes based on 
neuropeptides, exceeded the function of electrical firing between neuron synapses. On 
behalf of this theory, Pert claims that communication between nerve cells can happen at 
a distance, and she moves on to suggest a complex communication network in the 
global body, which is based on the communicational function of a variety of peptides. 
Thereby, she has paved the way for a theory of emotion that involves the whole body, 
and that indicates a close relation between emotions and physiological processes, in 
part, because she points towards a clear bio-chemical connection between the immune 
system and the molecules of emotions. 
One claim that can point towards a global network of communication is 
that neuropeptides reside not only in the brain, and along the spine, but also at the end 
of other major organs. From this point of departure, it becomes possible for Pert to not 
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only claim that emotions are chemical, but also that there is a physiological aspect of 
something such as memory and consciousness at large. A central thesis in Pert’s 
framework, which was also central in Lakoff, Johnson, Fauconnier, Turner and Nunez, 
and, as we will see, in Oschman’s framework, is that properties of consciousness, even 
such of rational decisions, are understood to be mainly sub-conscious and tied to bodily 
functions that do not reach brain interpretations and the intellectual mind in anything 
other but a strongly reduced version. Pert writes: 
‘These recent discoveries are important for appreciating how memories 
are stored not only in the brain, but in a psychosomatic network extending 
into the body, particularly in the ubiquitous receptors between nerves and 
bundles of cell bodies called ganglia, which are distributed not just in and 
near the spinal cord, but all the way out along pathways to internal organs 
and the very surface of the skin. The decision about what becomes a 
thought rising to consciousness and what remains an undigested thought 
pattern buried at a deeper level in the body is mediated by the receptors. 
I’d say that the fact that memory is encoded or stored at the receptor level 
means that memory processes are emotion driven and unconscious (but 
like other receptor-mediated processes, can sometimes be made 
conscious).’ (p. 143) 
 
This research paves a way in which we can find intersection points between biology and 
philosophy, and takes us one step further in defining feeling, all though, of course, 
Pert’s concept of emotion is not completely equal to our idea of feeling (and definitely 
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not to Damasio’s definition of emotion). Pert, however, focuses mainly on bio-
chemistry, and extrapolates into general explanations from this point of departure. The 
holistic biophysics of Oschman, on the other hand, opens a pathway that allows a 
complex, but integrated view upon a variety of processes that could be involved in 
consciousness, as well as in energetic communication in the bodymind. This framework 
can, perhaps, help us overcome the division between physics, biology and philosophy, 
between brain and body, and between feeling and emotion. 
 
The biophysical theory of Oschman does not present us to an original speculative 
proposal like that of Brier’s cybersemiotics. The purpose of Oschman’s two books 
(2001; 2005) is rather to present a scientifically based overview, which connects the 
dots of a larger puzzle concerning the biological organism in order to inform us of 
energetic pathways and their cooperation with well-known molecular and cellular 
processes. In this pursuit, Oschman extends the understanding of energy from the 
concept of “work” derived in physical science, to a broader and more encompassing 
perspective. His main contribution is to cast attention to the complexities involved in 
bio-energetic communication. Oschman's concept of energy is, in some instances, closer 
to the Asian concept of chi, which is also to be understood as a real physical dynamical 
object, and part of his research is aimed towards providing speculative and evidence 
based theory that can account for something such as the meridians.28 Oschman’s work 
mainly consists of existing hypotheses, which he combines in a new episteme, aimed 
towards explaining the biological body as an excitable dynamic and connective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  To Peirce, the dynamical object is the object in itself, whereas the actual object is the way we signify it in cultural 
semiosis	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medium. Oschman moves into aspects of bodily functions that are central in the field of 
biology (brain-nervous system perception, the circulatory system, the immune system, 
cell communication, protein synthesis, tissue functions, etc.). But he adds research 
results and theories by scientists that have been working in the periphery of established 
paradigms (however, where one of them, Albert Szent-Györgyi, was a Nobel Price 
winner. Szent-György experimented with theories of bioelectronics and cancer in 1968). 
The contributions to research that can account for bio-energetic processes and global 
connectivity in biological tissues have in common that they have not influenced 
Western biology or medicine to a high degree. 
 
Integrating main aspects of this framework in order to broaden the perspective of the 
ideal user allows us to articulate biophysical aspects of feeling, emotion and 
consciousness that are directly tied to the flesh and blood body. Furthermore, it 
complicates ideas from Human Computer Interaction and Interaction Design Theory, 
which often present too narrow ideas of human cognition, perception and user 
experience. Where Markussen (2010) in his use of conceptual blends in interaction 
design theory broadens the conception of the user by re-evaluating cybernetics and the 
concept of information in light of cognitive semantics, and thereby points towards 
biological aspects of perception and cognition, as well as a level of internal semiosis 
that has to do with cognitive models related to perception and embodiment, Oschman’s 
framework allows us to broaden this view into actual biological functions. Because a 
high percentage of what we call experience and consciousness happens at an 
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unconscious level, the next central move is to uncover some of these levels, in order to 
reach a higher degree of self-understanding. 
 
How well Oschman's theory fits with theories such as cybersemiotics, biosemiotics 
(based on molecular biology), or Ji's concept of the gnergon as the precondition for 
semiosis in biological processes, is an issue that needs yet to be determined. For our 
purpose here, I wish to highlight the most important alternative propositions that 
Oschman casts light upon in his book from 2003: 
-Oschman suggests a view upon the structure of cells, where the cell is understood not 
just as a solution in a bag, encapsulated by a phosphor-lipid membrane. Oschman 
suggests that the true barrier between cell and extra-cellular tissues is formed by a layer 
of proteins, which forms a pathway for electron conduction across cell interior and cell 
exterior. He further suggest, on behalf of the theory of Buckminster Fuller, and the 
further work with this theory in the domain of biology by Donald Ingber, that the cell 
forms an architectural structure consisting of “skeletal” and soft components in a liquid 
that is more like a gel, and less like water; the architectural structure being sensitive to 
pressure. This view extends regular ideas of proprioception, and makes the bodymind 
more sensitive, than what has regularly been thought. 
-The central thesis is that extra-cellular connective tissues form a continuum that 
spreads across the body, and surrounds all cells and harder substances (skeleton, 
muscles, organs, etc.) in the body; and that so-called integrins form protein-molecules 
that allow electron and proton conduction belonging to this continuum to be distributed 
	   174	  
within cell interiors. Furthermore, water molecules hold the structures of molecules in 
connective tissues together. This is a property that is abundant in the organism, 
according to Oschman, and which allows for proteins to function as semi-conductors. 
The continuum forms a prerequisite for a global communication system, in part based 
on electron conduction. Oschman calls the entire system of connectivity “the living 
matrix”. 
-Because of the architectural structure of cells and molecules, the living matrix gains 
piezoelectric effects. This means that pressure can cause electricity conduction. 
-Oschman explains that it is the crystalline structures of molecular arrays in the 
connective tissues, together with the arrangement of water molecules, which allows for 
the conduction of elementary particles such as electrons and protons along whole 
surfaces and global networks. This theory is similar to the theory presented by geneticist 
Mae Wan Ho (2005). 
-He further presents two kinds of consciousness in the body (understood as awareness), 
where one is based on the traditional nervous system, and the other on what he calls a 
“continuum pathway”. The continuum pathway is a “super highway” of information 
that is closely connected to what in Chinese Medicine is called the “meridians”. The 
continuum pathway operates together with the perineural system, and works much 
faster than the regular nervous system. 
-The function of macro level organs (for instance the heart-circulatory system and 
brain-nervous system) and their close relation to emergent supra-structures based on 
electron conduction and quantum wave properties brings together micro and macro 
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levels at certain nodal points, where an interface would be located at the molecular 
scale. 
-Oschman further casts light on the fact that the heart has neurons in an order higher 
than that of the brain, wherefore the heart might have a function similar to that of the 
brain (which is also a central thesis in the Institute of Heart Math, California, USA). 
 
It is necessary to highlight that Oschman’s theory is, of course, much more complex and 
detailed than what is possible to bring into this context. Our quest is to let Oschman’s 
theory inform our notion of feeling in relation to aesthetic excitement. 
 
So how can all this be relevant when narrating our ideal user? One element that can 
bring Autopoiesis as a text and our articulation of an ideal user together is Oschman’s 
pedagogical use of concepts from electronics and computer science, when he seeks to 
describe bioelectronics aspects that form pieces of the puzzle that can describe the 
complex communication networks involved in the processes of the living organism. I 
must emphasize that Oschman in no way reduces functions of the organism to 
explanations made on behalf of electronics, computation- and information theory. He 
does, however, extract insight and metaphors from these domains in order to support the 
articulation for instance of the nature of electronic pathways in tissues, and points 
towards the fact that the technologies that humans develop do, generally, rest upon 
principles inherent in Nature. Humans, then, extract reduced understandings of 
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biological processes, and distribute them in artificial text forms, because they are useful. 
It is in this sense that we can learn from our own technologies. 
With Szent-György’s thesis that electrons, when the atoms to which they 
belong form a stable part of a molecular, crystalline structure, no longer belong to one 
single atom, but rather migrates across the global structure (which is what we could call 
bio-electronics), Oschman suggests that proteins can work as semi-conductors for these 
electronic pathways. And Oschman (2003) writes of semi-conductors: 
‘Semiconductors … have the ability to process energy and Information in 
sophisticated ways, that is, to switch, store, delay, modulate, amplify, 
filter, detect, or rectify (allow to pass in one direction but not in the other). 
In addition, semiconductor networks can have read-only and 
programmable memory and logic circuits that evaluate the information 
flowing through them. In a living organism, such circuits can make and 
process decisions that lead to actions. The actions selected are determined 
by a combination of genetic programming that gives rise to the proteins 
that are built into the circuitry, the memory of previous activities, and 
current information from local and distant sources.’ (p. 93) 
 
Here we have not only biological equivalences that might relate to the concept of 
feeling. But the citation also relates somewhat to the processes of our artificial text, 
since it operates with similar (less complex) functions in order to distribute behaviour, 
responsiveness and intelligence. Oschman extends from talking solely about electronics 
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as energy; he also points to the fact that tissues conduct many kinds of energy such as: 
light, sound, solitons (pressure waves) and conformons. Later on in the book he points 
towards the pedagogical usefulness of applying the functionalities of a computer 
network to biological functions, and uses terms such as node, link, protocol, correction 
algorithms, queue, etc. Oschman (2003) explains: 
‘The terminology used to describe protocols for computer networks can 
give us some realistic insights into how living systems may be able to 
communicate and function in a coordinated fashion with little error’ (p. 
127). 
In Autopoiesis we have electronic circuits, artificial intelligence, central information 
handling units, packets of information travelling around the system, light emitting 
diodes, and, at another level of communication: sound distribution. These functions 
present a coordinated system of communication, and this system is a central prerequisite 
for the sculpture’s “emotional” states and behaviours. In accordance with the theory of 
autopoiesis, this system would be a cognitive system that forms the foundation for 
language, or with Brier: semiosis. However, when taking something such as electronics, 
light emission and sound distribution concretely, we are asking for another reference, 
where Oschman seems to offer a more appropriate framework. When indicating 
equivalences between the biological body and Autopoiesis, we must, of course, 
remember, that we are talking about two fundamentally different text forms. And as we 
saw in case study one, the main reference would be symbolic rather than concrete. 
Furthermore, equivalents to biological communication would appear as a totality of 
relational functionality with a symbolic reference, rather than single functionalities  
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understood concretely, and transferred directly from one text to the other. Relational 
structures based on space and time would of course not be equivalent in any concrete 
manner: micro scale functions in biological tissues that are based on electron 
conduction would appear in the artificial text as an extrapolated and reduced version 
that appears at a macro scale level (the artefactually real). 
 
Oschman furthers the points given by metaphors of electronics, computing and 
information science with a theory of self-assembly in micro-molecular structures, which 
is far more extensive than the reference points by which terms from computer- and 
information science can provide for. Oschman’s biological communication theory thus 
involves more than chemistry and more than signalling, which also leaves an open 
question concerning Brier’s use of biosemiotics, together with autopoiesis theory, to 
describe the variable semiosic systems at stake in the complex model of the human 
subject (figure 2, Part I, chapter four, p. 93). 
 
A representation of micro scale processes presented in a reduced form at the macro 
scale of cultural semiosis, such as in Rinaldo’s Autopoiesis, is, I claim, necessary in 
order for our intellect to understand. I further claim that the process of understanding 
increases and involves a higher degree of complexity when embodied interaction is 
involved. This is so in particular, because, our brains are not able to interpret micro 
scale processes directly through the intellect at the level of internal semiosis (at least not 
as far as we know). So, the text forms are not equal. But they can inform each other, and 
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they can potentially cause a realization that changes the ideal user, if she is willing to 
orient herself through theoretical contemplation, and if the totality of the experience 
surmounts into the excitable and mind-altering moment of aesthetics. 
 
Oschman calls the body an excitable medium. This idea fits with my intuitive notion of 
feeling as being global and electrical. From poetic metaphor we know of being excited 
and “electrified”. Is it time to take this notion from the poetic to the concrete? 
Damasio's concept of feeling as something internal could be related to 
Oschman's biological continuum pathway and living matrix, in which excitation would 
happen at a regular basis. And, all though this would neither fit with a biosemiotic or a 
cybersemiotic view, I would see the kind of excitation involved in aesthetic experience 
to be a sign that creates effects, and which can function as a cause that leads to a 
network of interpretants at levels of internal semiosis. Oschman suggest properties of 
global information patterns to be understood as an information system, which exists at 
an extra-molecular level, and which might possibly connect to what we understand as 
human consciousness. The brain is connected to this global communication system 
through nodal points at a local molecular and cellular (neuron based) scale. With Pert 
we have seen a connection between the brain and the global body through molecular 
chemistry. When it comes to electromagnetic wave frequencies, we could expect levels 
of the continuum to meet with single macro level organs in an interface based on wave 
patterns and wave frequencies (for instance delta waves, which are known in certain 
brain states as well as in electromagnetic states of the heart). This leaves a potential for 
many levels of consciousness in the bodymind, one of which would result in the kind of 
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global feeling that is involved in the moment of aesthetics, the whole of which I 
imagine would involve an overall, wave based structure that exists shortly in time and 
space, and that could be understood as cognitive, because it rests upon biological 
intelligence. It is pre-intellectual. And it is related to, but non-equal to functions of 
macro level organs (which have a stronger persistence in time and space). Again the 
pre-intellectual level could be interpreted through the intellect into abstract thought and 
language (which depends on, but is not equal to, these processes) in internal semiosis, 
which then accounts for the moment of aesthetics. And we must speculate: it is possible 
to sense this pre-intellectual excitement clearly outside of brain interpretation through 
wave-based proprioception alone? 
 
Now, coming from the use of terms such as “information processing”, “electronics” and 
“computation” in regard of the biological body, we could easily come to think that the 
processes that Oschman cast light upon, would have to be defined as “signals” and 
“pattern fitting” as according to Brier’s cybersemiotic framework. However, as I have 
tried to demonstrate, I believe that these emergent systems, at an overall, wave based 
level, would demonstrate a semiotic off cast based on wave patterns that is likely with 
the connection between autopoietic systems and semiotic off cast in Brier, however, 
whose basic systems are not as persistent in biological time and space as autopoietic 
organizational systems. 
Yet, in order to truly understand what happens, we cannot rely on a biophysical 
framework only. This means that our perspective from the natural sciences, as creative 
as that might be, does not exclude Brier’s views, even if it questions and extends them 
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at some levels. We do need the full spectrum of semiosic processes presented by Brier, 
to be able to call processes of global electron conduction and wave interference patterns 
signs, and to speculatively observe how they can cross interface boundaries between the 
kinds of semiosis involved. If we look at the scientific field of Neuroaesthetics, and 
explanations of aesthetic experience based on a neuroscientific approach, we can say 
that such an approach typically produces explanations based on signs internal to one 
macro system only (brain-nervous system), and not at the multiple levels of emergence 
in an overall complex system such as presented by holistic biophysics, or the multiple 
kinds of semiosis as presented in the cybersemiotic theory. It thus represents but a small 
fraction of what could be expected to happen (local micro level events in a macro level 
organ, the brain), in the total embodied process of cybersemiotic, multi-levelled 
meaning making as one gets aesthetically excited. 
 
If we relate this to the former case study, and the idea that there is a higher level of 
signification in aesthetic excitement, which connects to final cause and Peirce's 
agapistic evolution, or the learning aspect connected to Aristotle's concept of mimetike, 
then the philosophical dimensions of these theoretical suggestions grow proportionally. 
The interpretant or the sign becomes established at a process-oriented basis in a 
complex dynamical system, where the human subject meets the sign as she connects to 
instances of agapistic evolution. The signs at the level of the artefactually real are 
fragments of objects that exist in totality at the level of the virtually real. Given the extra 
level of reality, which is not usually taken into account by contemporary science or 
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philosophy, the conceptual equation in the semiotic triadic landscape becomes 
complicated, however, no less interesting. 
 
8.6.1. Biological transcendence? 
To this, I will shortly comment, in accordance with claims made in Part I, and in case 
study one, chapter five, that the artwork would ideally invoke a semiotic connection 
between levels of the ideally real and objects of the virtually real, which would 
represent unknowns or unknown unknowns at the cultural level, and that that meeting is 
what characterises the true quality of difference that is central in the moment of 
aesthetics. This means that it involves the idiosyncrasies of internal semiosis, but that it 
also provokes alterations within them. It also means that the intelligence of the 
bodymind “knows” of the unknown unknown before intellectual mind would ever 
know. The meeting between the ideally real, the virtually real and extensions of 
idiosyncratic levels seems somewhat similar with what Kant and Husserl called 
transcendence. However, in the time of Kant and Husserl, it was only possible to 
describe the level of transcendence in philosophical terms, and it was in no way possible 
to make empirical evidence of this state of mind. The idea of a connection between the 
virtual and the physical body, which affects experience significantly, goes well with 
Massumi’s idea of a connection between quantum potential and affects in the body. I 
thus envision that the moment of aesthetics would function as a prerequisite that allows 
new virtual objects to be brought into the sphere of cultural semiosis. I do not, however, 
feel convinced that it would be adequate to equal the virtual with the idea of quantum 
potential like Massumi does. I expect the virtually real to be more rich, more 
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qualitatively describable and more ontologically deep than Massumi’s idea of the 
virtual. 
 
8.7. Homeostasis, signification and the agapastic aspect of regular heart beats 
Affect and feelings are expected to have semiosic function, and to be directly connected 
to processes of cell communication, and communications at quantum levels. The 
informative processes of global quantum communication could possibly affect and be 
affected by the dynamics of overall homeostasis in the global bodymind by networked 
feedback processes at another systemic level. The idea of homeostasis as a regulating 
function balancing the interference between different systems of communication in the 
bodymind is central (Damasio, 2005; Hoffmeyer, 2008; Oschman, 2005; Ho, 2008 have 
all emphasized the importance of homeostasis in biological and psychological processes 
in each their different way). As I view it, homeostatic equilibrium becomes an interface 
that allows transfer of information from phenosemiosic and/ or biophysical levels to 
such of thought semiosis. And this perspective also seems to connect well to our study 
of user navigation in Autopoiesis, and its semiotic indications. Autopoiesis imitates the 
idea of homeostasis in a system. 
 
The term homeostasis is here extended from its original physiological meaning, which 
generally concerns stress and relaxation of the peripheral nervous system, into involving 
a more complex dynamics of larger scale affect and feeling (Damasio, for instance, talks 
of homeostasis in relation to complex feeling). It could also be likened to a momentary 
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state of equilibrium, which could occur at certain, non-stable intervals, and as part of the 
biological processes involved. 
And, to complicate matters, we could expect that equilibrium could, in 
principle, occur at some emergent levels, and that different systems might not achieve 
equilibrium simultaneously, or at similar time scales. Thus, the semiotic line between 
what Brier characterises as autopoietic systems, and which I would extend to involve 
several levels of reality, would mutually cause moments of equilibrium across 
autopoietic systems (through structural couplings), which would cause moments of 
balance that could be interpreted at the level of internal semiosis. These moments of 
semiotic balance gain sign value to the phenomenological and intellectual mind. 
From here, we could further the thought with the observation that coherent 
heartbeats are essential for optimal bodily functions. Ho (2008) writes of 
electromagnetic signals of the heart as either being in distress, or in balance, where 
feelings of love are directly related to the balanced state that relies on coherent 
heartbeats. This, analogically, relates to Autopoiesis, where irregular, fast and distressed 
sound patterns indicate frustration, and where regular harmonies of sound indicate 
happiness. 
The signals from the heart could also be interpreted as signs of something 
at the macro level of the bodymind (connecting of course to all other emergent levels), 
which I choose to relate to the evolutionarily based phaneroscopic telos of final cause, 
involved in aesthetic reason, which again relies on the sense of being moved: First of 
all, one is sensuously moved. Second of all, this movement leads to aesthetic synthesis 
at the pre-intellectual level consisting of short-term cognitive structures at the level of 
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wave consciousness, which connect to macro level organs, the signs of which are 
coherence in heartbeats and a positive feeling. The signifying events thus happen at 
different scales of biological time and space, and must have a complex coordination. 
The series of events would, perhaps, be registered by brain cognition as one, overall 
event, which can, again, be interpreted into verbal language in the form of retrospective 
contemplation, where the ambiguity of signs in the interface is connected into a 
meaningful (semantic) whole that connects to instances of feeling assisted by the 
aesthetic moment. 
 
If we look at it from a perspective of trying to understand the dynamical object of 
processes of internal semiosis per se, and the pertubations and semiotic counterpoints, 
the processes might not be complex in themselves. By this I mean to indicate that 
biology on its very own premises is capable of running systems that are, by far, superior 
to our mental capacities. The organism's capacity for arranging complex semiotic 
exchange, however, might re-present a simple semiotic logic to itself: interpretants are 
established in a healthy organism with ease. At the theoretical level of the research 
situation, however, we have to draw intellectual distinctions to serve our conceptual 
understanding of the dynamic continuum of the bodymind. Without analytical division 
we do not understand the whole of the model, and more importantly: we are not able to 
connect aspects from the otherwise ambiguous and seemingly incompatible frameworks 
of evolutionary natural sciences and hermeneutical-semiotic human sciences. 
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From here, we can make a short conclusion by saying that like Aristotle's idea of 
learning by contemplation, being moved aesthetically becomes a positive sign that 
involves the whole spectrum of the biological, psychological and social body; a sign 
that indicates a state of health, and can be experienced as part of an anticipatory telos, 
which, however, at higher levels of habit in Nature, is perhaps a simple, overall process, 
which human beings only experience as partial signs. 
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Chapter 7, Case Study 3: Instances of consciousness. 
Contemplating the signs of evolution. 
 
9.0. Introduction 
In this case study, I will present a close reading of the bioart installation, Blue Morph 
(2010 version), created by nano scientist James Gimsewski, and artist Victoria Vesna. 
My close reading will be based on the relationship between the artwork and the concept 
of the ideal user, which I commenced to develop in case studies one and two. Whereas I 
have been concerned with modelling and describing the work as a text in case study 
one, and with defining aesthetic sensibility in case study two, I will be focusing upon a 
further investigation of what opens up in Ho and Oschman's perspective, concerning the 
intersection point between biology and consciousness in case study three. With a focus 
on the oscillation between artwork and ideal user, and in my quest to define new states 
of subjectivity, I will remain in a focus upon processes based on intrasemiosis, where 
we find the idiosyncrasies and generalities of individual perception, cognition and 
consciousness. From here I will explore how the ability to integrate deeper layers of 
introspection into the process of self-observation, and to actively affect observation 
processes by means of technoscience, might, in combination, play a crucial role in our 
present potential to understand more of human consciousness. Case study two was 
concerned mainly with affect and feeling as prerequisites for the moment of aesthetics, 
which was understood to be based on interfacings between micro level global systems 
represented as the sign of feeling in internal semiosis. Blue Morph can add to our self-
understandings in ways that take new levels of science into account, by pointing 
towards nano-science, not only as a central contemporary scientific pathway, but also as 
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presenting levels of reality which can be hard to grasp, and to connect with in real life 
experience, and experiences of the day conscious intellect, and even normal ways of 
being sensitively attentive. Blue Morph connects levels of scientifically based 
epistemological insight with spiritual ideas concerning Buddhist silence (the idea that 
the mind can become silent through meditation, which indicates that another level of 
consciousness has been reached), the affect of meditation on consciousness, and appeals 
to a contemplation of what no-thing might stand for. 
As we commence, we must remember that the ideal user and the research 
subject differ only in a manner of degree, and that they constantly affect each other 
mutually, as they represent two close states of noetic subjective observation, connected 
to me as a researcher. 
                          
               
                    Figure 7: Blue Morph by Victoria Vesna and James Gimsewski 
         Taken from: https://quote.ucsd.edu/feministit/files/2013/02/VictoriaVesna.jpg 
	   189	  
9.1. Blue Morph 
Blue Morph communicates as an artwork mainly by an aesthetic and multisemiotic29 
interface that involves a physical exhibition space. It demands an embodied, interactive 
and immersive approach by the user. In Blue Morph nano scale movements evoked by 
the transformation process of the Blue Morpho Peleides from caterpillar to butterfly, is 
translated into sound. The use of nano scale mirrors and a projected nano scale, laser 
beam, effectuates this. The laser beam registers the vibrations of the movements of the 
caterpillar’s shell over time, and transforms them into audible sound. When visiting the 
installation, the user must place herself in a silent sitting position, and wear a caterpillar 
like hat that hangs down from the top of the ceiling (Aalborg, 2010 version). By 
wearing the long hat, and retreating into a state of attentive focus upon the innenwelt 
(Uexküll), which demands of her to balance her body in its center, she is presented to 
the soundscape of biological metamorphosis. 
 
Further than presenting this soundscape, the installation distributes digitally projected 
images on four pieces of white cloth, also hanging down from the ceiling. Images 
appear only in moments where the body is physically balanced in its own center. The 
images are held in bluish colours. The blue colour is significant for the way the Blue 
Morpho Peleides butterfly is normally registered by humans at the level of the non-
aided, gross senses. However, as Vesna points out, what we experience as colour is in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  12Multisemiotic is a term that has been necessary to establish and use as part of New Media Theory, in particular 
when it comes to literary science and text science related to the many semiotic sign systems of digital text. For 
further reading see Günther Kress (2003), Christiane Heibach (2003), Søren Pold (2004). I apply the term also to 
Augmented- and Mixed Reality settings, which means that material objects can also become part of the overall 
semiotic interface. 	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this particular species not pigment, but nano scale, optical effects of the patterns 
inherent in the structure of the butterfly’s wing. 
 
The installation is based on a communication that evokes interpenetrations between 
functions in bodily systems that, according to general beliefs, would not usually meet: 
the silence of nano scale behaviours, the gross senses, and the cultural signs that we 
produce on behalf of impressions from such, interpenetrations between biological 
signals internal to the body, thought semiosis, and socio-communicative autopoietic 
language games. By technological amplification the signs that we took for granted when 
observing the butterfly without technological aid (or with Latour's terms without 
inscriptions) transform from colour and growth to patterned, optical structure, and 
sound. We are presented to a level of reality that is not available to our naked senses. 
Furthermore, in Blue Morph, as we have seen in Life Writer, Bion and Autopoiesis, 
object and representamen moves from being static properties, to be representative of 
processes in action. 
 
In the first place, as one interprets the experience of Blue Morph, the immediate 
impression would be one of having experienced a set of nano scale events translated 
into macro scale events by the use of technological inscriptions. We do not usually have 
direct access to nano scale level of semiosis inside ourselves until we signify the 
experiences in some sort of language, which, in the inner process of the individual, 
would happen in thought semiosis. I described the process connected to aesthetic 
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synthesis in case study two in such a way that there would be a conceptual relation 
between quantum biological processes, phenosemiosis and intellectualized thought 
semiosis. Thus, I suggested an intersection point between processes that would allow 
micro scale events to become known to the intellect. It is, however, by no means clear, 
how this could happen. Or whether all people would be equally sensitive to these subtle, 
internal signs, and if so: how one would become sensitive to them. In this case study, 
we are moving further into these questions, and questions of what it means to become 
acquainted with micro- and nano scale level events as part of our conscious experience. 
When it comes to the nano scale levels presented to us by Blue Morph, we have to ask 
ourselves: does it matter whether we understand the butterfly as blue and 
metamorphosing or as optical light patterns and dynamic patterns of sound? Will we 
make new, metaphorical assumptions, and interpret life in new ways, once we have 
experienced the butterfly in a context of cultural semiosis that points towards the 
important role of vibration and optical effects in the living organism? And how can we 
understand the role of technology as intermediate between nano scale signals and our 
gross senses? 
 
9.2. Phenomenological and contemplative moments of the ideal user 
What is particularly interesting about Blue Morph is how the interface is constructed to 
invoke a focus on first person perspective, and the activity of introspection. So part of 
the narrative of Blue Morph would naturally be concerned with physical levels of 
introverted states of being. Very few interfaces are constructed towards the user having 
to pay attention to inwards processes while presented to external (cultural) 
significations. So Blue Morph is original in this way. Besides from the visual and 
	   192	  
auditory user appeal of the installation interface, it appeals to the tactile senses through 
the hat that delivers the sound, and to the proprioceptive senses necessary to keep 
balanced in one’s center. The immediate experience of these levels would all be an 
implied part of the phenosemiosic process. 
 
At the level of cultural semiosis, where one would take one step back and view the 
installation intellectually, the objects of the installation come to gain their semiotic 
quality by symbolic reference to the very being of the caterpillar as it is in the middle of 
its transformation process. Thus, the real process of a living organism, which stretches 
in time and space, becomes an object of reference. The situation established in the 
installation becomes the representamen, and the interpretant is the relation between the 
two, as understood by the user. Naturally, no process of signification is that simple. 
There would always be multiple levels and layers, and furthermore, the Peircean 
semiotic picture is one of networks of interpretants in dynamic, communicational (never 
ending) processes. Further than looking at the overall process, which becomes a sign, 
there are also references at the level of the single material object. The reference of the 
long hat clearly presents a reference to the shell of the Blue Morpho Peleides larvae, 
which gives it an iconic value. The soundscape and virtual images also have a level of 
iconic value, however, it would make sense to call both symbolic, partially analogue 
references to the living and moving nano scale processes which refer to the real-time 
scenario of the larvae’s transformation process, however at a scale of technological 
amplification and a digitalized time recording, non-equal to the real process of the 
larvae, yet a clear reference. 
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The question of what does it feel like to be a Blue Morpho Peleides caterpillar is thus 
sought symbolically and phenomenologically staged and questioned in a very material 
sense that demands of the user to completely immerse herself into the experience. All 
though it could be viewed as a banal comment, I place value in the difference between a 
kind of communication that integrates the overall bodymind, however, still has an 
intellectual appeal, and regular print theory, which writes theoretically for instance on 
the subject of the ontological being of the caterpillar. In reading the theory you have a 
language based abstract object to refer cognitively to. In an installation you combine a 
phenomenological experience with the intellectual experience, activating existing and 
known concepts into a process of meaning making and understanding. When such 
insights are presented in material, interactive communicational forms rather than 
intellectualized print speculation, there will be consequences at the level of overall 
learning, to which I have referred by both Aristotelian and Peircean philosophy. An 
installation has a higher potential, in my view, to cause induced experience through the 
sense of being moved, than a print theory: at least if we think of the integration of 
sensuous modalities. And the user appeal at the intellectual level is associative, rather 
than directive, which is often the case with linear print communications. It thus appeals 
to already knowns, which are, however, designed in new synthesis (of meaning making) 
with indications that go beyond common cognitive schemes. If the artwork is successful 
in my view, it will demand of the user’s subconscious processes to seek new conceptual 
blends and new knowns, and to combine them in creative meaning making. 
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9.3. Meditation as phenomenological experience and as a symbol of a state of 
conscious being 
Apart from this, there is yet another level of symbolic reference, which is part of the 
design of the interface, and not a clear, explicit, fixed sign. This is the level of the 
interface that suggests to the user to enter a meditative state, in which the focus of 
concentration is on the relationship between breathing, sound input, and closed eyes. 
This inbuilt request of the interface to identify with the physical state of meditation is 
indicated by the sitting position one has to take to experience the installation. And it is 
part of the pattern of interaction necessary to make the installation react in the expected 
way: the body that is balanced in its center is what makes the blue images and the sound 
become available to the senses of the user. If the user slides out of a centered body 
position, the images refuse to show. This means that it is part of the affordances of the 
interface, and of what we could call the implied user to enter at least a meditative 
position, and perhaps also a meditative state. But the state of meditation also 
symbolically refers to a particular bodily state. This state involves physical alterations 
of the inner body, which have a philosophical and biological relation to the subject of 
nano scale processes in relation to intrasemiosis and the question of consciousness, if 
we recall the section on holistic biophysics in case study two. I will return to this more 
explicitly in the section on Ho’s biophysics. But what does the state of meditation 
indicate to the contemplative ideal user, if we look at it from a scientific perspective? 
It is known from studies of meditation that deep breathing can alter the 
brain waves, and the overall state of the reticular system, among other things. It has 
been examined scientifically that the mastered, meditative state would, ideally, evoke a 
relaxation of the frontal lobes of the brain, and an activation of alpha brain waves in the 
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posterior brain regions. 30  Thus, the meditative state would affect the autopoietic 
processes of the nervous system. 
 
This normally results in a less attentive focus on exosemiotic sense impressions, less 
prejudgment, and more openness to the pure flux of consciousness within 
(phenosemiosis). As seen from this perspective, there would be a relationship between 
the different kinds of internal semiosis (bio-, pheno- and thought semiosis), and what 
we understand as consciousness. This would further have to do with how brain based 
cognitive properties of the user are activated, in my view. The meditative state seems to 
allow for consciousness (pure phenosemiosis) to operate more on its own terms, so to 
speak, than when it is directed by the day conscious focus of attention and will. My 
thesis is that when entering the meditative position, informative events based on internal 
semiosis of the user could be experienced more on the terms of phenosemiosis, than if 
the user was not in a state of meditation. This would be so, because the judgmental 
functions of the frontal lobes are not directing the interpretation of input and experience 
in the manner that it would regularly do. 
 
The question of the symbolic value of meditation is, though, whether the user is able to 
truly enter such a state, while visiting the installation, and thus get an alternated 
experience of meditation, which is based on the assistance of remedies and 
technologies. And at another level, where we have understood the interface as a symbol 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Lagopoulos et al. Increased Theta and Alpha EEG Activity During Nondirective Meditation. The Journal of 
Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 2009; 15 (11): 1187 DOI: 10.1089/acm.2009.0113	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of the meditative state, one has to ask whether meditative silence per se could be 
understood as a state of pure (thoughtless and non-signified) phenosemiosis as 
suggested in the above paragraph? And whether nano scale phenosemiosis is empty in 
day conscious thought connected to language games, however, full at protosign and 
biosemiotic and quantum semiosic levels? 
 
In Blue Morph this question is answered by technological amplification, which indicates 
fullness at the nano scale. It thus indicates that experiences which we have thought of in 
purely philosophical terms, for instance through Indian systems of transcendental 
meditation and the philosophy connected to this practice, are now discovered or 
signified by empirical research. And if we are able to signify by empirical research, 
what we could only signify through intellectual thought semiosis with verbal language 
as a medium before, a change has happened in our common perception and 
conceptualization, as I see it. The signification sphere is evolving, and this involves the 
development of not only communication systems, but also of individual and collective 
cognition and perhaps consciousness. As indicated also in case studies one and two, 
there has been a transfer of insight from thought to practice over historico-cultural time. 
This transfer evokes the development of cultures and cultural communications, largely 
speaking. The only reason why this connection is so invisible is that there has been a 
division in space and time, as well as a division in our ways of fragmenting knowledge, 
which has not allowed the two different approaches to come together. And first and 
foremost, Indian philosophy as one example, has presented philosophical truths which 
are applicable today (at the level of the artefactually real), but which were, however, not 
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resonant with the state of the arts of contemporary signification spheres, when it was 
formed: there was a discrepancy between the virtually real and the artefactually real that 
prevented the two to meet. Indian philosophy could, to some extend, be applied to the 
spiritual development of cultures and individuals, however, not to the formation of 
artefactual materialities in signification spheres. 
 
9.4. Is phenosemiosis full of quantum jazz? 
At this point, I wish to shortly move into the biophysical theory of quantum 
communication by Ho. Ho's perspective is closely connected to the influence of current 
technoscience, that is, science that is not only related to, but relying on technological 
developments. In this perspective, specific instruments used must be seen as an implicit 
part of the process of observation. In relation to the theme of technology in the art that I 
work with, it makes sense to point out that there are researchers today who no longer 
make a distinction between technology and science, but use the term technoscience 
(Ihde, 2009; Reichle, 2009). In relation to nanotechnology it is obvious that new 
technologies play a central role. Ho (2008) has, due to unconventional use of polarized 
light microscopy, been able to localize light in the water structures of a Drosophila larva 
in all the colours of the rainbow. Ho tells of her cooperation with Michael Lawrence in 
1992: 
‘We had accomplished the first ever, high resolution and high contrast 
imaging of an entire, living, moving, organism. And the very idea of using 
polarizing light microscopy to look at dynamic order within the organism 
was also new.’ (p. 208) 
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The untraditional use of microscopy resulted in the finding of optical patterns in many 
light frequencies below such of visible light at nano scale levels. It is important to 
notice that the larva was whole and alive at the time of measurement (biological in vivo 
research as opposed to studying parts of dead organisms). The light interference patterns 
were, to Ho, signs of the structure of molecules in cells and tissues, which she found to 
be aligned as liquid crystals, with properties that allowed them to move together as a 
whole. The crystalline alignment of molecules, to Ho, forms the basis of a proton 
conduction network of communication at the quantum level of the organism. Ho's work 
forms an element in what has inspired Oschman's theory of energy medicine. 
 
In The Rainbow and The Worm, Ho relates the philosophical concepts of time and 
duration, originally suggested by Henri Bergson, to these recent biophysical findings. 
To Bergson time is mainly related to mechanical, clockwise time, and duration is more 
of an inner, conscious and subjective experience. Ho suggests that consciousness in 
living organisms could be related to the quantum properties of what in this context I 
choose to call nano scale communication, the interactions of which Ho calls quantum 
jazz. She describes the complex networked, far from equilibrium, non-linear 
interferences of the organism with the metaphor of quantum jazz: 
‘compartment, micro-compartments and micro-domains, right down to 
molecular machines, protons and electrons, each functioning 
autonomously, doing very different things at their own rates, generating 
flow patterns and cycles of different spatial extensions, yet all coupled 
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together, syncopating and harmonizing in complex rhythms, a veritable 
quantum jazz of life.’ (p. 283) 
 
In Buddhist philosophy silence is as important as noise. In the scientific universe of Ho, 
silence might be equal to quantum jazz. Perhaps Buddhist and Bergsonian philosophy 
present a level of signification of phenomena that take place in internal semiosis, which 
is based on a more direct and undisturbed relationship between phenosemiosis and 
thought semiosis? A level of biological signification that is freed of the dominant 
influence of logical, cognitive, brain based interpretation, yet possible to experience, 
nevertheless? And perhaps the quantum jazz of Ho presents a level of signification 
based on new technologies and empirical testing, which implies a techno-scientific level 
of socio-cultural language games that does, however, point towards aspects of the very 
same phenomena? 
 
What, then, is the difference between philosophically based top-down insight, and 
empirically based bottom-up interpretations? What parts them? And what brings them 
together? Ho’s theory relates well to the symbolic indications of Blue Morph. When 
new technologies allow us to interpret signs that we were not formerly able to interpret, 
our overall interpretations of reality at the level of cultural language games, and perhaps 
also phenosemiosis, alter. What does it mean that light and sound occur as part of the 
communicational processes in extra cellular tissues? What does it mean that properties 
that we have usually tied solely to processes of our gross senses, like eye vision based 
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on eye-brain interpretations of light waves/photons, and hearing based on ear-brain 
interpretations of sound waves/phonons occur in similar ways as part of semiosic 
processes at the level of cells and molecules? Are cells and molecules perceptive when 
they interpret photons and phonons? Can we ask of a semiotic connection? Do they 
interpret light and sound waves, or do they solely react on the basis of properties of 
signalling or pattern fitting? Or do they function at collective bases in ways that makes 
the use of the interface metaphors more relevant, as suggested in case study two? 
 
To Ho, nano scale sound and light communications are closely related to instances of 
consciousness, as Brier would describe them from the point of departure of autopoiesis 
and semiosis. If these theories have any truth in them, instant quantum networks of the 
cell structures and connective tissues in the body would, if we choose to see them as 
endosemiotic systems, be interpenetrated directly by the sound, vision and touch of the 
installation, because sensory input would create effects not only in the nervous system 
and brain, but also in the global proton conduction systems at levels of quantum 
superposition. Parts of the organism would be excited, as Oschman writes. They would 
again interpenetrate the molecular systems, and the psychic system, and cause affects 
(Massumi, 2005) and feelings (phenosemiosis) in multiple recursive loops at several 
different scales of spacetime. In this view, the physiological basis of feeling and 
sensation is certainly more than the interaction between periphery sensory cells, nervous 
system, and brain, even if it includes such. It is because of the wideness and global 
character of these processes that they can become so crucially significant for thought 
processes. 
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The fact that Blue Morph creates affects in particular ways not only concerns Blue 
Morph. It concerns all experiential situations in which the human being is involved. But 
having led ones attention towards nano scale light and sound, together with seeing Blue 
Morph through the eyes of an ideal user, allows and provokes us to contemplate levels 
of sensation that could be involved in our own sensuous and cognitive experience, but 
towards which we have not been accustomed to direct our attention. It seems to play a 
crucial role, whether, we direct our attention or not. 
 
9.5. Phenomenology, phaneroscopy and evolution from the inside 
With Ho I have implied that consciousness could be related to scientifically signified 
phenomena of light and sound at quantum levels of the organism. If this it so, and let us 
speculate that it is, there could be a relation between what has formerly been sensed 
through meditation and active philosophy as the silence of phenosemiosis, and the 
current technoscientific experience of nano scale light and sound. This could point 
towards an evolutionary development in the overall, cultural, signification spheres 
where we are becoming acquainted with new levels of signification and possible 
interpretation relating our understandings of consciousness more directly to the flesh 
and blood physical body. We are becoming acquainted with new levels of ourselves as a 
species. I will try to explain this thesis more in the following paragraphs. 
 
First of all, I must take us into a deeper dialogue with the ontological and philosophical 
levels of Brier's theory. This would necessarily involve the metaphysical aspects of 
Peirce’s philosophy. My suggestion is concerned with the issue of introspection and 
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inner experience, raised by the communication of Blue Morph, and a further question 
concerning the quality of phenosemiosis as an instance of consciousness that, apart from 
presenting a realm of experience, could also have a functional role at an evolutionary 
scale. 
Since firstness in humans and other living organisms, if we follow 
Peirce’s philosophy, would be an instance of the same nature as firstness in the universe 
at large (in a non-materialistic cosmology), which develops by evolution, takes habits 
and generates structures (secondness), there could be a relationship between 
consciousness and mechanisms of cognition in humans, and consciousness and some 
regularities of the universe. The fabric of universal firstness (I call it fabric in an 
unspecified sense. There could easily be particular qualities involved, however, at this 
moment we are not able to specify such) could be connected to the fabric of firstness in 
ourselves, and distribute elements of secondness in both realms that take similar 
properties or are connected in some sense. Brier (2008, p. 487) himself points towards 
something likely with a quotation from Peirce that relates mechanistic properties of 
nature (secondness) to cognitive properties of human minds. The idea of inner evolution 
also lies in part as a consequence of Peirce’s phaneroscopy. It places an inherent, 
evolutionary perspective in its phenomenology together with a telos related directly to 
thought. Peirce's telos and thought are primary and universal, as opposed to purpose and 
thought as expressed in species-specific ways in humans. The necessity of evolution of 
consciousness, followed by developments in cognitive potential, in general further lies 
in Briers combination of Peircean phenomenology with Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela’s idea of autopoiesis, where the development of cognition in a species 
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through structural couplings builds upon evolutionary properties as a central 
prerequisite. 
 
My suggestion is that the mind signified in firstness as phenosemiosis in the processes 
of the human being, is extending the potential physical realm of the human body 
structure in relation to sensation, perception and cognition as a consequence of the 
present time in evolution. As this development happens at the level of phenosemiosis, it 
would be a pre-linguistic experience that might not enter thought semiosic processes in 
any kind of immediate manner. The extension of accessibility of consciousness in the 
organic, human body would have two general outcomes: 
 
1. It is, in part, directly or indirectly, becoming accessible to the intellectual mind, 
and from there signified in cultural semiosis (through for instance technology 
assisted art concerned with nanotechnology and bio-electromagnetism31 
2. The nature of phenosemiosic processes is altering, and this would affect the 
relations between states, elements, structures, and levels of invariance and 
closure32 in the organismic structure from within. The physical and energetic 
structure of the body, thus, might take on new and more complex habits (this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This field is concerned with electromagnetic functions in the organism that extend from electrification of neurons, 
into cell membrane potentials, and the possibility of global electron and proton conduction within the whole of the 
organism. Mae Wan Ho and James Oschman are both working with bioelectromagnetism. See the International 
Journal of Bioelectromagnetism for further information: http://www.ijbem.org/ and the International Society for 
Bioelectromagnetism: http://www.isbem.org	  32	  Vocabulary taken from Richards, 2010 on definitions of cybernetic systems	  
	   204	  
means that our ability to sense and feel could be extended from within our 
physical body as part of evolution). 
 
A consequence of these two hypotheses would be, for one, that not only the semi-stable 
structures of cybernetic, autopoietic organization that, according to Brier's model can be 
seen as part of what makes people individual entities (the black boxes of cybernetics), 
are understood to be affected by evolution. It is also that the nature or quality of 
consciousness working as a flux of communication in humans as mind or pure feeling 
would alter its effects on the human body. It would be extending its realm, affecting the 
organic structure and organization from within. It does so, because it carries 
evolutionary properties as part of its quality, like the rest of Nature. Due to these 
alterations, the ability to focus inwards on instances of pure feeling would inhere an 
actual potency when it comes to future perspectives of gaining insight and creating new 
cultural significations regarding Nature, both inside and outside ourselves. To some 
extend, the presented emphasis on introspection seems to bring us back to Descartes’ 
meditations. However, in the presented perspective, the full flesh and blood of the 
(scientifically signified) body from quants to molecules, cells, organs, nervous system 
and skin, and our most central technological experiences has furthered the scope of 
observation, and the existing vocabularies at hand. 
 
It goes without saying that if phenosemiosis becomes signified (in cultural semiosis), 
then it is no longer phenosemiosis. Because as Brier describes it, phenosemiosis is pre-
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linguistic. It might rely on the protosemiotic processes of biosemiosis. But it is not 
signified in intellectual thought processes, coupled to the socio-communicative, 
autopoietic language games that are shared and developed at intersubjective levels. 
Thus, we can only think of this evolutionary property as happening in the active 
exchange between interfaces that cross boundaries between different kinds of semiosis, 
and between autopoetic and semiosic processes. Biosemiotic processes would directly 
interface with phenosemiotic processes, which would again exchange with, or affect, 
the many kinds of thought processes that humans can have. My addition to this scheme 
would be a further, speculative proposition: that the dynamics and refinement of 
interfacing in the organism could be seen to have self-organizing, evolutionary 
properties based on syntropy (Albert Szent-György, 1977, and Luigi Fantappié, in 
Corpo and Vanninni, 2009 have both operated in original ways with the concept of 
syntropy) rather than entropy or negentropy. 
 
Syntropy would be a property particular of the living organism, and has to do with its 
ability to perfect itself from a point of departure of the micro scale level. This relates 
somewhat to the telos of Peirce’s phaneroscopy, and it relates to our ideas of the 
potential relationship between quantum biological processes and what we usually 
understand as properties of consciousness. 
 
We already know that the foundation for human consciousness, and self-interpretation 
through extended cognition and consciousness has happened physically as part of 
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evolution with the extension of the brain by the neocortex in the latest version of Homo 
Sapiens. Susan Hart (2006) writes with Jaak Panksepp that the evolution of our species 
seems to have typically had long periods of stability, followed by explosion like 
expansion (p. 25). The contemporary increase of interest in human consciousness on a 
broad, global scale could point towards a likely contemporary explosion of 
evolutionarily based properties relating to consciousness. It is said that there is still 
much unused brain matter, just like the dark matter of the universe seems as extensive 
as inexplicable. There could be equally more at the level of the global, in-vivo 
bodymind, which we have mentally and materially not yet realized. If we can see 
ourselves as expanding from the inside, then the idea of being implicit observers inside 
a material universe, as suggested in Otto Rössler's (1998) observer dependent theory of 
endophysics, might seem less claustrophobic. 
 
9.6. Conclusion 
In this case study, I have examined how intellectual interpretation of technology 
assisted, contemporary art is possible. I have applied central theoretical terms from 
Briers cybersemiotic framework, which also includes a deeper, philosophical 
speculation concerning a potential current, evolutionary process influencing upon our 
ways of being conscious as humans per se. In relation to Blue Morph, Briers model and 
terms make me able to divide and relate semiotic processes at different levels and with 
different characteristics, both in relation to the artwork and in relation to the user. The 
establishment of an ideal user forces me to define a human subject that extends from 
divisions usually made in each corner of Brier's cybersemiotic star, and to seek for 
explanations that can tie elements from each corner of the star together in new, 
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meaningful wholes. Interpretation through the ideal user makes me able to see Blue 
Morph as a contribution to the research of human consciousness, and to explore the 
possible connection between consciousness and human physiology. 
 
Besides from investigating an art installation from a semiotic-hermeneutical 
perspective, I have used the theory to make further inquiry into a possible development 
of the phenomenological understanding of the human being, and the relationship 
between phenomenology as philosophy, phenomenology as science, phenomenology as 
design, and phenomenology as real time, subjective experience. I have further placed a 
process oriented, evolutionary, time aspect into the relationship between bio-, pheno- 
and thought semiosis, which indicates an alteration in the quality aspect of 
phenomenological experience as part of our evolution as a species. One consequence of 
such a proposal is, if it has any truth to it, that our ability to observe our own evolution 
has increased, that the focus point of human evolution would be consciousness, and that 
this development is closely connected to developments in technoscience. 
 
Furthermore, when understanding the role of amplification and augmentation of the 
senses and general mediation through technologies and media, we realise how 
problematic it is to understand phenosemiosis as bearing any kind of stable 
characteristics. It might be that to Brier phenosemiosis is pre-intellectual and pre-
linguistic, and therefore indefinable. This is also what makes it difficult to claim that 
alterations take place at exactly this level. However, in the interchange between 
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phenosemiotic streams of consciousness, cybernetic pattern fitting, and triad semiosis at 
biological levels, the dynamic perspective that lies in Peirce’s agapistic evolution 
somewhat supports the stance that consciousness in humans can alter at an evolutionary 
basis. A characterisation and detailed distinction between biological properties, 
information and sign qualities, interfacing with such of phenosemiosis in concrete 
processes, are, however, by no means made at the current moment. 
 
The orientation presented in this article implies an expectation towards a real potential 
when it comes to furthering our (self) understandings of pure feeling by the aid of 
technoscience, and technology based art, together with a renewed focus on the process 
of introspection. As a consequence of this, new semiotic terms and meaningful texts 
related to such understandings can emerge. An interchanging dialogue between the 
empirical sciences, technology and semiotic approaches that results in culturally 
negotiated significations concerning new realms of sensation and qualia related to 
biological empirical experience (such as the biophysical results of Wan Ho, or the nano 
scale signals of Blue Morph) would in itself represent a sign of evolution, relating 
directly to our common state of collective, conscious awareness. 
It must be said, in the end, that all though I emphasize the role of 
technologies, it is no claim that technological aid is by any means necessary to expand 
awareness of the subtle processes inside ourselves and their relation to the autonomous, 
generative processes of thought, and our own intellectual willed handling of such. 
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Chapter 8, Case Study 4: On light - and the flux of 
informative events in Nature and technologies 
 
10.0. Introduction 
In case study four, I will move into deeper, integrative speculations concerning the role 
of light in the relation between human consciousness and the surrounding world. This 
case study varies from the others by combining a religious and mystical philosophy with 
a technological and art based approach (syncretism). Concretely, I will explore the 
possible connection between light and mind as a prevalent idea throughout the history 
of Eastern and Western cultures, and examine it in a contemporary context, the last of 
which is mostly based on the study of new technologies and the way they influence 
upon the knowledge that we can achieve today, where the area of photonics is gaining a 
still wider influence, and lies as a central technological tool for the generation and 
maintenance of the physical structure of the world wide web. 
 
Oschman's biophysics of energy medicine contains a hypothesis suggesting that the 
body uses holographic information as part of the processes running in the bodymind. In 
this case study, I would like to further investigate the influence of light both within the 
bodymind, at the intersection point between biology and consciousness, but also at an 
overall ontological level. I will establish an exploration of thought that stages the 
possible connection between light as central to biological processes, light as an 
information storage property in electronic and biological tissue, light as a connective 
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communication pattern in and between humans, and also in and between planets and 
stars in the cosmos. 
 
The artworks that I have chosen for this case study are Christa Sommerer and Laurent 
Mignonneau's Phototropy (1994), and UVA's Speed of Light (2010). The reason for 
integrating studies of light art (UVA) and art that works with conceptual ideas of light 
(Sommerer and Mignonneau) is that technologies and technoetic art communications 
evoke new understandings and generate new metaphors that can be applied in new, 
conceptual explanations. Again, art installations add to the overall epistemological 
approach to the question of how to understand the knowing human subject. Light is 
central in many biological and physical processes, and we have to ask ourselves of the 
relation between light in non-organic material, and light in organic material and where 
our own place as human subjects would be in this landscape. Technologies that are 
based on light, teach us more of the phenomenon of light, in particular the lasers of 
UVA's Speed of Light. 
I will commence with a short, historico-philosophical survey of 
philosophies concerning the connection between light, consciousness and human 
knowing. 
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10.1. Religious and spiritual concepts of the connection between light and human 
knowing 
In Christian theology light is understood as directly connected to human knowledge. In 
Buddhism, enlightenment is central. It is in no way like Western enlightenment. It is 
rather a spiritual path towards expanded consciousness and a higher state of being. 
Ancient Persian traditions such as the School of Illumination, which form part of 
Persian mysticism, offer an extensive framework that connects light to human 
knowledge, the idea of the soul and its connection to the body (Suhrawardi, 1155-1191). 
This means that the apparatus of perception is understood to be the soul, which is based 
on light. Objects perceived represent an “essence”, which is based on light structures.  
Where Alhazen (965–c.1040AD) in Iraq is well known for his early 
attempts to create an empirical science of light, presented in the extensive volume called 
Book of Optics, the Persian philosopher Suhrawardi, a century later, in Persia, presented 
a school of philosophy that was primarily based on light. Where Alhazen was interested 
in empirical testing, Suhrawardi was interested in God, soul and consciousness. Of the 
two, it is AlHazen who became known in the West, and is still mentioned in the science 
of light today (Zajonc, 1993), whereas Suhrawardi has not attained widespread 
attention. Suhrarwardi was, in part, inspired by Plato and Aristotle, however, his 
philosophy can, to a high extend, also be viewed as a critique of Peripatetic philosophy.   
 
Suhrarwardi’s ontology presented the idea that light is the original source of all being, 
which originally started with the light of lights. From this point, light moved into 
descending orders of still greater diminishing intensity. At a certain point, an array of 
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light was formed that informed the manifested world and the species of the earth; in part 
this happened through the formation of Platonic geometrical forms, which would then 
belong to one level of virtual light, which interfered and created the forms as a 
prerequisite for the space and objects that we as humans inhabit. The connection to 
other realms of light would be there, however, indirectly. The original light of light was 
immaterial. 
 
Were we to transfer this framework into a current setting, with the knowledge that we  
have today, light in the universe would be but one level of descended, or slowed down, 
light. Stanford Encyclopedia33 says with Ziai, 2003 of Suhrawardi’s conception of 
physical bodies: 
‘Suhrawardi even revisits the classical theory of the ten Categories which 
(as with theStoics) he lumps together and reduces to five: substance, 
quality, quantity, relation, and motion, of which the latter four are 
accidental categories. The Categories now become ‘degrees of intensity’ 
(or perfection) of light that entities possess and that they emit, rather than 
being merely distinct ‘ontic entities.’  (p. 452). 
As such, the degree of intensity (with its corollary ‘weakness’) of light becomes a 
property of substances as well as of accidents.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
further writes of the connection between human perception and the world: “Between the 
two, the psychic pneuma functions as an intermediary that is able to receive images, 
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  www.plato.standford.edu/entries/suhrawardi	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forms or ‘icons’ of metaphysical realities that it then reflects and manifests into the 
soul.”  Were we, once again, to understand this in a current mind frame, it could back 
up the idea that something such as geometry, mathematics and other symbols have a 
virtual shape as a part of Nature, which humans can capture, however, not by logical 
thinking. Suhrawardi thus presents the idea of light as a main interface between the 
psyche and the body, and between the human subject and the world. Suhrawardi 
determines vision to be the dominant sense, however, in reality it is the soul that 
perceives. For this reason, the brain is but a material sub-category of the body's 
perception, which is made by the whole, which is the soul, made of light. The soul can 
be educated to experience light frequencies in other souls or objects, and to perceive 
mainly through this interface. And we must note how this skill demands practice. 
Intuitive knowledge is, to Suhrawardi, recognition of light in matter with low-intensity 
light, or of pure light in one of its different stages. 
 
If we are to relate the presented philosophical ideas to insights gained through the case 
studies made in this thesis, we can both think of Wheeler's (2006) tacit knowledge, but 
what comes even closer is Oschman’s concept of intuition and connectivity in 
holographic information. Intuitive notions of an object then are perceived by functions 
of the living matrix, rather than by regular perception through the nervous system and 
brain. Our understanding of tacit knowledge and intuition would then be at least 
partially defined by the idea of biological storage and distribution of light in the 
physical body, consisting of a variety of local-global systems and organs through wave 
interference patterns. And we can further relate it to the idea that intuition is tacit 
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knowledge that can become available to the day conscious mind through thought 
semiosis and cultural semiosis. 
 
Suhrawardi's teachings had a wide influence on Persian thought, although he himself 
ended up dying a martyr’s death. Similar thinking, concerning a connection between 
light and consciousness, can be found in the science-philosophy of Rudolf Steiner 
(2001), who was a physicist by education, however developed esoteric knowledge. 
Steiner carried out empirical physical research, but connected it to a spiritualist vision 
of mind and consciousness, inspired, in part, by the German poet Johan Wolfgang Von 
Goethe. Steiner presented holistic theories, where typical Western theories were 
reductive and analytical. Because of his esoteric approaches, he has not been widely 
acknowledged within a scientific context. 
 
10.2. Suhrawardi and Peircean ontology 
So, according to the ancient philosophy of Suhrawardi, there is more to light than meets 
the eye, literally speaking. And even more than would meet current possibilities in 
research, based on available instruments and techniques, including digital modelling 
and spectral analysis, if light is connected to an immaterial consciousness, first and 
foremost. If we were to liken Suhrawardi's philosophy with that of Peirce, light, would 
be inherent at the level of firstness and be part of pure feeling. However, the ontology of 
Suhrawardi goes deeper than the philosophy of Peirce, because of the many levels of 
light intensity that exist before matter even arises. This would demand a levelling of 
firstness. 
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With Suhrawardi, we would have to broaden our view on the virtually real, and the 
potential for moving into ontological depth at this level. And were we to describe 
deeper ontological levels, we could not use terms that rest on physicality, which makes 
it difficult, and demands a metaphorical approach. I will move towards a proposition of 
a deep ontology based on light in this case study, in order to examine its theoretical 
potentials. I will deepen my view upon levels of immaterial ontology in part three, 
chapter one: Time and Relativity. 
 
Suhrawardi viewed the human subject in a holistic manner, where the brain was a 
sentient organ among other sentient organs, but not the main processor or producer of 
consciousness. What I mean to imply by bringing in this philosophy, is not that 
Suhrawardi's model might apply today. However, that there are likenesses between the 
concept of extended sentience, and Suhrawardi's idea of how the human being is 
conscious and sentient from a level that is beyond that of regular biological processes. 
The concept of extended sentience provides more empirical detail, because the level of 
the artefactually real is not equal to that in which Suhrawardi lived. At the philosophical 
level, there could be an overlap, however, between the dynamical objects that I am 
trying to capture, and the dynamical objects that Suhrawardi studied from a historically 
and geographically distant position. 
 
10.3. Light and the material universe 
Today, it might be difficult to see the relationship between human knowledge and light, 
beyond the fact that knowledge about light has been extremely important for science 
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and technology in the West. What happens today, however, when it comes to 
information technologies and the area of holistic biophysics, is that the ability to detect 
and manipulate light at the scale of single photons gains increased importance, while a 
connection between consciousness studies and studies of light gains still more 
relevance. On that basis, it makes sense to ask the question of the connection between 
light and consciousness once again. If it turns out that there is a connection between 
light in the biological organism and consciousness, this will also affect the way we 
understand the human subject, and the overall process of human knowing. 
 
But what are the main ways in which the study of light affects our understandings of the 
world and ourselves? Light is an essential part in the way we perceive and understand 
the world of objects today. It is central in knowledge generation: 
At the outer, physical scale (noemic observation), light is what makes the 
world of matter accessible to us, and eye vision is often understood as a dominant 
information source. In this sense, light plays a huge role, because it is what gives us 
perceptive access to the world of objects (objects are perceived as a range of light 
frequencies, ordered in particular patterns). The way we understand the physicality of 
light, and how it operates in connection to eye vision plays a central role, then, in how 
we understand the relationship between the world and ourselves. This has traditionally 
meant that ways in which we interpret the influence of eyesight on perception and 
cognition has become decisive of our further interpretations of space and objects in 
space. Naturally, as I have mentioned, and which is implicit in the concept of extended 
sentience, sensation would always be synesthetic by nature. This means that at a 
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molecular level, connected to specific areas of the brain, and neuron activation, the 
senses might be partitioned; they use different receptors, which, again, activate different 
brain areas. However, at the level of extended sentience, this partition might not be 
relevant. The wholeness and global nature of sensation at this level, could relate to 
Suhrawardi’s soul. But if perception is synesthetic, and if there are new realms of 
sensation to discover, then what happens to the academic and the phenomenological 
understanding of space and objects? The focus upon eye vision and the meeting with the 
external world through eye vision might be preliminary of classical Positivism. This 
role of scientific interpretations of eye vision, of course, has been problematized many 
times (for instance by Marcel Duchamp, 1975). However, classical ideas of perception 
still seem to play a central, but unacknowledged role today. 
 
But it is not only in ordinary perception that light plays a central role. The theory of the 
Big Bang, which must be characterised as a basic Western ontology, is built upon the 
idea that light grew out of the plasma state of the early universe, and that the backwards 
reflection of light can tell us about the motion and evolution of the physical universe. It 
tells us about the formation of stars and galaxies, and of the chemistry involved. Light, 
according to Einstein’s relativity theory, is furthermore one of the only ubiquitous 
constants in the universe. The speed of light thus forms a central measuring parameter 
in our basic, epistemological understandings of the constitution of the Universe. If the 
speed of light was not constant, for instance, this would change our conceptions of 
space and time (relativity theory already does) Light is thus both a central concept in 
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our basic ontology, and a measuring device when it comes to seeking out new cosmic 
territory. 
 
Matter absorbs and reflects light unequally, according to the fabric of the particular 
material, and the differences in reflection of light from different materials is what gives 
objects shape, and what makes the world appear in colour. So light is central both in 
how we gain information about the world, and how we interpret it. But, what happens, if 
we discover that light is also an intrinsic, and perhaps essential, part of ourselves and 
our biological mind, and not only relevant when it comes to the relationship between the 
eye, day consciousness, and the surrounding world? 
 
10.4. Light as bio-information 
According to Marco Bischof (1995), DNA emits and absorbs light at very weak 
frequencies. A system of photon emission can, according to Bischof, account for a laser 
like transmission across cells of the global body due to the dynamic, and spiral structure 
of the DNA molecule. Biophotons can become coherently structured, and operate in a 
variety of frequencies at many spacetime scales, which gives it capacity to carry high 
amounts of information bits. In the same book, Bischof further references the founder of 
the International Institute of Biophysics in Neuss, Switzerland, Fritz Albert Popp, with 
whom he has cooperated through a number of years. According to Bischof, Popp finds 
that photons are what cause coherence, which is a principle of organization, which again 
forms the necessary prerequisite for chemical processes in cells. This theory is an 
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extension of Oschman’s otherwise complex framework, which mentions photons, 
however, does not go into detail with the topic. The theory of biophotons implies that 
cells, tissues and organs are informed by light structures that work both locally and 
globally, much like an endosemiotic internet which, due to its quantum properties, also 
is able to communicate across the boundaries of the individual (in part, because quants 
are not particles, they are clouds that can exist freely in spacetime). 
 
As we recall, Mae Wan Ho (2008) and Bischof both suggest a relation between the 
biophotonic information system, and properties that we currently understand as 
consciousness. This means that the biophotonic organization would be one element that 
works as consciousness in the organism; and this implies all living organisms, not just 
human beings. But it also means, to Popp, that coherent biophotons form an interface 
between the day conscious mind and biology. This brings us back to the relation 
between light and human knowledge. If we were to move back to the central question 
posed by Brier, concerning signalling, pattern fitting and semiosis, it would at this point 
be unclear, whether the emergent properties of biophotons should be viewed as function 
based on pattern fitting (pure relation), or whether they would be semiosic 
(interpretation). If they are semiosic, they demand interpretants in order to cause events 
such as cascades of chemical processes in the cell. In order to know more of this topic, 
we would have to study in detail, how the body interprets the information that these 
biophotons provide. I would say, however, that we could hardly talk of 
communicational networks based on biophotons, without simultaneously suggesting 
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semiosic properties. The information of photons seems to trigger further chemical 
processes, which again demands interpretants within the biological structure. 
 
If there is indeed a relationship between quantum scale biological activity and the day 
conscious mind, taking this seriously into account leads us to a moebius strip logic, 
where there is no clear-cut distinction between biology and philosophy, noetic 
(inner/quantum information) and noemic (outwards/matter information), large or small, 
mind or body, matter or non-matter. Depending of course upon the ontological weight 
that we give the concept of physical light and the kinds of consciousness that the 
biological body presents as opposed to the kind of consciousness that arises on the basis 
of the day conscious mind. And then we have to ask: is insight in the existence and 
function of biophotons going to be ontologically decisive? Or are we exaggerating the 
meaning of quantum biology by doing so? Before trying to answer such a question, let 
us dare to slide around the moebius strip just suggested, and experiment with some 
alternative explanations of the relationship between light and matter. 
 
10.5. The space medium 
Physicist Milo Wolf (2008) claims that the electron is the simplest matter structure. It's 
basis is the behaviour of an ingoing, and an outgoing spherical wave that together form 
a standing wave. The standing wave has higher density at the center, which appears as a 
particle in a microscope. In this framework, the nature of all matter would rely on the 
appearance of waves that oscillate in resonance in more and less dense points, creating 
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lattices of wave interference, out of which space and space properties appear. One of the 
central principles of the Space Resonance Theory (SRT) is that waves in a common 
lattice seek the lowest possible common amplitude. This happens in atoms, molecular 
structures, and more complex structures forming the world of matter. Thus, the basic 
principles of the space medium are: sensitive communicative awareness, and behaviours 
of interfering waves. What physicists have typically observed, when describing energy, 
according to Wolf, is signs of energy exchange, not energy itself? We have thus moved 
our concept of energy one bit deeper at the ontological level. And this is important 
when we seek to understand properties of consciousness in relation to such of physics 
and biology. This concept of energy and information, which then become properties of 
pre-space, fits somewhat with Bischof and Popp’s idea of the photon as an information 
source that drives chemical processes in the cell, and perhaps also with Ji’s idea of the 
gnergon, where information and energy become one. But it does not go as deep as 
Suhrawardi's philosophy, which has a levelled concept of pre-space. 
We do not necessarily have to take Milo Wolf's theory at face value in 
order to play with the thought of yet another, ontologically deeper level of physicality. 
And as mentioned, the integrative method through formulation gives an opportunity to 
observe through articulation. It is the work of the generative philosopher to establish 
well-founded theses, in order to think of new connections, connections not yet fully 
explored at the level of academic practice. In this case study, the generative philosopher 
has been demonstrating assimilation of basic components in the Big Bang theory, which 
are, by now, understood to be common sense for the schooled person, since it represents 
basic physics, and from there entering the thought experiment. 
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10.6. Light as communicational energy exchange 
According to Wolf, there are no photons. There are only processes of energy exchange, 
that, when they happen between the wave structures of the smallest measurable entities, 
electrons, result in an emission of light that appears as a photon in the matter realm. The 
speed of quantum waves is approximately 300.000 kilometers per second. Light, as it 
shows in the space resonance medium, would thus be the most direct expression of 
space medium information exchange, and it would follow the natural speed of EM 
(electromagnetic) waves as it appears. Light appears in space as EM waves travelling 
mechanically from one spatial point to the other. But relating to SRT, EM waves would 
rather be an overall sign of energy exchange happening in the communication between 
already connected oscillation points at the level of pre-space information, which then 
appears as a spacetime event. These oscillation points cannot be related to ordinary 
four-dimensional spacetime. 
 
As I see it, however, for the relationship between pre-space information and the space 
medium to make sense, there would have to be a reversible communication between the 
space medium, and pure information as well. Thus, space could potentially create 
effects in the information realm, and this would give the virtual some kind of time 
property, at least in the moment it relates to four-dimensional space and matter. This, 
then, would form the offset of the virtually real, or one of its characteristics. It would be 
part of the physical interface between levels of emergence, or, we could call it diverse 
physical densities. If we believe the basic ontological level of the Universe to be best 
described by terms from physical science approach, that is. 
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If we add the physical philosophy of David Bohm (1980), then what he understood as 
enfolded orders could be seen as a set of non-computational algorithms underlying the 
structure of space and space phenomena, in the form of quantum wave patterns. Light as 
a sign of an energy exchange becomes executable information, not only as a function 
and property of its material existence (even if photons are massless), but also as a sign 
of codes from the enfolded order. An information pattern (dynamical object) could, in 
principle, be distributed in a number of spacetime relationships. There would be 
essentially no time (perhaps only 300.000 km/sec) nor space between them, even if in 
four-dimensional space, they would appear very different (for instance in a fractal 
structure across scales).  But let us broaden the picture by studying the chosen artworks 
for this case study, in order also to let art and technologies add to the narrative and 
inquiries made here. 
 
10.7. Phototrophy 
Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau's work Phototrophy (1994) explores the 
relation between light and living systems. The installation presents an environment of 
Artificial Life (A-Life), that allows for a relationship between the evolutionary 
behaviour of a (digitally) virtual world, and the behaviour of users in the so-called real 
world. The central navigation tool is a flashlight. The theme of the installation is based 
on the biological idea of phototrophy, where plants have an intrinsic urge to grow 
towards sunlight. 
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        Figure 10: Phototrophy. By Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau 
                        Taken from 
  http://www.interface.ufg.ac.at/christa-laurent/WORKS/FRAMES/FrameSet.html 
 
The virtual insects need light to grow, and reproduce, but can also be damaged by too 
much light. A sensitive balanced control is needed between users and A-Life world. 
Even if the living creatures are insects and not bacteria or plants, we are reminded of the 
central relationship between the cosmic rays of the sun and organic life IRL (In Real 
Life), by the ability of plants to bind and use solar energy chemically (which humans 
then take in through a diet of greens), and for sensation and perception. It is not, 
however, the biological concept of light as a life source that is of interest here. It is 
rather the symbolic implications of the interface that links behaviours, as light forms the 
path to interaction between the real and the (digital) virtual. Light functions as an 
oscillating behaviour that connects the choices of the holder of the flashlight, with the 
development and behaviour of the virtual insect species. Light, at the symbolic level, is 
then an interface between two different realities, or two different dimensions of reality 
by which light, to the artificial creatures, is the only visible sign of the world on the 
other side. This, we could relate to the above framework, in which light is the primary 
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visible sign of energy exchange between virtual information and the space medium, and 
we could contemplate further on the implications of light as a sign of an intelligent, 
oscillating relationship between enfolded and outfolded orders. 
 
10.8. The Speed of Light 
The Speed of Light by the London-based artist group UVA (2010) is based on a series of 
installations that was exhibited in London, in April, 2010. The purpose of the works is 
to acquaint the public with fiber optic technologies that are central to modern 
communication, particularly broadband Internet. Fiber optics is based on very thin glass 
strands that allow travelling light impulses to float and carry information. 
        
                        
     
                               Figure 11: Scene from UVA's Speed of Light 
 Taken from: http://www.uva.co.uk/work/speed-of-light 
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The Speed of Light is not a deep and provocative technoetic work. Its relevance lays 
rather in the way it points towards the ability of light to carry large bits of information at 
the quantum scale. The installation is arranged so that the voices of users, answering 
emotional laden questions into a microphone as they enter the warehouse, are closely 
tied to the light scenarios presented in a variety of rooms inside a four-story building. 
Each room has its own story. One room offers a setting where a sofa and TV appears as 
sculptures made of light tubes that illuminate the darkness, perhaps indicating to the 
ideal user a process of light coming into formation? Another room allows for an 
experience of lasers, forming geometric patterns in the air as they interfere by the linear 
qualities of coherent light sent out from lasers in different positions of the room. The 
installations form a constant interplay between light and darkness, between light and 
space, and between sound and light. They present a variety of functions and qualities of 
artificial light connected to the use of fiber optic technologies. From here, the user can 
contemplate relationships of light, matter and information at the scale of the gross 
senses, and perhaps, indirectly, gain insights from processes happening at the level of 
the five senses, the levels of quantum information and biological photonic motion as 
part of internal semiosis. 
 
10.9. Lasers in hardware and wetware 
Bischof describes photon networks between cells, where the laser properties are 
distributed from cavities formed in the kernel of the DNA molecular structure, which 
allows storage, transmission of biophotons, and amplification into laser light. The idea 
of laser light transmitted from cavities, carrying huge amounts of information has 
equivalences in contemporary attempts to create, for example, nano photonic crystals. 
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Nano photonic crystals are based on cavities in materials particularly suited, and in 
which single photons can ideally be captured, manipulated, and used to structure 
information on behalf of laser properties (Bjarklev, Hansen & Smit, 2011). The 
vocabularies of biophysics, and the physics of photonic technologies aimed towards 
quantum computing do have some affinities, which implies a possible mutual influence 
similar to what we have experienced in the development of the digital computer and the 
theoretical province of cybernetics, and later on: the cognitive sciences. 
 
Bischof (1995), with Popp, however, emphasizes the ability of light to operate at many 
frequencies and wavelengths in complex dynamic structures, which could account for 
the difference between the living organism versus the less complex information patterns 
of dead material. He even suggests an evolutionary development, which implies an 
expansion in refinement and complexity in light structures in living organisms. In this 
line of thinking, dead material, even advanced optic technologies, would always show 
less degrees of complexity, than what can be found in the living organism. If we were to 
liken biophotonic coherence internally and externally to the boundaries of the individual 
to the broadband internet, the human organism and its relationship to Nature, including 
other human beings, could inhere likely properties, however, it would inhere a much 
higher degree of complexity, and provide more dynamic broadband canals (internally 
and externally) for transmission of information; and the organic network would have the 
capacity to carry more bits than information networks based on fiber optic technologies. 
It is the reduction and captivation of the functionality into material space, however, that 
allows us to contemplate the mechanism. 
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10.10. Information flow in Nature and technologies 
If we investigate the idea of semi-closed systems interacting in nature, then perhaps we 
see a macro effect of energy exchange in the ecological relationship between cosmic 
solar rays and living organisms on planet Earth, and a micro effect of energy exchange 
happening by photons emitted and absorbed by human DNA in cell nuclei, such as 
suggested by Bischof; and perhaps, we can hypothesise, there could be a fractal 
similarity in the properties of information distribution and structure by pure information 
causing energy exchange at both scales. Following this line of thought, we can see our 
cultural interpretations of such connections in the areas of optics and photonics (Zajonc, 
1993; Winn, Meade, Johnson, Steven & Joannopoulos, 2008; Bjarklev, Hansen & Smit, 
2011). As Bischof suggests, the sun seems to have more functions than merely 
providing light for the visual sense, for vitamin D generation, for photosynthesis, and 
for heating the globe. There might be a further moebius strip connection between 
macro-scale and micro-scale light information that builds upon the dynamic interface of 
the resonant space medium in which matter appears, and of which all we have detected 
so far are the outfolded energy exchanges of measurable light (EM-spectrum). Since 
four-dimensional space is, according to both Wolf and Bischof, not the only reality, it 
makes sense that properties can be connected according to other premises than those of 
traditional spacetime at a level that we could call pre-space. If Wolf’s theory has any 
truth value, we can see ourselves immersed in a universe of multi-frequent, vibrating 
information that both informs and is informed by the space medium, affecting us at 
micro and macro levels, and is based on pure information, the reverse logic of which we 
have yet to discover. 
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In this scheme, it makes no sense to call human consciousness and intelligence the 
highest form of intelligence. Rather, Nature herself provides the highest level of 
intelligence, and we are mere bricks in a much larger puzzle. The kind of information 
that I am talking about here, cannot by any means be described by the paradigm of 
Information Science, as criticized by Brier, because statistical probability or pattern 
fitting cannot adequately describe how it generates effects in inorganic and organic 
spacetime structures. Furthermore, we must remember that the very connection between 
lattices of waves, light and the further components of matter, might be much more 
complex than what can be explained by physical science and theories of light. In this 
sense, the coordination of Suhrawardi's early philosophy on one side, and current 
philosophy of physics, combined with empirical research on biophotons and 
engineering in the area of photonics, might not seem so irrelevant. The area of 
photonics strives towards using light to carry and distribute information in very small 
physical spaces, so as to generate quantum computers, and to refine properties of 
information processing machines at large (Hameroff, 1987; Blümel, 2010). The area of 
biophotonics equally is concerned with ways in which light in its natural context is 
capable of storing and distributing information, which might tie to both well-known 
biological processes, as well as realms of what we now understand as consciousness. 
There is an overlap in meaning here. If we take Wolf's theory at face value, this also 
relates to Suhrawardi's idea of dimensions of light, where those of physical visibility, 
and where light is measurable by our instruments, are not the sole dimensions of light. 
This also relates to the metaphorical symbolic levels of the interface of Phototrophy, 
and to the idea of consciousness behind all physical manifestation. 
 
	   230	  
From here, we can extend our image of Nature. We can view the ecosystem that we 
inhabit as extended into encompassing at least the solar system. For now, we know 
mostly of the relation between earth and the sun, and earth and the moon. However, if 
light functions as information, and the number of stars is infinite, then there is some 
possibility that Earth living is much more related to it's cosmic environments, than we 
have thought so far. If Wolf's theory has some truth-value, then not only the connection 
between electrons will generate light, but also the connection between stars and planets. 
All is connected, as in the principle of Ernest Mach, which Wolf presents as a core 
pillar in his theory. If we believe in a relation between light, information and 
consciousness, our ontological image of the universe will be connective, and based on 
living information, all though we still do not know how to understand either the concept 
of something living, or the concept of information. 
 
10.11. Conclusion 
In this case study I have presented speculations, and the most basic ontologies have 
been built upon David Bohm's philosophy of physics, and Milo Wolf's theory of the 
wave space medium. There is no certainty that Wolf's theory will last. Wolf still rests 
upon existing theories of the Big Bang, and does not move further into string theory, 
involving multiple dimensions. He only adds a deeper, basic ontological level, based on 
lattices of wave interference patterns at a variety of levels. We have explored possible 
outcomes of such an ontology, and have, simultaneously, made clear that the ontology 
is then dominated by explanations of physical science. We can choose to view physics 
as a sub-part of Natural forces, which are, in themselves, multidimensional. However, 
physical science discovers only one or few dimensions. Or we could view the 
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interpretations into consciousness philosophy as a mere extrapolation, based on 
metaphor and analogy, and extended into fictional explanations. I will not choose the 
concept of fiction here, because I operate with a different concept of reality, as 
demonstrated in our levelled reality. Therefore, I will speculatively go with the idea of 
multiple dimensions, whereas classical physics, quantum physics and the overall theory 
of the Big Bang, and the main parameters inherent in this theory, only demonstrates 
parts of the forces that they attempt to signify. What is most interesting about exploring 
the ontological outset presented in this case study, is, in my view, the consequences that 
it has on the general cause and effect relations, which again affects the way we can 
interpret installations, but also theory concerning how we can describe the universe and 
the human subject. Wolf's theory adds in the positive to Wan Ho and Oschman's ideas 
of a wave-based functionality in biological living tissue, which relates to what we 
philosophically understand as consciousness. 
 
If we add this insight to our understanding of the point of departure of the generative 
philosopher, we have a shifted ground on which to determine the actuality and truth 
value in her position as a transcendent philosophical explorer, and a changed foundation 
for evaluating theoria as a dynamical approach connected to the process of becoming 
(Aristotle). For one, because we now understand that information is not only a property 
of written books, but, by far, also a property that the generative philosopher can strive 
for from within (remember the moebius strip between external and internal worlds at the 
micro scale level of light), and furthermore, because with Wheeler, Polanyi and Longo’s 
epistemological turn, we also know that tacit knowledge is a central part of the 
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evolution of knowledge today. Tacit knowledge does not come from studying and 
analysing existing book works. However, to implement inner knowledge and tacit 
knowledge into written academic knowledge generation is difficult today, because the 
academic thesis cannot be written outside of the existing tradition of critical discourse 
and retrospective analysis, which, from the domination of logical positivism does not 
allow speculation. That, by itself, causes a cultural suffocation of true philosophical 
talent. 
The question about deep ontology of space and time will be treated further 
in Part III, in the chapter Time and Relativity. 
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Conclusion, Part II 
 
11.0. General considerations 
In this project I have made a testing of vocabularies and theories that have made it 
possible to connect biological, psychological and social processes in a way that can 
explain connective aspects of consciousness, relate these to existing understandings of 
the body and mind, including quantum philosophy and the idea of a multi-levelled 
reality, and, none the least: to test these ideas against the symbolic of central technoetic 
artworks. 
It is, in particular, the way vocabularies have been connected into a cross-
disciplinary integrative syntax that transgresses the idea of brain equals mind, the idea 
that there are no levels of generality, besides from biological measurable such 
(neuroscience) in subjective minds, and the idea of the one-dimensional individual, who 
is separated from social and evolutionary time lines, that have been central to formulate 
in the project. This has resulted in a multi-spectred image of a human subject, who 
relies on extended sensation and aesthetic reason, based on a firm centering in 
embodied intuition. 
 
On the basis of understanding the relation between bio-, pheno- and thought semiosis, it 
has proved valuable to integrate a biophysical framework that, in itself, delivers strong 
resonance with existing philosophical ideas on consciousness (Bergson, Peat, Bohm, 
Nicolescu, et.al.), even if the biophysical framework is not in full accordance with the 
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molecular biosemiotics used by Brier, and even if Brier views sign games as inferior to 
socio-communicative autopoietic language games; which we, in our concept of 
extended sentience, do not necessarily subscribe to.34 
By moving from Brier into the framework of James Oschman, we have 
suggested that not only is the body constantly overloaded with sensuous information; it 
also structures and loads some of this information in the body, and in the right kind of 
excitation, the body can generate what I call feeling as a connective response to an outer 
stimuli. Feeling relies, in part, on extremely low frequency electromagnetic vibrations, 
but also on a heart-brain synthesis; and according to Corpo and Vannini (2010) and 
Bradley (2006), it can have anticipatory functions.35 I have made the conclusion that the 
intellectual mind functions in a subordinate position to these processes when it comes to 
fastness and accuracy, but that it has a potential to “listen” to them (with or without 
technological amplification), and to signify them in thought semiosis at levels of the day 
conscious mind. This forms part of the foundation for inner knowing (including the 
processes of our generative philosopher). 
 
Oschman, Ho, and Bischof have provided bio-energetic and bio-physical theory that 
allows for a differentiation of biological levels of consciousness, which gives us a 
foundation from which to conclude, at a provisional basis, that quantum biology is 
connected with molecular and cellular biology, and with macro scale anatomy in non-
linear ways, which do coincide with levels of thought, and which we can only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  But	  then,	  Brier’s,	  in	  developing	  his	  theory	  of	  sign	  games,	  has	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  bio-­‐energetic	  frameworks	  that	  integrate	  quantum	  levels	  into	  the	  study	  of	  the	  living	  organism.	  35	  It	  connects	  to	  a	  dynamical	  object	  in	  a	  process	  that	  happens	  outside	  of	  macro-­‐physical	  spacetime	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conceptualise by philosophical language. This relates well to Nicolescu’s levelling of 
realities, which, again, has inspired our levelling of densities. The concept of extended 
sentience, together with our five levels of reality provides us with a renewed point of 
departure from which to define the correspondence theory of truth; since the individual 
subject is multi-dimensional and relates directly to the external world through quantum 
based “imagination” (Nicolescu, 2002), and since there is accuracy in “feeling”. While 
placing an intense focus of attention on a dynamical object, feeling becomes a sign of 
truth. However, this sign of truth will always have idiosyncratic traits, and must 
therefore be negotiated at the level of socio-communicative autopoietic language games 
as well. This last fact, however, does not strip the experience of truth from its reality 
value; it represents a certain kind of embodied perception, just like Peat and Bohm 
(1987) have originally suggested. The extended version of the human subject supports 
our re-insertion of the first person generative philosopher. 
 
If one expects a purely strict logical syntax in the lines of argumentation and conclusion 
in this project, it might seem that I have presented an overall eclectic redundancy or 
even tautology in the respect that I have defined a topic, examined it, and have ended up 
with a likely conclusion as the one I made to begin with. This would be true, however, 
only if we judge the project through the criteria of strategies of linear progression and 
validation through one-dimensional classical logical cause and effect argumentation 
(Nicolescu, 2002), which functions at an overall objective level connected to a 
theoretical syntax that refers to the short time frame of a here-and-now situation. What I 
have done, however, is to fill in blanks that concern noetic levels and levels of deeper 
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meaning. This demands an articulation of processes of internal semiosis, and a 
consideration of how these processes can be extended and complicated, and related to 
traditional understandings of being and knowing. In order to fulfil this purpose, I have 
integrated a cybersemiotic vocabulary in my readings of technoetic arts, and in the 
formation of the ideal user. Forming the ideal user allowed me to further my version of 
the extended human subject to incorporate new levels of the artefactually real that 
integrate digital technologies and electronics, and thereby mixed- and augmented reality 
environments with multimodal interfaces; thereby also integrating a multisemiotic 
perspective (cultural semiosis). These environments, in themselves, represent a new 
level of signification, including anticipatory tacit knowledge. Although only the 
contours of the ideal user has appeared in the case studies, each study has provided new 
information and angles on the extended human subject. As the dynamical object that the 
ideal user is, she cannot be nailed down and captured in any strict manner. She can only 
be approached. 
Technoetic artworks typically present numerous levels of signification, 
where I have, in part, focussed upon a symbolic level where function becomes sign. 
Technoetic interfaces present condensed and ambiguous references, where most of them 
are not formulated in verbal language. The mere act of establishing a vocabulary that 
can adequately express information extracted from artworks that, in themselves, present 
new ontologies and new languages, is a result in itself. I have furthermore generated a 
framework that allows me to attack dynamical objects, which are primarily intangible. 
Intangible objects demand formulation, before one can further test if there is 
correspondence with the respective levels of reality. 
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Expanding our insight of internal semiosis, which is a realm that has been banned in 
academia for a long time, affects many other areas of study, and in particular our prior 
ontological onsets for making any theory or empirical testing. In particular because it 
shows that internal idiosyncratic foundations are not only wide and complex; there are 
also levels of generality at complex levels of internal semiosis. And furthermore, 
internal semiosis is not set once and for all. Rather we are talking about dynamic 
properties that are extremely sensible, and which develop over time; even at an 
evolutionary scale, as demonstrated in case study three. The levels of generality in 
internal semiosis, along with their dynamic nature, must be taken into consideration 
when we understand and define what it means to learn and to know. 
 
The project most probably leaves more to wish at the empirical level. However, a 
critical negotiation of accuracy and positivistic truth in the biophysical theories used has 
not been a central aim of the project. Testing their explanatory potential in a 
philosophical frame has. Critical argumentation of biophotons can, for example, be 
found in the book Thinking Hyperorganisms: Art, technology, coherence, 
connectedness and the integrative field (Nobrega, 2010), which delivers a solid and 
critical investigation of scientific research into biophotons and holistic biophysics, 
which functions as part of an overall artistic strategy, however, represents genuine 
empirical and theoretical considerations. 
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Part III: Philosophical ontologies 
 
12.0. Introduction 
Part III presents philosophical speculations concerning three major themes under the 
headlines: Time and Relativity, The Life Cycles of Metaphor, and Logos Philosophy and 
Virtual Grids. Whereas in Part II, I sought to integrate knowledge of technologies at a 
fairly technical level, and I was looking for explanations that relate to holistic versions 
of physical and biological science, Part III will mainly be preoccupied with thought 
experiments, and a demonstration of comprehensions made by the generative 
philosopher (1st person subject), which concern the formation of new ontological 
positions, the starting point of which are based on the new vocabularies and the logical 
cause and effect relations inherent in their connotations, which were derived in Parts I 
and II of the project. Central hypotheses and their crucial implications taken further in 
this part are extended sentience, endobiological evolution, syntropy, and Brier’s 
differentiated types of semiosis.36 
 
Ontology, in Philosophy of Science, is often understood as the way one understands the 
world and the human being in the world. In this project, I understand ontology to be 
related to a form of essentialism that cannot, however, in any way be equal to Aristotle's 
essentialism. The reason it cannot be equal to Aristotle’s essentialism is that Aristotle 
gave this idea meaning within a cultural signification sphere that had a completely 
different nature than contemporary signification spheres, in particular at the level of the 	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  Biosemiosis,	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artefactually real. The relational logic concerning our five levels of reality would be that 
there is a connection between potentials of thought, discourse and language game and 
the evolutionary state of the artefactually real. This also relates to Lakoff and Johnson’s 
metaphor theory, where human conceptualisation takes its points of departure in 
experience with the world of material objects and a three dimensional space. Thus, a 
signification sphere that is not adequately rich in signification forms at the material 
level is expected to result in equal difficulty in specification by reference to pure 
philosophical thought (first philosophy that reaches into the most general aspects of 
what is, and the generation of basic axioms from this point of departure). 
The basic principle, however, is that, further from the signification level of 
the artefactually real, there are qualities behind all phenomena that we, as humans, 
register through our sensuous, cognitive and conscious apparatuses. John Deely (2004) 
writes of Jakob Von Uexküll’s “innenwelt” and Thomas Sebeoks understanding of 
language as modelling: 
‘Hence the human Innenwelt can represent things not only on the basis of 
sensation and as sensed objects are perceptually given, but as intelligible 
as well, i.e., able to be investigated and studied on the hypothesis that they 
have an internal constitution or “essential structure” of their own which 
may look like nothing we have ever seen or could see with the eyes of our 
animal body’ (p. 25). 
Deely is here pointing towards the fact that there are objects that we sense which can 
only be described though language, and which do, however, have a status as 
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representing real aspects of that object. With our five reality realms, we can allow 
ourselves to let virtual objects be included in this scheme. 
 
Moving from a separated self with confined senses and brain dominance, to a structure 
relying on extended sentience, while realising that the human structure only receives a 
small amount of the information potential that exists in the world, also places the 
virtually real in an non-mystical position. It is then merely presenting levels of reality 
that we have not yet been able to sense and articulate. From here, and with our 
acceptance of an evolution of consciousness, we can simultaneously understand that we 
extend our repertoire over time, by sensing and articulating new intangible objects. 
Brier (2005) writes that modern science cannot escape metaphysical 
questions, and, as we know, science builds its foundation upon metaphysical grounds 
(the philosophies of Greek Antiquity). I find that resisting the idea of intangible and 
non-measurable influences, which do, however, have a potential to be acknowledged 
and signified, and which clearly affect the world of physical objects (including 
ourselves), is an error. It cuts the heart out of the part of knowledge that we call 
wisdom, and results in a kind of representation that strips Nature and human beings 
from their deeper being. It also compromises the truly creative researcher (Peat & 
Bohm, 1987), who is not allowed to make explicit his/her subjective comprehensions 
(based on experience and knowledge as perception) and ability to work with generative 
thought patterns and the relation between the human mind and Nature – with an 
intermediate, intentional and idiosyncratic personality as well. 
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The historical break with essentialism presents a change of focus, made by the 
collective mind, which has dominated and formed Western science the recent hundred 
years or more. Bohm (1980) writes how the etymological understanding of the term 
“measure” has changed from Greek Antiquity, where measure was an expression of 
balance between all things. He writes: 
‘…measure was not looked on in its modern sense as being primarily 
some sort of comparison of an object with an external standard unit. 
Rather, this latter procedure was regarded as a kind of outward display or 
appearance of a deeper ‘inner measure’, which played an essential role in 
everything’ (p. 25). 
This is very different from how we view measurement in positivistic or critical 
rationalist paradigms (Popper, 1959). But that, in itself, is no argumentative 
confirmation that there would not be qualities and structures behind appearances in a 
relationship that is far from one to one. The ontology that comes closest to this 
understanding of reality could be Peirce's idea of dynamical objects. Essences, in this 
respect, could be viewed as dynamical objects, and physical objects as representamens. 
We must, however, remember, that the reverse is not true: not all dynamical objects are 
essences. 
 
By taking this standpoint, essences are given a signifying status. And they must be 
understood to arise from a sphere where everything is in constant dynamical change, 
and this would go not only for the materially real, but also for the virtually real and 
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intangible habits in Nature. This gives our triad sign relation a relative status. 
Simultaneously, the fact that we have divided reality into five levels, which we have 
given an equal and non-hierarchical value, makes us realize that all significations are 
referential, and never one to one with their object – even something such as Niels Bohr's 
famous model of the atom's structure, Feinmann’s diagrams in quantum 
electrodynamics, or interpretations of the double slit experiment (where photons appear 
to change behaviours according to context). As Latour has claimed, science uses 
inscription devices, and translates from this stage into whole scripts, lectures, articles 
and actions, where knowledge changes both medium and representational form during 
the process. This process, to Latour, is part of what constitutes scientific knowledge, 
and gives it a constructionist quality, and demonstrates how human language games are 
dependent upon the level of development in the artefactually real. 
 
What then characterises ontology in our context? Ontology is more than immaterial, 
dynamical objects. Ontology is, in my view, the deepest level of insight into Nature, 
which human observers are able to perceive and conceptualize at any given moment. 
Thus, ontology has to do with the depth of human (collective) mind. Ontology is also a 
meta-level from where a consistent background for all further observations can be 
formed. It is, to some extend, the beginning and end of any knowledgeable human 
conceptualisation. It starts with theoretical perceptions, and forms basic axiomatic 
premises for all further thought (Bohm, 1980). 
All though Brier, with Peirce, delivers a well founded, deep and 
provocative ontology in his cybersemiotic theory, I will explore the potential of wave 
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based ontologies from physical science philosophers, which also connect to the schemes 
of Ho and Oschman. It is my claim that Brier's framework has not assimilated a non-
classical ontology concerning spacetime, and has not treated how important scientific 
metaphors can, apart from seeing them as labels that change disciplinary domains, be 
viewed as signs of something actual at the level of the intangible. Furthermore, Brier 
has, with Peirce, pointed towards a relation between structure and relational forces in 
Nature, and human cognitive structures. But he has not gone into depth with this topic, 
and examined how it affects human knowing when it comes to (generative) philosophy 
and its impact on institutional practice. All in all, it does not only tell us something 
about Nature as thriving not only upon habits, but also upon enactive, teleological 
qualities that constantly inform the habits that we observe as representamens. I have 
emphasized that I find there to be a need for a further differentiation at the level of 
quality. Quality might be vague and imprecise, when we try to signify and understand it, 
but I am speculating that it has an order of its own. I expect that human minds, which 
can never grasp such overall orders with the biological equipment available through the 
human sensuous and cognitive apparatus, be forced to discriminate and reduce at an 
intellectual level in order to comprehend. The assumption that there is, in fact, some 
reason in essentialism, which must, however, be understood as placed in a new context, 
backs up the approach where theories are constructed on the basis of a semantics of 
cultural intertextuality, which strives towards correspondence with real essences (or 
dynamical objects) through the logic of consistency in explanation. 
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But if it is really so, then how can we test the truth-value of such insights? My 
suggestion is that it takes aesthetic reason based on extended sentience, where truth can 
be understood as a significant event within the organic structure that appears as a sign 
(through feeling) to the intellect from within. From this point of departure, any theory 
must prove itself through concrete processes of negotiation with peers in relevant 
communities of knowing, because in the end, knowledge is a process of intersubjective 
negotiation and general accommodation of what might have been idiosyncratic 
approaches to begin with. 
 
This approach has as a consequence that the main objective of theory cannot be critical 
argumentation, which places too much emphasis on theory as arbitrary reference points 
tied to a kind of observation that is viewed as a discursive construct with no reference to 
a deeper reality – rather expressing social power relations than truth.37 This, again, 
indicates that the objective of this thesis is to locate and integrate intangible dynamical 
objects in Nature, which have, otherwise, been dismissed. The main objective of Part 
III, thus, is to capture and discuss the dynamical object spacetime, the dynamical object 
of the “life cycles of metaphors”, and the dynamical object of logos in Nature, and to 
relate them to a context of collective mind that is significant of a contemporary 
situation. We are here not leaving our academic heritage and epistemological 
foundations, but rather musing in a mix of intellectual, intuitive abductive meditations, 
which connect to particular instances of embodied feeling. Critical argumentation can, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  This	  understanding	  is	  mainly	  postmodernist,	  and	  relates	  also	  to	  discourse	  theorists	  such	  as	  Foucault,	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  but	  to	  some	  extend	  it	  also	  relates	  to	  Qvortrup’s	  Luhmann	  inspired	  idea	  of	  society.	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by it's inherent rhetoric and demands upon the clarity of the confined ego-subject38 as an 
implicit writer, overshadow the potential for capturing true dynamical objects. This is so 
in particular, because their nature could be different than such of a former, or even 
currently dominating socially accepted truths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  “ego-­‐subject”	  in	  the	  glossary,	  appendix	  1	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Chapter 10: Time and Relativity 
 
13.0. Introduction 
The question of time and relativity is one of the most basic philosophical questions, 
when it comes to questions of consciousness. From a semiotic point of view, time, space 
and the relativity of both have deep implications for how we make meaning. This is 
why it, further than being central in physical science, is essential in philosophy. Most 
often, within established paradigms, the influences of ontological positions concerning 
time, space and relativity are not taken explicitly into consideration. Logical, theoretical 
and argumentative structures are typically based on a three-dimensional material 
spacetime ontology with implicit assumptions of a natural linear progression based on 
the concept of irreversible time in cause and effect relations. Although the topic of non-
linearity in philosophical thought has been debated for instance by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (1987)39, where non-linearity in text was debated by Jay David Bolter 
(1991), George Landow (1997), N. Katherine Hayles (2002), Marie Laure-Ryan (2001) 
et.al., and the logical implications of non-locality, paradox and potential in stead of time 
was discussed by quantum physicist Basarab Nicolescu (2002), which again affects the 
linear structure of an argument, linearity is still the ideal for the traditional academic 
thesis, and thereby also for the presentation of philosophical thought. The linear 
structure is taken for granted, when students and researchers follow institutional 
directions and are being schooled in academic writing, methodology, and especially 
argumentative structure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  ”A	  Thousand	  Plateaus:	  Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia”	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Although it might not always be obvious, and is often left unnoticed, ontologies from 
physical science concerning time and space form essential backgrounds for the causality 
lines, on which both argumentative conclusions rely (in Feynman diagrams as well as in 
overall academic argumentation), and the structure of the text itself. We have, 
throughout the project, complicated the point of departure in a three dimensional 
material reality. On this basis, we might have to rethink causal relations at fundamental 
levels, with consequences for meaning making in the academic thesis. This is 
particularly relevant for philosophy – a discipline whose medium is words and meaning 
making through textual representation. Therefore, it is essential to relate an explicit 
ontological understanding of time and space directly to processes of meaning making in 
research contexts, and this ontology will affect our understanding of both the first and 
the third person human subject in question in this project. 
 
In this chapter, I will present an alternative vision of space, time and relativity, and 
consider the consequences of these ontological pillars when it comes to meaning 
making, reason and logical causality in collective philosophical thought. I will combine 
viewpoints from philosophy of physical science, inspired by Leonard Susskind (2005), 
David Bohm (1980), and Milo Wolf (2008) respectively, with a semiotic and 
speculative approach. David Bohm and Milo Wolf have each in their way presented 
philosophy of physics that deviate from classical interpretations, also that of Einstein, 
whereas Susskind presents a more traditional approach that does, however, take string 
theory into account. 
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13.1. Space and time as objects in Nature 
In many ways, it makes sense to talk of a mutual influence between time and space as 
relying on cognitive properties of the mind, and simultaneously as properties of a 
physical and biological reality. In this sense, time and space can be understood as 
dynamical objects in Nature. But they are also interpretants that rest upon human, 
cognitive properties that, again, rest upon our ability to systematize and structure 
knowledge. As we recall from case study one, sometimes mind and reality meet in 
isomorphic moments. But we must assume that often, they don’t. The representamens, 
which are the signs of space and time as natural properties at the level of the materially 
real, are what we communicate about when talking of natural laws, through the 
networks of signs and meaning produced in science, art and philosophy. They are not 
equal to time and space as dynamical objects, but they are representative of aspects of 
them. 
 
We can communicate about the dynamical object of spacetime through multiple 
disciplinary frameworks. Disciplines tie the levels of reality together in varied manners, 
where logical Positivism40 is strongest in its tie of the ideally real (based on functions of 
the logical mind, most possibly a left brain dominance) and the materially real (through 
induction and deduction in accordance with a three dimensional understanding of time 
and space). Philosophy is typically strongest in its tie between the virtually real and the 
ideally real (through abduction and musing or intellectual meditation), and art between 
the virtually real and the materially real (through aesthetic reason and multimodal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  For	  instance	  the	  classical	  language	  philosophy	  of	  Ludvig	  Wittgenstein	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semiosis). As we recall, I have suggested viewing objectivity and subjectivity as 
observational forms of the human subject, which relate the human knower to the world 
differently, and are, thereby, complementary. They are not opposed, and the division 
between subject and object not mutually exclusive. In fact, there can be multiple kinds 
of positioning of the observer within each type of observation. Already here, we are 
transgressing the classical logic of A is not non-A (example from Nicolescu, 2002), 
which does, however, also appear as an implicit logical syntax in academic text, that 
structures subject, object and intersubjective ontologies as if they were mutually 
exclusive (either you are subjective, objective or intersubjective, but not two or more 
simultaneously). While taking the idea of collective intelligence and collective thought 
seriously, having incorporated the level of the virtually real into the other four levels of 
reality, and quantum theories into our biological perspective, we can potentially 
transgress the point of the departure that sets a confined ego up against an objective 
external nature, and against other ego-subjects. 
 
13.1.1. Space, time, experience and observation 
-Why does it matter? 
Remembering Gadamer, we are aware that experiences can alter our point of departure 
at a level of consciousness. Peat and Bohm (1989) described the creative process in 
science, where knowing is equal to experience, and where creative thought would lead 
to whole new theories about the world. My explanation as a generative philosopher, 
who has noticed this experience within myself, is that when my consciousness alters 
through the kind of experience that disturbs the regularity of my cognitive habits, and 
perhaps pushes some cognitive structures into higher order levels, the point of departure 
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for interpretation alters with it. And this again can change the basic ontology on behalf 
of which, I operate. Mary D. Jones and Larry Flaxman, on behalf of their studies in 
neuroscience, say that ‘every new experience causes chemical changes within the brain, 
and when those experiences repeat themselves, they become part of our general 
perception of life around us’ (Jones and Flaxman, 2009, p. 144). In order to articulate 
this further, I will present a thought experiment, based on the logical implications of 
Luhmann’s idea that mutations can happen in autopoietic systems, together with our 
concepts of endobiological evolution and extended sentience: 
 
In extended sentience, which is built on the expectation of a high level of ease in the 
micro-scale biological-communicational systems inherent in the bodily structure, and in 
accordance with the concept of syntropy, this is prone to happen at a regular basis, 
especially since the structure is affected by an evolutionary process and through 
syntropy always strives towards a realisation of its utmost potential. If my focus in 
perception changes from a basis in a rational confined self, mainly operating through 
brain based logic and eye vision, and moves into a basic pheno-hermeneutic position 
that is primarily focussed in extended sentience, which inheres a level of quantum 
proprioception and what I have characterised as “feeling” (based on ELF 
electromagnetic global bio-communication), it follows that not only the way I 
experience the world changes, but also the causal logic by which I cognitively order it; 
especially because the laws of the quantum realm do not follow linear local logic 
(Nicolescu, 2002): cognition and consciousness at this level, are influenced by the 
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counter-intuitive laws of quantum mechanics. Bohm and Peat present a similar thesis 
concerning quantum laws and consciousness (Bohm, 1980; Peat & Bohm, 1989). 
If my perception is truly embedded in extended sentience, then this, again, 
must be expected to influence upon my logic of signification. And we can take this one 
step further: given that not only I, but large clusters of individuals change their 
perception into extended sentience as part of an endobiological evolution, the long-term 
consequences, when taken into inter-subjective dimensions of language and knowledge 
negotiation, would be a mutation that would cause a necessary alteration in the 
semantics of language games in the signification sphere, because the inherent logic of 
thought has changed by necessity. 
 
As viewed in retrospect, single philosophical authorships have usually been based on a 
stable ontological ground where a leap in consciousness that would cause a change in 
ontological foundation, and thereby changed logical cause and effect lines of reasoning 
is typically not expected. This is even more so, when it comes to a broader institutional 
practice in given research societies, concerning what Kuhn (1962) called the production 
of normal science. At the philosophical level, central contributors such as Descartes, 
Kant, Peirce, and others, might have continuously built and added to their theory, rather 
than making basic, ontological jumps several times during one and the same 
authorship.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  All though, of course, it does happen, just like any philosopher is prone to question his/her own work during the 
time span of an authorship 	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On the basis of the above argumentation, we can assume that today the pace in which 
experience is felt, due to the extensiveness and refinement of information intake based 
on extended sentience, together with the enormous increase in information at the socio-
cultural level, and the faster pace in intra-institutional negotiation of truth and meaning 
value of loaded terms (terms that form a central place in an overall social semantics, 
often also with deep historico-philosophical reference), must by logical necessity 
change the relation in space and (social) time between a single lifespan and the potential 
insight an individual can gain from what is socially accumulated and articulated in this 
period. Due to these two changed factors, it follows that an individual can change 
ontological position several times during a lifetime, and that the connotation of central 
terms can therefore shift during such a development.42 With endobiological evolution, 
and the increased activity in internal semiosis, we have a noetic change that might, 
however, not show as clearly at the noemic level.43 The suggestion here is that shifting 
ontological standpoints within one lifetime is a new condition. We have thus 
extrapolated consequences out of our main theses of autopoietic social communications, 
extended sentience and endobiological evolution. In the following we will continue to 
do so in further thought experiment. 
 
Since we have assumed that endobiological evolution will distribute itself in non-linear, 
somewhat chaotic progression (tychastic evolution in Peirce), however, with an overall 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  The	  idea	  of	  changing	  ontological	  position	  at	  a	  regular	  basis	  is	  today	  found	  in	  the	  social	  science	  paradigm	  of	  Critical	  Realism,	  suggested	  by	  Roy	  Bhaskar.	  This	  is	  in	  opposition	  to	  Kuhn’s	  idea	  that	  a	  revolution	  was	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  an	  ontology	  to	  shift.	  Furthermore,	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  triangulation	  as	  research	  method	  also	  shows	  that,	  in	  many	  ways,	  we	  have	  already	  established	  practices	  that	  operate	  on	  behalf	  of	  more	  than	  one	  paradigm,	  and	  thus	  we	  are,	  philosophically,	  able	  to	  manage	  several	  paradigms	  in	  one	  overview.	  In	  that	  sense,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  evident	  shift	  already	  since	  the	  1970’ies	  till	  today.	  43	  The	  same	  term	  can	  be	  used	  by	  several	  theorists,	  while	  giving	  the	  term	  profoundly	  different	  connotations	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teleological evolutionary syntropic strife (multiple evolutionary lines of irreversible 
time relating to anancastic and agapistic evolution in Peirce), it follows with this 
premise that influences based on cognitive changes, combined with changes in newer 
technologically based communicational forms, accessible in both academia and in 
lifeworlds, could result in discrepancies between the habits of individual cognition 
versus socially stabilized cognition. In Luhmann and Qvortrup it seems an implicit 
understanding that human subjects are cognitively inferior to the supra-individual social 
systems. The indications of our thesis, however, would lead to the open questioning of 
whether it follows naturally that social systems are always a one to one representation 
of the broad state of mind represented in a given culture, and thereby also of 
individuals? Points of discrepancy could concern aspects of society that we can 
understand by referring to Luhmann's “symbolically generalized media” (power, 
science, law, money, love, etc.) and the structure of Qvortrup's social semantics, but 
also when it comes to levels of discourse, concerning the implicit reference to time, 
space and pace. 
Expecting human beings to have a contingent amount of free will, and 
with the postmodern decentralisation of power in society, and the freedom of speech 
represented by social media and the Internet,44 the mutation of cognitive habits of the 
individual could have the potential to happen in a pace un-equal to the mutation of 
social habits (and thereby established systems). While taking the endobiological 
evolution into account, we could expect that the individual can develop a more 
unlimited space of contingency in mind, than a social system can, because the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  whole	  discourse	  on	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  social	  media,	  it	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  not	  within	  the	  scope	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  project	  to	  take	  up	  this	  discussion	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system must, by nature, present the kind of stability that can be inclusive of a high 
number of individuals simultaneously – individuals, who might, at the noetic level, 
subscribe to different timelines of irreversible evolution. The system must balance itself 
towards a common denominator – but that does not, necessarily, constraint the cognitive 
development of the individual. The idea behind this argument is somewhat likely to 
Kuhn’s idea of periods of “normal science”, where anomalies accelerate over time – 
however, our thesis is that a broad cultural and even global paradigm shift, which 
begins outside the institution of science, is accumulating. I will contemplate this 
problem further, through a re-consideration of time, space and relativity that integrates 
contemporary philosophy of physics. 
 
13.2. The Big Bang as semiosic self-observation 
Because physical science has been a dominant science, when it comes to forming 
ontologies in Western societies, conceptions of space, time and matter have been 
closely related to a general understanding of first Newton’s laws, then Einstein’s 
relativity theory and later on quantum mechanics (Bohm, 1980). 
The theory of the Big Bang often functions as a dominating implicit 
ontology in mainstream Western science and mainstream societies. This supports the 
idea of a material world, stripped of meaning, where everything happens by chance. The 
field of quantum mechanics has, however, provoked existing images. Philosophy, 
derived from studies of quantum mechanics, typically takes the consequence of 
understanding that there is empty space between the elementary particles of the atom, 
the idea of quantum fields, un-manifested probability, and the problem of the observer 
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affecting the observed directly (the double slit experiment) and inserts this into a 
philosophy that ties together physical reality and the mind (Bohm, 1980; Laszlo, 2004; 
McTaggart, 2001; Hawking, 2010). The quantum level is what brings mind back into 
the picture, thereby complicating traditional understandings of a division between mind 
and matter. Evolutionary cognitive science (Goodson, 2014; Platek, Keenan & 
Shackleford, eds.,2007) today, however, rarely takes the philosophical implications of 
quantum mechanics into account, and typically built on paradigmatic approaches based 
on information science. This is why they have not been found useful for this project, 
although they form part of the background reading. 
 
When it comes to time and space in physical science, Einstein presented two 
propositions to his physicist relativity theory: the special relativity and the general 
relativity theory. Einstein's theory expanded space into more detailed macro level 
observation, where science came to the understanding that all movements of mass in 
space and time, were by nature relative. This is how Newton's concept of inertia turned 
out as inadequate when talking of macro scale levels. To fulfil the needs of a theory in 
which all elements fitted together, Einstein had to operate with a range of constants, 
among which the speed of light was central. It became a central component in 
mathematical equations concerned with macro scale spacetime. Time was now a 
property of matter, rather than a finite property in and by itself. And light was 
understood to bend, as it was attracted to the gravity force of matter, where gravity was 
no longer understood as a force in and by itself, but rather as a pull generated by the 
dense compression of matter. In this sense, space would be bent. 
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From this point of departure, spacetime is relative, because all elements are relative to 
each other, even if there are constants such as the speed of light and the Planck constant. 
However, according to Leonard Susskind (2006) the greatest challenge has been that 
Einstein’s cosmological constant, which presented the idea of a strife towards 
equilibrium between gravitational force and an anti-gravitational force, has not 
presented a sufficient level of explanatory precision. And that theories that a quantum 
vacuum exist have complicated the idea of a cosmological constant, in particular the 
idea of the vacuum being full of high frequency virtual energetic entities: a zoo of 
quants and quarks. Einstein’s theory has not been able to explain this zoo, and it’s high 
level of energy, which would destroy the whole universe as we know it, had it had the 
effects of energy that we know from our universe (Susskind, 2006). Furthermore, 
besides from the vacuum of virtual, potential elementary particles, elementary particles 
in ordinary space, demonstrate a counter-intuitive kind of presence, which Susskind 
refers to by using the terms “behaviour” and “events”. These behaviours and events are 
not, however, a property of the three-dimensional space that we can immediately 
observe with our senses and physical presence (if we do not count in extended 
sentience). 
 
The important thing here is to view the realm of quants as a set of behaviours that exist 
in accordance with space and time, however differently than in Einstein’s four-
dimensional spacetime. So, as is by now well-known, the very existence of the quantum 
vacuum full of loaded energy presents an unresolved puzzle in quantum mechanics; in 
particular in relation to the referential value of mathematics as a cultural semiosic form. 
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If this level is taken seriously at an ontological level, we have to ask, again, how images 
of the universe through the Big Bang model are represented, and how this influences 
upon our general worldview, and basic logical assumptions, and what would happen, 
were we to understand the basics of the universe in a different manner? 
 
13.2.1 The Big Bang Theory signified at the artefactual level 
When it comes to communication of the Big Bang theory to a public audience, and 
thereby making it part of a broad, cultural episteme, the distribution of the theory is 
often made by using digital virtual three-dimensional models distributed in domes and 
planetariums.45 This makes the theory available to adults and children alike. The digital 
virtual 3D compositions, however, do by the necessity of the digital format end up 
staging a Cartesian three dimensional space in order to illustrate the complex theories of 
the Big Bang, electromagnetism, space and time, all the way from the beginning of the 
Universe (and thereby of time and space), represented by the microwave background. If, 
however, we do not believe the expanding universe to be spatial in a three dimensional 
sense, based on linear, irreversible time, where the limit of time is set by the speed of 
light, which is constant in empty space, we would have to conclude that such visual 
models give an imprecise representation of the dynamical object of space and time. If 
there is, in reality, no beginning, middle and end relating to one and the same overall 
dimension, then the whole idea of space and time, the expansion of the universe from a 
beginning to an end, and the possibility of measurement by current mathematical 
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systems that operate within this overall computer modelled, visual and theoretical 
representation, must come into doubt. 
 
Furthermore, according to classical physical theory (Susskind), all the components and 
forces that have generated inorganic matter on Earth are present in the universe proper. 
The process of star formation that relies on dust particles, attracted by gravity, and held 
together by the strong nuclear force, and the further production of carbon, helium, and 
nitrogen inside stars, which can, again, sometimes lead to Super Nova explosions that 
provide Earth with the kinds of particles and substances that are needed in order to 
generate both inorganic and organic matter, are all, as far as we know, based on the 
same physical laws that also define physical Earth. Thus, from our current situation on 
Earth, astronomers and astrophysicists extrapolate Earthly experience into universal 
explanations. 
If we were to regard this from a semiotic point of view, we could claim 
that every observation mentioned is based on the horizon and cognitive prejudice and 
intentionality of human beings relying on the socially real and the level of the 
artefactually real, the standpoint from which they experience. This relates somewhat to 
what Susskind refers to as the “anthropic principle”, which claims that the universe is 
made in precise accordance with the needs of humans as physical beings. And if not, we 
could not be here to observe it. 
 
	   259	  
Presented from a semiotic and cybersemiotic point of view, we could say that human 
beings have formed both the theories and the technological inscriptions that are behind 
our unified theory, which, at the sensory level and the level of instinctual need, now 
forms our umwelt, because our senses are being amplified through technological 
artefacts. This, again, informs our common signification sphere (through presentations 
in public domes and school curricula to give but two examples), and become deeply 
embedded in our language games. In this sense, the Big Bang theory dominates Western 
cultures, and forms a central part of the signification spheres. It is central in common 
sense and certain scientific self-understandings, and thus also central in the way we 
conceptualise the human subject. 
 
In order to move out of this dominance, our concept of Nature is important. Because of 
the signifying trait of human knowing, it is necessary to operate with a concept of 
Nature that is always more than present stages of human knowing would be. A social 
constructivist understanding of the Big Bang model would lie at the level of the 
representamen. As the representamen of a real object, the Big Bang theory would 
represent the most validated versions of a cosmological theory, and because physical 
science has been a dominating discipline, also the most common shared ontology, 
today. But everything that lies outside of the dominating theories in our signification 
sphere belongs to Nature. This stance goes well with Peirce’s theory of signification as 
presented in Brier (2005; 2008) and Esposito (1980), where we say that the universe per 
se forms a dynamical object, which we seek to capture through an immediate object (the 
theory). 
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So, to sum up, we can say that the causality line that steers the theory of the Big Bang 
could be inverted, so that rather, Earth reality and human conceptualizations are viewed 
as extrapolated into coherent epistemes that form representamens of objects that we 
have not yet fully understood. These epistemes are represented through language games 
that are distributed by signs and mediated signs in the signification sphere. They thereby 
become assimilated through schooling, and are embedded in the existing language 
games, which are, according to Brier, also, in part, in power over the individual. 
As we know, the Big Bang theory is, of course, inconsistent with itself, 
since, within its own framework, it is only able to explain few per cent of the universe. 
 
Today, there have been attempts to present scientific explanations within the field of 
physics that integrate the counter intuitive insights gained from quantum mechanics, 
including propositions of a multidimensional cosmos that is based on a multiplicity of 
micro scale enfolded strings, which again complicates our relation to time and space 
(Susskind, 2005; Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010). So we are moving towards an extension 
and re-formulation of our common signification sphere, however, with no certainty. If 
the cosmos is understood to be multi-dimensional, with multiple strings that form the 
deepest levels of physicality at micro scales, this will have severe consequences for all 
further thought. This makes it clear how institutionalized production of signification 
becomes essential to the future generation of science, common sense knowledge, social 
strategy and agency. 
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13.3. Imagination 
The philosophical thesis derived form this excursion into physical science, is that we 
observe what we are able to observe on behalf of our imaginative skills and the extent 
of our horizon46, which form a prerequisite for observation – even when the objective 
and material paradigm underlies the excursion into the horizon of the imagination. 
 
Brier presented a retrospective overview over the four major epistemological pathways 
taken in Western knowledge traditions. I have, with the empirical turn and in vivo 
research methods, suggested a forward directed path, based on creativity (Peat & Bohm, 
1989). In this sense, if we take a starting point in the middle of the cybersemiotic star 
with a semiotic point of view, based on a retrospect understanding of the four 
epistemological highways, a new level of subjective imaginative skill that can, besides 
from integrating traditional academic objective methods as skills, adapt to the logic of 
abduction and intellectual musing, becomes essential. Because we are moving in a 
forward directed, anticipatory approach that is based on fallibilism and the necessity of 
intuitive hypothesis, the instrument of the imagination is necessary. 
 
On the basis of our assimilation of central vocabularies, and thereby central theses, of 
the cybersemiotic theory, we can understand the imagination as a cognitive and 
conscious space for the exploration of potential constructive syntheses between 
phenosemiosic and thought semiosic processes that can incorporate internalized 	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information that has not yet been intellectually ordered. What amplifies and structures 
observations at the social level, and what varies strongly from the preconditions of 
esoteric thought in Greek Antiquity, is: a different structure of collective consciousness 
connected to digital Information technologies, such as described by Roy Ascott (2005). 
In Ascott's Telematic Embrace, it is not just so that one logical mind 
meets another logical mind in virtual space; the connotation of the term embrace means 
that qualia and phenosemiosis meet as well. This is the radical implication of the 
telematic embrace. The thesis is that as we connect through the symbol, we also connect 
through non-local phenomenology (perhaps based on properties of extended sentience), 
including qualia, in spite of geographical distance. The new levels of collective 
consciousness facilitated by digital technologies, then, become mediators of the 
interpretant relation between object and representamen, when it comes to understanding 
more of Nature and thriving upon information inherent in Nature. Digital technologies 
incorporate functional and structural aspects of human cognitive processes, and present 
platforms that bring individual minds together (one example could be the current 
formation of the semantic net) and build and assist processes of collective mind – most 
probably also our very realisation that there is such a thing as a virtual collective mind. 
 
 
13.4. The ontological starting point 
-On the levelling of physical densities 
With extended sentience experience, observation and knowledge generation commences 
from a different level that what we are used to take into consideration. And properties 
that have been taken as oppositions, such as body and mind, or brain based emotion 
	   263	  
versus embodied feeling, amounting to paradox, become not only complementary 
couples (Nicolescu: 2002; Kelsoe & Engstrøm, 2006), but overall holistic integrations. I 
would like to take this into account. It implies a return to a starting point in a material 
reality once again. However, now both human observer and reality are expanded and 
transformed. Observation is more than empirical and rational. It is more than a Kantian 
aesthetic judgment based on apriori categorisation. It is more than Hegelian synthesis. 
And the world has become technologically augmented. Because this is the case, I must 
not only operate with the concept of extended sentience together with my division of 
reality into five different categories. At the level of the materially real, I must define 
more than one level of physical density. 
 
As we have seen in case study five, Milo Wolf's Space Resonance Theory moves further 
into deep ontology than Susskind’s explanation of the physical Universe. This means, in 
principle, that all levels of physicality are connected at the level of scalar waves. Wolf’s 
wave space medium demonstrates a level of order that exists prior to the pure quantum 
potential of Brier's phenosemiosis, Massumi's virtual reality, or Susskind’s vacuum of 
virtual high frequency energetic entities, which is, however, ontologically in line with 
the theory of the enfolded order by Bohm. The main implication of both theories is that 
there is a level of order that is somewhat determinate of the seemingly chaotic 
behaviours of virtual and elementary particles at the quantum level. If it is so, this must 
imply that our physical bodies are also connected to the pre-atomic-, pre-space level of 
reality; and perhaps not only in indirect, reverse orders where fourth density spacetime 
takes ontological precedence over the quantum vacuum. Nicolescu (2002) claims that 
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our bodies are connected to the quantum realm, which, again, enlightens our extended 
view upon the theory of correspondence in truth. He does not, however, incorporate a 
level of virtual spherical waves such as that of Milo Wolf. And he, furthermore views 
the levels of reality as a hierarchy, so that the quantum level of reality encompasses the 
world of particles, however, not the other way around. He claims: ‘In the sphere of 
levels of reality per se, that which is above is like that which is below, but that which is 
below is not like that which is above’ (p. 52). We will incorporate Wolf’s level of 
physical reality into our thought experiments, together with Nicolescu’s hierarchical 
value of the levels. But let us now try to characterise our physical densities. 
 
Nicolescu began the exploration into multiple levels of reality by referring to the three-
dimensional physical reality based on classical physics, which we could call the third 
density. This is where Newtonian laws apply. Then we will refer to the four-
dimensional spacetime reality, where Einstein's two theories of relativity, including 
theory of electromagnetic fields, apply. We can call this the fourth density. Nicolescu, 
however, made his main distinction between the local logic of classical physics with 
irreversible time, and the non-local logic of quantum physics, with probability instead 
of irreversible time. This is where we have quants and quarks that distribute a range of 
so-called counter intuitive behaviours (counter intuitive, because they do not follow the 
laws of either a third or a fourth density). Entering and accepting the so-called excluded 
middle that formed a logical paradox between the third fourth and fifth densities is what 
Nicolescu called to enter “the zone of non-resistance”. In this scheme, there is not a 
contradiction between Einstein’s relativity theory and quantum theory; they just 
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represent different levels of physical reality. The ability to operate with multiple 
realities, affect the deep logic of our ontological interpretations profoundly. 
 
We can call the world of quants the fifth density. Generally, the quantum realm is 
viewed as pure chaotic and non-ordered potentiality, and this is where virtual particles 
come in and out of existence in accordance with our observations. Linear causality, 
thermodynamics, or even chaos theory and theory of dissipative structures cannot fully 
explain these behaviours. 
Wolf's wave-space medium forms the entrance point to the sixth physical 
density. This is where we begin to understand a level of pre-space order, based on 
interference patterns between spherical waves; all of which would lie behind the 
electron, proton and neutron. It directs behaviours and events, which we then register as 
elementary particles in microscopes. Wolf does not deliver a full elaboration of 
spherical wave patterns, but declares that the most elementary pattern consists of an 
ingoing and an outgoing spherical wave, forming the electron. The idea of a fifth and 
sixth density behind the densities, which we have registered today, relates somewhat to 
Bohm’s (1980) idea of enfolded and outfolded orders. To make an even deeper 
ontological frame, from which we can observe, we can exhibit a seventh density that 
would lie behind the sixth density level, and have yet another qualitative spacetime 
reality, which demands a zone of non-resistance to enter. We could also choose to view 
the zone of non-resistance through the metaphor of an interface between densities and 
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reality. Our seven density levels represent an arbitrary categorization and an intellectual 
frame from which it becomes possible to think out our problems.47 
 
To couple our idea of physical densities with the idea of extended sentience and the 
observational potentials of the organism, with Oschman, Ho and Bradley, and their 
integration of quantum physics into biology and psychology, which is somewhat in 
accordance with the theories of Bohm and Wolf, we could assume that in the bodymind, 
there would be equivalences to all seven physical density levels. The theory of the 
physical densities, however, would not be adequate by itself to describe Brier’s 
cybernetic and semiosic processes of the bodymind. Therefore, some processes, and 
parts of processes must be articulated through terminologies and references outside the 
realm of physical science. This is also a central thesis in the cybersemiotic theory. Since 
our general approach is semiotic, and starts from the middle of the cybersemiotic star, I 
will suggest that the wave-space medium of Wolf is understood to affect and operate as 
a partial effect in all material densities. There are signs of the wave space medium all 
over the third and fourth densities. However, not all of these signs can be met in 
empirical measurement, as of yet. This relation between the human subject, based in 
extended sentience, and our five density levels relates directly to the way we can 
understand the correspondence theory of truth. 
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When it comes to the implementation of densities into densities, we can say that at the 
sixth density of spherical wave patterns there is full connectivity, relative to the level of 
connectivity at the level of quants, and the full separation formed by macro scale matter, 
presented in the third density. Full connectivity illustrates what in philosophy of 
quantum mechanics, and at the level of the fifth density presents itself as non-locality 
and entanglement. The sixth density presents a spacetime realm that is non-equal to 
third or fourth density realms. Both density levels include spacetime. But spacetime 
would have to be different in different densities. At the level of the third density there is 
a higher level of partition and diversification than at the sixth density level. And in the 
third density realm there is full separation. 
 
Categorizations in language often appear on the basis of correspondence (of the ego-
subject, who is not based in extended sentience) with the third density (for instance in 
Lakoff and Johnson). This would, however, not be adequate in descriptions of the 
effects of fifth or sixth density on third density physicality. Although classical physics 
holds the material level apriori, and quantum philosophy holds the quantum level and 
consciousness apriori to the material level, I suggest that the respective densities be 
related in a non-hierarchical manner, at least when it comes to causality. Like Roy 
Bhaskar’s (2008) three ontological domains, and our five levels of reality, density levels 
would by necessity be out of phase with each other when it comes to space and time. 
This means that the qualities of the sixth density are not causally a priori to complex 
structures or differentiations that appear in the third density; however, they also cannot 
be described fully by the features of the third density. So, we are back to a simultaneous 
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integration and separation of physical realms that affect our being and thinking, and 
relates our human subject with extended sentience to the physical world in ways that 
must be thought through before it can enlighten us of a possible new relation 
representing our correspondence theory of truth. 
 
13.5. No effort communication 
Jürgen Habermas' (2001) solution to optimal communication was the attempt to reach 
consensus at the level of discourse. With an understanding of consciousness connected 
to the fourth, fifth and sixth densities, and thereby to levels of reality that are mainly 
based on wave qualities, we could suggest a potential for communication lying in 
principles of resonance and synchronicity that makes itself explicit at levels deeper than 
discourse. 
 
Marie D. Jones and Lary Flaxman (2009) have delivered a theory that builds on 
mechanical and sound based resonance. They characterise resonance as ‘when the 
vibrations produced by one object align with those of another, ...’ (p. 21) Thus, 
resonance, by its very function connects objects or people through resonant vibration, 
and the resonance frequency can mutually reinforce the vibration in both. In this sense, 
resonance causes amplification. The effect of resonance is typically known from 
physical objects, both in technologies, but also in nature. However, Jones and Flaxman 
points to research that tells us that humans are also affected by micro scale frequencies 
of sound and light. The scale of sound frequencies is, just like the scale of light 
frequencies, much broader than the scope of audible sound and visible light as taken in 
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by the ear and the eye, which represent but a minor part of the full spectrum. This 
means that our regular, non-amplified sensorium only detects and interprets small parts 
of the reality that surrounds us. Jones and Flaxman, however, point towards extra-
sensory levels where the micro scale environment can, in fact, affect a person, for 
example at the level of infrasound. What is central for us here is the idea that 
communication can happen through the effect of resonance and synchronicity, based on 
different frequencies of sound. This thesis certainly provokes established theories 
concerning the human sensory realm. But what we want is to play with the potentials of 
such an idea. And we can ask further: what does that mean for social connections, and 
thereby for intersubjective communication? 
 
This level of sound based resonance between people would precede Habermas’ 
discursive consensus, because it is mainly connected to the fifth and sixth densities, and 
thereby to people’s intuition rather than rational thought. But it would not contradict or 
eliminate it. 
Detecting resonance and synchronicity between human subjects demands 
feeling over brain based cognition, as also suggested by Dr. Raymond Trevor Bradley 
(2006) in his psycho-physiological theory of intuition, which is based on a theory of 
light. Here Bradley suggests that there be quantum holographic effects in and between 
human minds. Bradley is part of a team that conduct research into the intelligence of the 
heart located at the California Institute of Heart Math. Both Bradley, and Jones and 
Flaxman are controversial in their suggestions; however, fit the scheme of Bohm, Ho, 
Oschman and Wolf, and also the indications of artworks such as Blue Morph, to a large 
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extent. They are thereby writing themselves into a controversial, but new, tradition that 
is, as of now, in conflict with established disciplines in the natural sciences, but 
nevertheless in growth. 
 
If it is so that connection to intangible objects and social connections in general can 
happen at the level of the fifth or sixth density, which are the implications of Bradley’s 
theory, then this could result in the potential of new degrees of accuracy when it comes 
to meaning making and truth, negotiated at the socio-cultural level. Bradley writes in a 
2006 article: 
‘Often such intuitive foreknowledge involves perception of implicit 
information about non-local objects and/or events by the body’s 
phychophysiological systems. Recent experiments have shown that 
intuitive perception of a future event is related to the degree of emotional 
significance of that event, and a new study shows that both the brain and 
the heart are involved in processing a pre-stimulus emotional response to 
the future event.’ (p. 1) 
We could suppose that, if this is true, there is a potential for higher degrees of accuracy 
in the communication between people, and a choice of individuals in the act of social 
networking, which could change the speed of human agency and communication within 
the system. This is so especially because intuition works at a much faster pace than 
intellectual reason, and is furthermore much more accurate. It is not typical, however, to 
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train these abilities, and they are not generally accepted as a part of the process of 
knowing in academic institutions. 
To Bradley, navigating by the accuracy of intuition involves a focus upon the 
intelligence of the heart, apriori to that of the brain. This stems well with our concept of 
aesthetic reason, and Ho’s emphasis on the heart. 
 
In this context, the interesting level of human interaction is that which can best be 
described by metaphors from the electromagnetic spectrum. And thus, the underlying 
resonance and synchronicity in experience and knowledge, however in less concrete 
ways, would form the foundation for a conversation that could be on equal wavelength. 
If there were an equal wavelength, resonance and synchronicity in an intersubjective 
communicational exchange, there would be a high degree of instant adjustment and 
little resistance, with a re-enforcement of common intentional goals as a result. This is 
what I, poetically, will call the principle of no effort. It does not suggest that there is 
resonance and synchronicity between all at all times, but rather just indicates a potential. 
The social habits and patterns possible on this account would follow structures in 
Nature (secondness), just like the social autopoiesis of Luhmann, which was based on 
the functional pattern of the biological cell. However, it would be a different structure 
than that of autopoiesis, because properties of the fifth and sixth densities would never 
distribute equally in the third density. A dominance of no effort communication in 
social systems or sub-systems could change the pace of intersubjective communication, 
resulting in changes in social formations (such as, for instance, organizations or 
research clusters, connected to other research clusters, etc.), just like the concept of 
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cybernetics and networks have changed not only our perception of organisations, but 
also the very organisations proper. The level of communication explored here rests upon 
a focus upon effects of fifth and sixth physical density on the third density, and a reality 
that takes all the mentioned reality levels into account. 
 
This is yet another theoretical place to locate our post-objective human subject. In order 
to be able to navigate by these functions, a new kind of human subject is needed. An 
individual cannot be driven by intentions based on a day conscious rationality, and be a 
confined, separated ego-identity or a black box, if she is to integrate her non-local 
properties and properties of entanglement with the surroundings. Furthermore, due to 
the tight connection between the quantum level and the day conscious mind, the person 
who navigates on behalf of resonance and synchronicity is a human subject, who has 
become used to navigating on behalf of extended sentience. 
On this background we can begin to understand or view perspectives 
where it is possible to understand the relationship between individual, signification 
sphere, and common, socio-cultural clusters of agency in relation to the formation of 
knowledge cultures on a different basis. 
 
 
13.7. The contemporary academic Now 
- On time, presence and consciousness in academic work 
By integrating the principles of non-local consciousness, hereunder the potential for 
anticipation through heart and brain-based feeling, the idea of knowledge as a process 
of retrospect rational intellectualization no longer suffices. One significant change, 
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which I treated in Part I, Chapter II is The Epistemological Turn, where not only 
engineering practice becomes knowledge generation in itself, but more the forward 
directedness in practice forms and in theoretical frameworks. From a higher meta level 
of retrospection, I view theories and knowledge cultures of today to be formed in a 
much faster exchange between experience and retrospect analysis, and a forward 
directed, anticipatory creative approach than what has been seen before. This is related 
to what I called the speed of thought. 
 
13.8. Conclusion  
In the spirit of the theme of this chapter, the relativity of time, space, cognition and 
consciousness with overall patterns of social signification could imply that there would 
be a range of evolutionary lines, when it comes to the overall formation of social 
knowledge cultures, and not necessarily that there is one overall line of progression tied 
to a certain discipline, culture, practice (such as science), or even an overall, all-
encompassing telos of Nature that steers all processes. The idea of endobiological 
evolution does, however, imply an evolutionarily based extension of cognitive and 
conscious potential in the individual human bodymind over time, as viewed in relation 
to the species Homo Sapiens Sapiens, which changes perception, cognition and the way 
we relate and generate umwelts, which, again, affects the way signification spheres are 
generated. 
 
It is only in the relative spacetime frame of the human life span (which colours the 
perception and memory of the human observer), and the mass of the physical substances 
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that surrounds us, that matter can seem consistent and perhaps even eternal, as the 
cosmos was for instance presented in common interpretations of Aristotle. Everything is 
in a constant state of becoming and declining, and is always on their way towards 
morphing into new shapes and behaviours, and new states of provisional equilibrium.48 
Seen from this point of view, using a time perspective is a way of measuring relative 
relations between two or more basic elements, and the consciousness of the human 
observer is always implicit, and never fully objective. The composition of constants and 
variables that we form, delivers the frame of text through which we arrange content in 
order to explore, and create further meaning and understandings, that, on the other hand, 
also always form our point of departure. Time can be viewed as a property of matter 
itself. But the finality of space and time, which is a prerequisite for the lines of 
causation, strategy of academic rhetoric and overall theories that we make, also 
mathematical such, is a contingent construct, whether the theories be of the Big Bang, 
the particle zoo, or of collective intersubjective social formations. 
 
Time perception interpreted by the logical mind is thus a mental equation, and in this 
context we can understand the idea of an equation as an option for both mathematical 
language, but also for the logic and rhetoric of conceptual theories. In this sense we can 
say that the spacetime relation is one of the most basic algorithms that influence on 
academic rhetoric, and every central worldview dominating a particular system of 
thought. It is only that we don't notice, as long as we are, broadly, driven by static 
ontologies and a resistance to move into the depth of noetic realms, and, furthermore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	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resisting the discipline of philosophy to rest on a transdisciplinary epistemological basis 
that allows this modus operandi to explore all corners of the cybersemiotic star. 
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Chapter 11: The Life Cycles of Metaphor 
 
14.0. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will contemplate metaphors as a mental phenomenon that is part of 
how insights and concepts arise at the level of cultural semiosis, the day conscious 
mind, and our ability to name. I will suggest to view conceptual thinking by the aid of 
metaphor as a kind of cognitive scaffolding at the level of semiotic content in processes 
of signification in thought semiosis, which is formed on the basis of likeness. I expect it 
to form an effect in the meaning making processes that allows one domain to inform 
other domains, and to name objects from domains that move across scales such as 
micro- and macro, physical and non-physical, or, perhaps even fractal multiplicity. To 
view metaphor generation as a part of cognitive scaffolding also means that its use can 
have an effect that allows a cognitive mind (individual or inter-subjective) to hold 
increased levels of complexity, including navigation in different levels of reality. Here, 
it presents a potential for a condensation of former knowledge into a single concept 
through analogue reference, which results in the ability to express more with fewer 
symbols (where the term “more” includes both a vertical and a horizontal memory 
horizon). This property presents a constructive function, when knowledge and meaning 
accumulates at an evolutionary level of the signification sphere. 
 
I will look into how particular metaphors influence upon academic theoretical thinking 
by carrying loaded meaning. And I will look at metaphors that I understand to bear 
anticipatory connotations. I will not, in an anthropological approach, study and 
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articulate how the actual process of transfer between name given individuals or 
communities might have happened. I will rather form a philosophical consideration on 
the nature of metaphor. The main interest concerns transactions between mind and 
language in oscillatory points that involve individual and collective simultaneously (but 
in diverse time scales), which happens through a line of distinction that I categorize as 
bottom-up and top-down metaphor. Another line of distinction concerns the question of 
how metaphors affect developments at the level of the ideally real, and from this point 
of departure become implemented at the level of the artefactually real. At the bottom 
line, the mentioned distinctions (bottom-up, top-down, ideally real and artefactually 
real) have to do with how we give causal explanations, and how we draw the time lines 
in cause and effect explanations (forward directed, backward directed, reversible and/or 
irreversible lines between densities and reality levels). 
 
I will in this chapter limit myself to very specific metaphors that I regard as particularly 
loaded with meaning, and the point is not to treat the life cycle of a single metaphor, but 
rather to point out that metaphors have life cycles. The kind of metaphors that I have in 
mind, are terms that have had wide implications in academia, have transferred between 
multiple domains, and have been tested in art practice. They have thereby had an 
evident effect on knowledge cultures. They must, in fact, be understood to have directed 
processes of negotiation and meaning making in fields such as physics, biology, 
psychology, cognitive science, philosophy and parts of the social sciences. Viewed in 
accordance with the topics and theories treated in this project, terms like homeostasis, 
energy, information, entropy, dissipative structures, emergence, and autopoiesis are of 
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importance. We know the term “homeostasis” from the thermostat, but we also know it 
from theories in biology, concerning the function of the nervous system. Damasio uses 
the term as a reference to the balance of complex feeling. In this way, the basic 
functional meaning of the term has had important applicability beyond its source 
domain. Something similar goes for the laws of thermodynamics, and concepts such as 
“entropy” and “equilibrium”. Even a biological theory such as that of autopoiesis, has 
evidently been inspired by cybernetics and thereby indirectly by computer science. 
Thus, many of these concepts have arisen from physical-material source domains, in 
particular new technologies, and are then used to signify abstract intangible domains 
such as the functional processes of a cell, an organism or a whole society. Other loaded 
terms from a technological source domain that have functioned as a central drive in the 
development of theory in several fields, and which are also central in this project, are 
the terms “network”, “interface” and “virtuality”. 
A line of metaphors, which have, due to an ontology that integrates some 
implications of quantum philosophy, also played a central role in this thesis are 
metaphors from the domains of electromagnetics and quantum mechanics, which have 
become informative when coupled with new, deep ontologies, and placed in contexts 
outside of their source domain in physics and electronics. Metaphors from these 
domains have proven valuable as metaphors that could assist understandings of the 
biological domain (Ho, Oschman, Bischof), even if they can only provoke thought into 
partial explanations. They are terms such as: electronics, wave, interference pattern, 
laser, holography, wavelength, resonance, frequency and synchronicity, where the term 
and concept of enlightenment takes its own particular place, and which inheres a 
potential for both retrospective and anticipatory connotations, which I have discussed in 
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Part II, chapter four. Here, I pointed towards a possible mutual influence between the 
technological area of photonics, and the biological area of biophotonics that is like the 
mutual influence between computing and cybernetics and the cognitive sciences, which 
we have seen. Several of the metaphors that I have mentioned from the electromagnetic 
area have been used in the thesis as explanatory tools (case study four, and Part III, 
Chapter one, where laser and holography are used to describe possible bio-
psychological processes involved in intuition). 
 
However, in this particular chapter, I wish to contemplate how metaphors are mediating 
between source domains, thereby informing multiple areas, and pointing towards a level 
of similarity in frameworks that were otherwise alienated to each other. In this thesis, 
metaphors that relate primarily to the virtually real are taken seriously into account as 
significations of something real. This has to do with questions concerning how new 
information can be induced into the sensebody, and how the sensebody reacts by 
connecting a feeling that is generated by energetic induction to a particular signifying 
(cultural semiosis) concept, and which relates to extended sentience and Bradley’s 
theory of a psycho-physiological explanation of intuition. 
This could for example concern when the expression “being on 
wavelength” is used to describe the innate feeling of two people in sync, and where the 
symbol (being on wavelength) is supported by an inductive experience, and feeling of 
mutual connection. What makes the metaphor relevant, then, is not just a metaphorical 
function as part of a formal logical scheme, where signs are all viewed as arbitrary, but 
an actual inductive experience made through the sensebody. This inductive experience 
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will tell the user of the symbol that “being on wavelength” is not just a trope, but a 
correct, iconic reference to a felt experience. The same goes when the word “energy”, 
the explanation of which is typically linked to physical science today, however, was 
originally an ideal reference (Aristotle’s energia), is used to describe the quality of a 
pulsating flux of quality in the structure. And here, it is essential to emphasize how 
signs in one semiosic context (induction as feeling) would never be one to one with the 
self-same sign placed in another semiosic system (induction understood as a brain based 
cognitive function). 
 
My further expectation is that, besides from informing across disciplines, metaphors can 
also come into collective mind at an intuitive level (and are inter-subjectively 
negotiated) in a process that lasts over historico-cultural time, where they, at a later 
stage of the collective experience of the phenomenon, end up being taken at face value. 
This means that from being a product of pure mental pondering, they reach a stage of 
concrete representation in the signification sphere. I have mentioned the transfer of 
knowledge from the ideally real to the artefactually real several times in the thesis 
already. This is because I view it as essential. One example could be how Freud (2010; 
1961) used psychological and cultural explanations of how the sub-conscious repressed 
certain things (for instance sexuality) in dreams (the level of the ideally real dominates 
explanations), whereas neuroscientist and dream researcher J. Allan Hobson (2001) 
argues that the real explanation of the dream state is that the chemical balance in the 
brain has changed, and releases the free flux of images, memories and feelings from the 
judgmental function based on activity in the frontal lobes. This is how Hobson explains 
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Freud’s (2010) concept of the super ego and the burden of culture. Hobson argues 
through what he understands to be empirical evidence (the level of the artefactually real 
dominates explanations). In these coincidences, it seems legitimate to ask, whether the 
nature of these assumptions could be understood to have come into mind, before they 
came into matter? Something similar goes for Jung's use of the concept “synchronicity”, 
which concerns the meaningful match of seemingly non-causal events, and of which he 
wrote in the 1920’ies, and newer research into synchronicity as sound based events, 
which have a psycho-physiological side to them (Jones & Flaxman, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, in our attempts to signify metaphor, and its effects on language and 
culture, we are implementing stages of collective mind that cross the boundaries of 
individuals, and, individual life spans. It crosses historical as well as disciplinary 
borders. But the experiential development seems to be somewhat shared. A cluster of 
subjects will thus have the experience, and they will distribute it by negotiation of 
meaning in the social systems. If it has substance and pragmatic usefulness, the 
signification of the experience will gain a noteworthy position in the overall meaning 
making processes over a relative time span. This inheres a claim on my part, which says 
that just like language and thought can present an individual level that is logical in and 
by itself, so can the social semantics of a signification sphere. Thus, the socio-
communicative, autopoietic language games of Brier are more than the language games 
between individuals (Wittgenstein, 1965), and more than the autopoiesis of Luhmann 
(1984), because they distribute a higher level of collective semantics. Within this supra-
subjective semantic system, it seems that certain truths will prevail, because they are 
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based on particularly loaded meaning that has evolutionary attributes. This would be so, 
because they refer to real dynamical objects. In this scheme, we do not view theories as 
arbitrary constructs, but rather as representamens of dynamical objects, which, if their 
reference to the dynamical object is strong, while, simultaneously, they have pragmatic 
use and fit the logic of the given signification sphere, can have a generative effect – 
causing mutations within the given system of thought. If we were to borrow a term from 
Latour’s Actor-Network theory (2005), we could say that metaphors that function as 
loaded terms within such theoretical schemes could be viewed as central actants within 
the syntax of this social semantics. We can relate the constructiveness of this idea to 
Peirce’s agapastic evolution. 
 
14.1. A point of critique in Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor 
All though Lakoff and Johnson presented an important claim by insisting on metaphors 
as a primary way in which the cognitive mind works, their basic assumptions 
concerning source domains and levels of abstract thought are strongly connected to a 
three dimensional materialistic world view. In Where Mathematics Comes From, 
Lakoff, together with mathematician Rafael E. Nunez (2000) sought to explain the 
foundation of mathematics in embodied experience in three-dimensional space. We can 
say that they understand basic reality to imply a body that navigates in the third density 
only, and with no levels of extended sentience. As we know, ontological premises form 
potentials and limitations for possible explanations. Thus, metaphors are in general 
understood to be derived first and foremost from experiences in three-dimensional 
physical realms in Euclidian space, from where still higher degrees of abstraction can be 
formed. The virtually real, however, is non-existent in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), 
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Turner and Fauconnier (2002), Lakoff and Nunez (2000). Our position is actually based 
in a material reality; however, it is amplified by extended sentience, five levels of 
physical density and five levels of reality. This makes a radically different point of 
departure for forming conclusions, and also while trying to understand the influence of 
loaded terms, together with the creative potential of exploring the use of metaphors in 
philosophy, art and academic practice. 
 
14.2. Metaphors based on the relation between the Virtually Real and the Ideally 
Real 
I would like to suggest that metaphors could arise not only from being a physical, 
human body in a third density reality, but from being a physical body and an energetic 
structure immersed in a realm of dense and less dense energy, which involves a level of 
qualitative, dynamic information and a realm of a multi-levelled virtual reality. As I 
have mentioned in part III, chapter one, the virtually real would connect to the so-called 
wave-space medium of Milo Wolf, which again is directly connected through wave 
interference patterns, with electromagnetic fields, which are implied in the third and 
fourth densities. I do, however, believe that there would be more to say than to 
characterise the ontological background for the elementary particles (based on laws of 
quantum mechanics) and the particle world as mere waves, whether we extend our 
foundation with Bohm and Wolf, and accept a level of immeasurable spherical scalar 
waves or not. There are definitely forces behind the level of virtual waves, and, in a 
fallibilistic spirit, it seems appropriate to assume that Peirce’s triadic sign has no fixed 
ontological starting point. 
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Quantum mechanics speaks, in mathematical language, of behaviour of elementary 
particles as viewed from a point of departure of atomic particles and a material world. 
However, that does not mean that the level of quants and virtual particles cannot be part 
of a dimension, which has a completely different nature than that of the particle world, 
however, interacts with it. Or interfaces with it. The particle zoo of mainstream physics 
then, could be understood not as particles, but as different kinds of behaviours that are 
registered as part of our umwelt as they interface with the third and fourth densities in a 
variety of specified contexts (mostly laboratory contexts). If elementary particles and 
quarks can be recognized in the research context of physical science at particularly cold 
temperatures this is no certainty that behaviours would prove the same if studied in 
biological living tissue at nano scales (which the study of Blue Morph did indicate). 
Thus, physical density dimensions interface, but hardly in a one to one logical 
relationship, and we must expect them to show up differently in organic and inorganic 
substance respectively. 
Furthermore: we would have to expect that what happens in the realm of 
the interface is not equal to the density realm itself. Quants, understood as behaviours, 
would thus not be equal to their sixth density outspring, because they are measured on 
the premises of the material world. And just like the laws of the quantum world are not 
equal to those of the atomic world, a sixth density based on wave fronts must be 
expected to function differently than the premises that we observe at the quantum level. 
This also means that we cannot explain behaviours of physical creatures like ourselves 
by referring to enfolded wave fronts only, even if we think we have discovered yet 
another physical level behind that which we thought was the last frontier. What I am 
proposing in the project, however, is that it might add to the picture. So the laws of 
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interfacing would not be sufficient to tell the story of the nature of the wave-space 
medium or of third density materiality. The different levels and kinds of interfacing, on 
the other hand, are the very levels that we seek to identify in this project. 
 
14.3. When philosophy becomes empirical science and social communication 
In the above section, I sought to articulate a way in which metaphors, as a semiosic 
process could be understood to have life cycles. What do I mean by life cycles? I mean 
the way central terms have been derived from experiences in the material realm, have 
been formed as ideas of the ideally real, and which later connect more or less directly to 
findings at the level of the artefactually real. One example could be how aesthetic 
sensibility, which has primarily been part of a philosophical framework, is now sought 
explained by neuroscientific studies (Damasio; Singer; Christen & Changeux, 2005) 
because adequate instruments are available. Or, as a connection between an ideal 
capture of a virtual object, we could talk of Bergson's philosophical time and duree, and 
Ho's biophysical explanation of this concept (chapter 20, p. 317). Or, to view it from a 
different angle: we could view Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophical idea of 
embodied phenomenology (an ideal object), which now serves as ideal concepts in 
digital interface design (an artefactual object) (Kozel & Kofoed-Hansen, 2007). When 
virtual objects, captured at the level of the ideally real, become embedded into interface 
design, or are tested empirically with success, these objects have become knowledge 
that is embedded in the materially and artefactually real, rather than being real only in 
thought or language.  
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My point is that it makes a difference whether the idea of the two sides of a carbon 
dioxide molecule from molecule to pure vibration is experienced through embodied 
interaction in an interactive installation with Victoria Vesna's Zero Point as an example, 
or whether one gains access to this idea through theoretical knowledge and 
mathematical equations that have been derived as ideal knowledge of virtual objects, 
first and foremost. In case of Vesna’s Zero Point installation, the user will have an 
intuitive embodied experience. And, the installation also becomes a sign that the 
metaphor of particle/wave has transferred domain over time. This observation relates to 
Don Ihde's post-phenomenology, where he points out how the idea of embodied 
experience moves from being a theoretical concept, to become a concept for interface 
design, and becomes embedded in the cultural communications (multimodal, digital 
installations or interactive screens) and extensions of our senses and cognitive 
apparatuses, which form central elements in our current signification spheres. 
 
The life cycles of metaphors are related to ways in which we come to realizations as 
human knowers. This is essential in this part of the project, and by characterizing the 
phenomenon of a life cycle of metaphor in this ontological section; we would have a 
renewed background from which to understand Part II of the project. When suggesting 
the reader to read Part III of the project, and then move back to Part II, it is to encourage 
reading into depth. The idea of the life cycles of metaphors means that metaphors gain 
importance both in particular knowledge contexts, but also in particular historical times, 
which build upon where the culture, or the signification sphere is in it's developmental 
process in relation to the different levels of reality, and in particular in relation to the 
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creative potential at the level of the materially real and today the artefactually real. The 
last point is made because of the role technologies play today, and their increased 
influence in socio-cultural communications, because technologies are increasingly 
intelligent and gain partial agency when it comes to the further formation of social 
structures (Forbes-Pitts, 2011). 
 
14.4. A new level of induction concerning knowledge generation 
We are used to understand induction in relation to observation of an external world 
consisting of material objects and from which we draw categorical conclusions. When I 
write that metaphors can be formed by inductions into the level of the materially real, 
what I am focusing upon is how the intelligent bodymind can register effects that can be 
meaningfully interpreted and expressed in a symbolic form, which can contribute to 
knowledge per se. Not all metaphors, however, relate directly to the levels of the 
materially and/or artefactually real. They thus have to remain ideal philosophical 
objects, until they find material or artefactual equivalences. Because virtual objects are 
intangible, there is a need for a metaphorical language to describe them. This would 
happen, in the first instance, at the philosophical level. And it would, to some extend, 
relate to what Kant called a priori philosophy. 
 
Metaphors generated mainly on behalf of inductions from the virtually real are what I 
call top-down metaphors. And the most essential part about top-down metaphors is that 
they are, in this context, understood as representamens of real objects. God, soul and 
angel could be examples of top-down metaphors, whereas the term light can be used 
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both as a top-down and bottom up metaphor. With this suggestion of a kind of induction 
based on body intelligence through feeling, I will end my contemplations of metaphor. 
We have thus not studied particular metaphors and their pathways from philosophy to 
science and the artefactually real as much as we have generated yet another expansion 
of our conception of what forms the prerequisites for being a human knower. 
From here, I will move into new contemplations in a chapter dedicated to 
the theme of logos. 
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Chapter 12: Logos philosophy and virtual grids 
 
15.0. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will contemplate a so-called logos in Nature, which is the idea that 
Nature has an inbuilt logic that human beings can potentially perceive and understand 
cognitively. Since we have accepted knowledge to be fallible, and have situated the 
knowing human subject in Nature, which is always grander than any existing human 
knowing, and since we have inserted a virtual level of reality, it makes sense to 
question, just like we did in case study one, the relation between inner insight and non-
material objects in Nature. However, in this chapter we are more interested in objects 
related to structure than to pure quality. The idea of structure could also be related both 
to secondness in Peirce’s phaneroscopic ontology, and in mediated form to habit of 
nature (which is equal to natural law) in Peirce. 
Were we to accept that there is indeed a relation between the human 
logical mind and logic in Nature, which philosophers such as Aristotle, Pythagoras, 
Descartes, and Peirce have all claimed, it could be expected that it would generate 
effects in the part of the world that humans can register, and that it would colour their 
perception, cognition and being. In some way this also leads to a further questioning of 
the hypothesis that knowing is perception – first and foremost. And this, again, relates 
to our question concerning how to understand the correspondence theory of truth in our 
context. 
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Today it is typically not accepted in academic research to ask of this relation, in forms 
other than such of historical analysis of the theories of former philosophers. Therefore, 
the possible relation between human and Nature, building on cognitive structure, and 
related to a contemporary socio-cultural context, is left academically unarticulated. The 
idea of logos in Nature has, just like the idea of a deeper essence (a virtual level) behind 
Nature’s material objects, been dismissed. If, however, we find it reasonable to think 
that there is indeed such a connection, this will affect both existing knowledge and the 
future process of human knowing. If there is a potential to extract structures of Nature 
through cognitive endeavour alone, it will have to change how we look at originality, 
and how we currently set a demarcation line between actual philosophical insight and 
knowledge constituted through academic analytical methodologies. 
 
15.1. Nature's logic 
Let us start by a short look at the historical background concerning the idea of logos. 
The ancient Greeks were positive of the existence of logos, which was a property of 
nature that could be reached by the human mind. In later academic interpretations of 
Aristotle, logos were primarily connected to the study of language and rhetoric with an 
emphasis on socio-cultural exchange, rather than on the relationship between human 
and cosmos. The Stoics (Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, 170-180 AD) understood logos 
to be an active force that animates the universe. This was inspired by Heraclitus (500 
BC), who saw logos as form, and as an expression of the dynamic, logical principle of 
organization in Nature. Humans can capture aspects of Nature's logos, because they are 
born out of it's inherent logic. 
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In this project I will, at an experimental basis, subscribe to the concept of logos, and 
suggest that a resonance from Natural logos in human expressions would be situated in 
the underlying structures of language, symbols, words and concepts (perhaps, at this 
level we connect, in part, to the central essence in the theses of Chomsky and Saussure 
respectively), which would then, in themselves, form a representamen of the logical 
object that exists at the level of the virtually real. Language, would, in principle, include 
all forms of cultural semiosis, including principles of rhetoric, formal logic (hereunder, 
argumentative logic), numerical systems, mathematics, geometry, and even the digital 
principle of binary oppositions as a basic systemic algorithm (0 and 1’s), as systems of 
logic than can, through computational machines, generate new complex orders on the 
basis of existing logical orders. In this way, logos can also be expressed in the 
functional and structural aspects of technoetic art installations, even if they also present 
complex semiotic ambiguity at the level of the interface. 
 
If thought and language can demonstrate an innate order of logic, which the topic of 
formal logic does demonstrate, then technoetic art installations could inhere references 
to an equal kind of logic, which is, however, more complex than that of traditional 
intellectual logic, because it combines logical structure with symbolic and iconic 
reference in a level of cultural semiosis, that also functions as representamens of virtual 
objects. 
Technoetic installations are texts, and they inhere language that represents 
a different, newly evolved kind of cultural semiosis, which often presents condensed 
symbolic socio-cultural references that come to represent a higher-order level of 
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thinking. The inherent logic of thought as illustrated, in part, in the structures of 
language, which we are considering here, would not be equal to that of the semiology 
presented by Ferdinand de Saussure, who saw language as a dyadic, and thereby 
arbitrary system, which had it’s own internal logic consisting of oppositions, but which 
did, however, not present a genuine reference between sign and real object (Saussure, 
1986). Our considerations would also not be equal to the biologically based, inbuilt, 
language potential that Noam Chomsky (2002) has suggested. Chomsky presents the 
thesis that the capacity for language is an innate cognitive property that forms a natural, 
inborn trait of the human species. Chomsky, however, does not take qualitative aspects, 
metaphysical aspects and language structure in its property as a medium between 
human consciousness and Nature's consciousness, explicitly into account. Since this 
relation forms our point of interest in this chapter, we will have to understand these 
theories of language as relevant contributions that do not, however, offer a broader 
scheme in which to think out the possibility of logos in Nature and mind. 
 
We have thus made clear that our approach differs from the basic theories of language 
suggested by Saussure and Chomsky, and it does so at the ontological level; because in 
this context we operate with an energetic, wave based foundation behind matter and 
thought, which can, perhaps, better be described by metaphors of electromagnetism 
(resonance), behind words and their semantics, and their ability to capture not only 
deeper qualitative meaning (icons at the level of the virtually real), but also structural 
principles (indexes at the level of the virtually real) that become represented as logical 
systems in human thought. With Peirce, we could say that it is secondness in Nature that 
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is distributed somehow in thought, and then mediated through language. The 
signification of a structure in Nature, again, can be manifested as form at the level of the 
artefactually real. 
 
But, we could also speculate, on behalf of the theories of Oschman, Ho, and particularly 
Bradley, Jones and Flaxman, whether there could be a physical side to the experience of 
correspondence between a signified representation of a structure in Nature, and its 
actual dynamical object? Carrying it a little far out, however, still within a reasonable 
spectrum in accordance with our chosen theoretical pillars, we will have to ask if it 
makes sense to think that words and signifying representations in themselves are 
carriers of (quantum) energy, and thus represent a spectrum of our physical reality? In 
accordance with our five levels of reality, we can place thought and sign at the level of 
the sixth density, and expect it to connect to the below densities through complex 
processes of interfacing. As we know from Nicolescu, and although Nature seems to 
find out fine by herself, there would be no simple way for human minds to articulate the 
correspondence between the third and the fourth density (Nicolescu’s reality levels). 
However, we can understand the connection so that through the zone of non-resistance, 
we can encompass both levels in a comprehensive state that lies beyond the 
exclusiveness of paradox. Because of the complexity and difference in physical 
densities, and the underlying in-direct connection and interaction, it seems reasonable to 
name the zone of non-resistance with a metaphor from our artefactual world: the 
“interface”. 
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While contemplating the signifying value of cultural signification forms, Mathematics, 
as the abstract logical system that it represents, would then capture some higher logic 
and virtual objects such as aspects of natural laws (perhaps mechanical aspects of 
Peircean habits as dynamical objects49) with ways of precision that verbal language 
cannot accomplish. Mathematics connects to the structural, indexical reference, as I see 
it. It has an advantage over words that allows its transfer to the domain of the 
artefactually real in manners that imply a much higher degree of precision and accuracy. 
Thus it becomes a medium that delivers the possibility of exact measures, and secure 
transfer of information from one reality level to the other; at least to a certain extent. 
Verbal language, thus, cannot perform functional exactness in the transfer realm 
between the virtually and the artefactually real. It can, however, generate another kind 
of accuracy, when it comes to its reference of virtual dynamical objects, which is based 
on meaning, depth and quality.50 My expectation is that today our bodyminds have 
developed physiologically and at general levels of internal semiosis. They would thus 
be able to produce umwelts and signification spheres differently than in the early 
renaissance, where Descartes (1596-1650) formed his methodology of reason, or in the 
1800’s, when Kant (1724-1804) formed his philosophy apriori categories, or even than 
mainstream instruments of logic today. 
One important difference is that today, the development of higher logos 
would have to include principles of new technologies, artefacts and media, all adding to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  idea	  that	  mathematics	  corresponds	  directly	  to	  virtual	  objects	  is	  well	  in	  accordance	  with	  Plato’s	  ontological	  realism	  concerning	  mathematics	  and	  geometrical	  forms	  (Plato,	  c.	  427-­‐347	  BC/1998).	  Peirce,	  however,	  worked	  the	  ideal	  level	  into	  the	  real	  through	  his	  phaneroscopic	  phenomenology,	  and	  would	  therefore	  only	  agree	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  mathematics	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  signification	  of	  parts	  of	  natures	  habits	  (Peirce,	  1923;	  Brier,	  2008).	  50	  By this I am referring to the correspondence theory of truth, here in particular correspondence of signified 
meaning or logic with the realm of virtual reality	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the cultural, symbolic landscapes that are understood to, in part, mediate a higher logos. 
And talking about Logos 2:0 would imply that the formalities of classical logic, first and 
second order predicative logic that were derived at earlier historical times, today are 
becoming implemented as part of artificial intelligence design,51 and speech recognition 
systems and likely computer based functions. Some basic patterns of logic are thus 
being automatized through computers; from there they augment our artefactual realities, 
which forms a point of departure of the post-phenomenological situation. If today, our 
cognitive, perceptual and logical capacity is changing, and is being altered further by 
the implementation of these technologies into our current societies, then this could be a 
sign that a new logos has entered our signification sphere, and that the logic of human 
thinking per se would have to move to logic 2:0. Perhaps this could be why there seems 
to be an increased interest in the extended logic of Peirce, where abduction becomes an 
integrated form of reason, together with induction and deduction (Brier, 2008). 
 
15.2. Cosmological logos, religion and habit 
The ability to capture logic of structures from the virtual realm could be one reason why 
religions have been formed. Because only in metaphorical, analogue, poetic and 
symbolic language could such structures be captured in times where there was not 
representation of these structures at the level of the artefactually real. While 
understanding knowing as perception, we would have to expect that some people have 
the talent of being particularly receptive to virtual structures, even such that represent a 
time span longer than the one generation in which such individuals live. So the relativity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Where	  first	  and	  second	  order	  predicative	  logic	  is	  part	  of	  Boolean	  algebra,	  of	  which	  digital	  algebra	  forms	  a	  special	  case	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of time at both physical and social levels is a central problem also, when it comes to the 
truth principle of correspondence. What time frame does a given signification actually 
relate to? How, then, can we judge its truth value? Can true perceptions only be formed 
in retrospective versions? Or can truth percepts be anticipatory? We have, through the 
concept of syntropy and Peircean agapistic evolution suggested a complementary 
principle of an anticipatory perception of dynamical objects. 
 
I find that Peirce allows us to move into a higher level of complexity and depth by 
adding the phaneroscopic ontology, where triadism continues in the third density with 
the sign networks produced by human beings. However, our insertion of structure in the 
sixth density might come in the way of a Peircean phaneroscopic triad at the ontological 
level, and we have not explicitly solved this problem. We could further ask, whether the 
relationship between human semiosic “logic” and the logic of natural habits would not 
be in constant change – again in relative spacetime? 
In the concept of “the speed of thought, we have speculated that this is 
happening at the social scale, and that it is characteristic of our time. Habits, thus, could 
come in and out of formation in different time spans, and, perhaps, with different 
registered effects as they cross the interfaces of the respective physical densities. 
Therefore, the logic of Nature, represented in human thought and language cannot be a 
static formation. Peirce’s process oriented dynamical philosophy showed awareness that 
habits might not be universally and eternally stable, but present a process of eternal 
development towards still finer crystallisation. 
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As suggested in the chapter on time and relativity, the collective viewpoint of human 
knowing is human centred. It is based on the life span of the individual, the generation, 
and the cultural histories that we develop as a common memory in the signification 
spheres, but most of all; it is based in physical ontologies. This means that the natural 
laws that we have discovered so far at a macro evolutionary stage might seem like 
constants to us, relative to human horizons. In reality, even today, something such as 
gravity could be dynamic and change quality and scope over time spans, so wide, that 
we cannot grasp it.52 The important part here is not to point out that our knowledge is 
fallible. It is rather to suggest a relation between what becomes available as information 
for particular cultures of signification, and the state of the art of the collective cognitive 
and perceptive prerequisites for taking in this information; which brings us back to the 
human subject and why we argue for the importance of constant self-recognition. 
Concretely, this means that if extended sentience follows the 
endobiological evolution, the signified representations of the universe must necessarily 
gradually, change their form. The cosmology suggested by Aristotle could relate to the 
potentials and limitations of his horizon as a subject philosopher, but also to the 
potentials and limitations of the average state of cognition within the social system of 
power in which his knowledge was applied. A similar situation could be characteristic 
of today, where we are lacking an account of the multidimensionality of our physical 
world in our general theories of the human subject and knower. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  This	  idea	  is	  inspired	  by	  Moffat,	  2008	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15.3. Descartes and the potential of human ratio in the medieval age and the 
renaissance 
It seems that every time a dominating collective mind reaches into a new logos through 
subjective insight, and inter-subjective negotiation, and then gradually orders and 
structures knowledge from this renewed basis, there tends to be an exclusive focus on 
that particular logos form, until its potentials have been thoroughly explored and tested. 
This, however, would not mean that other forms of logos in Nature are not present. It 
rather means that one logos form comes into domination because a broader majority of 
the dominating classes resonate with this logos form. It can be that other forms of logos 
are developed as cultural signification, however become pushed aside by those in 
power. 
 
Looking back into Descartes' concept of ratio, and the historico-cultural impact of his 
introspective findings, where he explored and described a potential for ratio to discover 
higher logos phenomena through functions of the intellect, which Descartes presented in 
the act of hypothetical deduction and methodological suggestions (Decartes, 2008), we 
find an example of esoteric methodology, based on inner knowledge. Descartes’ 
methodology was one that connected introspective activity with the reality of God. 
Descartes’ form of deduction varied from Poppers theory of falsification, not only by 
difference in historical time, but also through the way deduction was used. Popper’s 
normative methodology that emphasised hypothetical deduction, empirical testing and 
falsification instead of verification, took its point of departure in intra-institutional 
practice of the mid 1900’s, and in anti-metaphysical thinking. As viewed within the 
context of this project, we could say that Descartes seemed to have rather examined a 
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level of precision that arose in the correspondence between objects of the virtually real, 
and structural functions of the ideally real (cognitive structures), where Popper 
continued in the materialistic track of the logical positivist, what reality concepts were 
concerned. 
 
Taking upon ourselves the evolutionary perspective, including endobiological 
evolution, we could here speculate that the need for development of the brain activity of 
ratio at a historico-cultural time, or in the developmental space time span of a 
signification sphere, then, would, in line with the findings of case study one, represent 
an inert, biological and sub-consciously based unused cognitive potential. At the time of 
Descartes, there were much greater social discrepancies between scholarly and 
unscholarly minds than today, which, of course, affected and characterised the overall 
signification sphere. Furthermore, Descartes was in clear discrepancy with the religious 
dogmas of his time, by suggesting that man could find truth through speculation, rather 
than through reading the bible alone. This, of course, all coloured the way the cognitive 
potential could manifest and evolve the signification sphere at the time. 
Since Descarte’s theories have created an impact that has lasted over 
several centuries, however, and in a retrospective analysis, we could allow ourselves to 
assume that there would have been high levels of pragmatic truth in his findings: truth 
in the sense that there was real correspondence between Descarte’s method and the 
cognitive abilities of a high number of individuals at the time, but actually more because 
it has come to represent a dynamic move in the evolution of social knowledge and 
social structures through the formation of the scientific institution (Brier, 2005). In this 
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sense, Descartes directions in his Mediations on First Philosophy and A discourse on 
the Method could be viewed as having been anticipatory, representing the potential of a 
telos in Nature. It could thereby be understood to have provoked an evolutionary 
potential already inherent in the signification sphere, in a cluster of existing individual 
minds. Through a realisation of this inborn potential, a further human individuation 
process could take place as part of the evolutionary path from stratified and hierarchical 
societies to differentiated societies, where a still higher percentage of the population 
could achieve insight and knowledge, and where the priesthood gradually lost its social 
power to the institution of science itself (Brier, 2005). 
I have to emphasize here that this academically unorthodox perspective on 
knowledge could not be understood in any linear sense when it comes to evolution, or 
the evolution of consciousness in cultures at large. There would be more complexity 
involved in the evolutionary perspective, since we also operate with evolutionary 
potentials and a diversity of evolutionary timelines, and we cannot expect an equal pace 
and quality in the evolution of consciousness in for instance the West and the East, 
which have, traditionally, operated through opposing ontologies.53 
 
So we have suggested that for the development of ratio and scientific method to 
represent a genuine potential at the time, there would have had to be an unused potential 
in the collective mind, which would imply an inherent, sub-conscious level of will, that 
existed outside of the day conscious mind, in individual and collective minds. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  The	  claim	  of	  opposite	  ontologies	  in	  the	  West	  and	  East	  is	  supported	  among	  others	  by	  Bohm	  (1980)	  and	  Brier	  (2008)	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would, by its teleological nature, be anticipatory of the future. At the biological level we 
can see it as a syntropic aspect, part of the brains' need to strive towards activating its 
utmost potential. Descartes, as a front figure, became the spokesman of the practice of 
this developmental activity. But the potential and readiness for the actual development 
was already present. The time span that characterises this process has been long: 
hundreds of years of development. No single human being could have figured out the 
outcome at the time. The inherent telos of the situation transgressed the perspective of 
any single or collective mind. The process was supra-individual, and supra-historical. 
The inherent mechanism thus has a scope of both space-time dimensions and 
intersubjective dimensions, which by far exceeds that of human comprehension in the 
here and now of the situation, however is no less ordered because of that fact. For a 
while, then, the hidden order is out of sight, so to speak, even for the people involved. It 
is only in the retrospect, and after long lines of development at many socio-cultural 
stages that we become able to retrospectively intellectualize such processes. 
This way of viewing historical development supersedes the 
implementation into linear, historical, noemic or externally focused explanation models, 
and builds upon introspection and the evolutionarily based development of cognition 
and consciousness that allows us to view ourselves as a species in the retrospect. Thus, 
as a species at phylogenetic levels, and as individuals at ontogenetic levels there would 
always be potential that is anticipatory of the future, as there is in the seed becoming a 
tree.54 This does not necessarily imply a deterministic view upon teleological potentials 
of Nature, because of the complexity involved while taking into account the growing 
space of individual free will, and because of the level of semiotic freedom, which is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Which	  was	  an	  example	  of	  teleology	  in	  nature	  by	  Aristotle	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always inherent when it comes to human beings, and which seems to also be increasing 
with less rigidity in hierarchical social structures. 
 
15.4. Logos and Aesthetic Reason 
The thought exploration presented in this chapter concerns the relation between 
cosmological grids and human minds. It builds upon the assumption that yet undefined 
patterns of resonance between virtual structures in Nature and the cognitive properties 
of our bodyminds exist as a physical reality. In this scheme, the properties of cognition 
as understood by ideas of cognitive processes dominated by information science do not 
suffice. They present an arbitrary dyadic relation to the surrounding world, when it 
comes to properties of cognition and what we could call cognitive percepts – 
information intake from the surrounding world. We are thus asking for an actual 
equivalence between virtual structures and cognitive structures, perhaps based on 
certain patterns in neuron activity. The thesis is that once a grid is implemented through 
resonance patterns, and patterns of synchronicity between the respective virtual 
structure and the structures of neuron patterns, and a further resonance of feeling 
through the heart, it would, again, relate to the language patterns of the socio-cultural, 
auto-communicative language games presented in individual thought semiosis, the last 
of which represents a mediation between feeling and language. If a person is fit, as was 
Descartes, and as would be the generative philosopher of today (ideally), he can account 
for this by capturing insights that correspond with the structure in words and cultural 
symbolic at large (knowing as perception), and seek further negotiation among skilled 
peers of the theory that comes out of it in order to test its pragmatic truth value; either as 
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part of a wider intertextual philosophical scheme, or, perhaps, in the materiality of a 
technoetic artwork. 
 
This means that the virtual grids would be informative, and that they would present an 
inherent non-human kind of agency and intentionality with anticipatory qualities that 
rely on the evolutionary process implicit in any habit of Nature, representing in the 
biological structure the syntropic quality. I would not expect the level of brain 
connection in this case to be based on a hierarchical and topologically distinct 
understanding of macro scale physiological areas in the reptilian brain part, the 
amygdala, or the neo-cortex for that matter.55 It would seem more likely, and in line 
with the bio-energetic premises involved in extended sentience and endobiological 
evolution, that, if based on the laws of the fifth and sixth densities, it would, first and 
foremost, relate to the global wave patterns, suggested by Stanislas Dehaene. Dehaene 
(2009) has suggested that there would be global brain wave patterns that function at the 
gamma wave level, and which order input and activity from brain cells in emergent 
patterns that represent a higher order than that of traditional macro scale physiological 
brain topology. We could suggest that the level of global brain wave patterns could have 
a potential to connect to the totality of the living matrix in non-local quantum exchange. 
While Descartes seemed focused upon development of very particular, 
brain based cognitive properties, aesthetic reason based on extended sentience takes a 
much fully developed, fine tuned bodymind into use; as opposed to an evolution that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Susan	  Hart	  (Hart,	  2011)	  has,	  distinctively,	  described	  the	  hierarchical	  topological	  strucure	  of	  the	  brain,	  which	  has,	  up	  until	  now,	  informed	  many	  interpretations	  of	  neuroscientific	  data,	  but	  which	  is,	  however,	  often	  viewed	  as	  outdated.	  Newer	  approaches	  research	  into	  the	  complex	  electromagnetic	  spectrum	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  frequencies	  involved	  in	  specific	  brain	  activities,	  where	  Stanislav	  Dehaene	  (Dehaene,	  2009)	  forms	  an	  example.	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primarily is focussed upon the development of functions in the neo-cortex. Here, 
cognition relies on both inter-molecular and quantum connectivity functions, based on 
the intermediacy between autopoiesis and semiosis, and across the borders of internal 
semiosic systems. In this line of thinking, the bodymind has a wider range of cognitive 
capacities than are usually thought of, which combine autopoietically based, 
information processing that work as pattern fitting, with a complex network of semiotic 
interpretants related directly to organic biology (and which would have to be deciphered 
by use of a biosemiotic vocabulary). 
 
By using this kind of explanation, I have moved from a metaphysical to a physical and 
bio-energetic understanding in order to explain the intermediary relation between logos 
and the perceptive and cognitive qualities of the mindbody. I must underline, however, 
that my use of terms from physical and biophysical science is always metaphorical, as I 
will not claim that they can be fully explanatory of the connection between body and 
intangible levels of Nature's consciousness. They can, however, lead us into new types 
of explanation that can, from here, be further explored. 
 
15.5. Conclusion 
We have in this chapter explored possible implications of some of our bio-energetic and 
quantum philosophical theories, in combination with cybersemiotics, a Peircean 
ontology and an extension at the level of physicality into our five density levels; which 
is, perhaps not in full accordance with a Peircean ontology. We must here make clear 
that the thought experiments represented in the chapters of Part III proper take us to the 
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absolute limit of acceptable hypothesis. Yet, this is also the very aim of the chapters. In 
order to be able to explore such schemes of thought, which must here be understood to 
be both imprecise and to represent an infant stage of integration of quantum rationalities 
into our overall philosophical and transdisciplinary scheme, it is necessary to form 
preliminary articulations. Thereby, we have not indicated final truths, neither when it 
comes to third person or first person understandings of the human subject, nor in light 
of our proposition of an extended view upon the correspondence theory of truth. 
 
What concerns the particular study of logos, reason, and the connection between the 
individual and virtual parts of Nature, the reason why it is important to emphasize the 
potential of access to logos in mediation between the virtually real and the ideally real is 
that the path of travelling the resources of inner knowledge through an esoteric 
understanding of logic in nature, can be understood as a basic pillar upon which a large 
amount of the philosophical knowledge that lies behind academic practice does rest. It 
is well known that Plato operated on esoteric backgrounds and sought logic on 
metaphysical terms. Pythagoras’ occult school, together with his metaphysical 
explanations of mathematics and music are equally well known (Dampier, 1966). 
Aristotle, who was a student of Plato, did, explicitly, divide his works into esoteric and 
exoteric writings. We have in this chapter also discussed Descartes, who sought the 
logic that God made available to his logical mind. We can add to this scheme, the often 
overlooked close relation between the active development by Sir Isaac Newton of what 
he thought to be a more original and pure understanding of Christianity and the 
development of his natural philosophy; where only the last part has been implemented 
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into the traditional canon of philosophy of science. This topic has recently come to the 
fore by scholars such as historian Stephen D. Snobelen (2004). Furher from that, 
philosophers such as Kant and Hegel are well known in philosophy of science to have 
relied on God and spirituality as sources of insight. Another example is C.G. Jung, who 
is known to have used esoteric methods (Lachman, 2013). Einstein is also known to 
have formed his theory of relativity as pure speculation, while he did not work in an 
academic institution: the theory could only retrospectively be validated by empirical 
testing and intertextual coherence (Bohm, 1980). Another example is the work of the 
famous inventor Nicola Tesla (2011), who claimed to see virtual objects as clearly as 
were they physical objects, which he then transformed from virtual patterns to science, 
and into actual technologies. Relating to Peirce, we could suggest that it is pure 
mechanical necessity and the level of secondness and the restrictions that secondness 
places on firstness which would show in the mind as pure logic; however, to Peirce, this 
level of reality was but one out of several: not the only foundation upon which to build 
valid science, and he would, furthermore, not prioritise firstness and secondness as 
primary realities such as we have seen in Plato (Peirce, 1923). 
 
In such a study, it becomes clearer that philosophy of science itself in no way resembles 
the process of scientific practice, and the rules and methodologies implied by current 
institutional demands on such practice. None of these philosophers could be understood 
to be scientists in the sense that we know scientists today. None of them have followed 
the contemporary domination of a so-called objectivity, or the anti-metaphysical 
demands that influence both the social and the natural sciences of today, in their 
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methodologies. With Peirce in mind, and his idea of a connection in the act of abduction 
between mind and Nature, and the fact that abduction is not logical in the sense that we 
understand logic today, it seems only fair to expect that most, or all, major works of 
philosophy that have contributed to the evolution of science, have been worked out in a 
bigger frame than that of institutional science, it has been connected to cosmology, 
“God”, but most probably to the kinds of logic that the mind is able to absorb through 
the act of thinking as a generative philosopher. The problem is that the relation of major 
natural philosophers to the mystical and religious traditions is being suppressed in 
contemporary Western academia. The inborn talent and urge to muse introspectively, 
and to find truth (signified correspondence with real dynamical objects) in line with 
those in existing philosophy, is thus being downplayed in contemporary educational 
environments. What do we do, however, if young people and/or children possess such 
talents? 
 
The possible acceptance of inner knowledge, here in the form of an understanding of 
logic in Nature, further generates a problem area that concerns how we can understand 
the originality of thought, when it comes to central philosophical conclusions made in 
original speculative research. Besides from the necessity of skill training and 
advancement in the use of verbal language, truths, as dynamical objects in Nature, can 
in principle be available to anybody. The level of ontological precision or depth in 
perception would not, in itself, be dependent on academic training, since this skill is not 
accepted as a genuine pathway to knowledge and is therefore not trained in academic 
institutions. When it comes to the philosophical capture of dynamical objects, academia 
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today, thus, would represent no assurance of presenting the highest level of truth and the 
genuine potential present within the system represented by those who are in their 
learning process, and the weight that is placed on the originality of a thesis in this 
direction, is therefore highly questionable. 
 
The idea of logos should colour and form a background of understanding that can be 
added to the approach that I have chosen to make to technoetic artworks at large. The 
way I interpret symbolic signs and their virtual dynamical objects is based on the idea 
that they are referring to real objects, where structures are often represented by central 
functions of the installations, and that these functions, while the artwork represents a 
high degree of aesthetic reason, can be directly related to a higher logos. Thus, the 
artworks, further than showing correspondence with central transformations in 
contemporary society, are understood to also correspond with particular virtual 
structures that we can understand as dynamical objects, which the artists try to translate 
into material form. 
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16. Thesis Conclusion 
The project has delivered a patchwork of texts (within the overall text), each presenting 
a unique syntax of combined art reading, theory, and abductive speculation that deliver 
new ways of conceptualising the human subject. Because the project reverses basic 
materialistic ontologies, described in the methodology chapter, which, again, connect to 
basic lines of causation, complementary pairs rather than mutually exclusive 
oppositions, and to the connotations of loaded terms, its meaning and structure can be a 
challenge for the reader to grasp. Once we have fully accepted fallibility of knowledge 
as signification, five reality levels, a dynamic and process based thinking, meaning and 
understanding over production of facts, and the acceptance of an unclear demarcation 
line between subject and object, and between subjective and collective consciousness, 
the inbuilt causalities and textual order can begin to appear. The reason for the changed 
conditions is forced by the very nature of the topic: to integrate into a subjectivity study 
the study of consciousness while taking central quantum philosophy and new cultural 
communication forms (multimodal installations) into account. We have, however, not 
made quantum reality level dominating, but rather integrated it as a part of an otherwise 
multi-levelled materialistic reality; thereby we have reached a material reality of a new 
potency. 
 
The new meaning produced in this thesis very primarily builds upon the concept of 
extended sentience, and how the consequence of taking this concept seriously implies a 
relationship between subject, object and intersubjective levels that integrates virtual 
levels, and something such as a collective virtual consciousness. A viewpoint that can 
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integrate all these positions has wide implications. It is especially the virtual densities 
(fifth, sixth and seventh densities), their connection to the body’s energy matrix, and the 
inherent potential of the body matrix for non-local communication that relates the 
individual to the virtually real, problematizes and extends from the idea of separateness 
and the idea of the human subject being either an ego-subject, or with cybernetics, 
confined as a “black box”.56  
It is also an ontology of five non-hierarchical density levels, and five non-
hierarchical reality levels that changes our ontological point of departure profoundly. 
While a three dimensional materialistic ontology and the positivistic inheritance would 
naturally ban the transcendental first person observer and knower, our, more complex 
ontology supports an understanding of the knower being connected not only to physical 
reality in an objective sense, but also to virtual reality realms, through a bodily 
sensorium, and extended cognitive properties, which can afford the complementarity of 
both materialistic exactness and philosophical transcendence. 
 
Within the speculative suggestion of the seven densities, quantum fields of pure 
potentiality and wave formations emerging at the pre-quantum field level (Wolf) are 
also considered part of the physical realm. In that sense, Part III of the project has made 
a transformative impact on how we can understand art communication. But it also 
impacts how we can understand the third and first person human subject, hereby the 
generative philosopher and the material world in which she is embedded. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  human	  subject	  as	  a	  ”black	  box”	  is	  used	  both	  in	  traditional	  cybernetics,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Luhmann’s	  social	  systems	  theory,	  and	  even	  in	  Brier’s	  cybersemiotic	  model.	  Thus,	  none	  of	  these	  theories	  incorporate	  non-­‐local	  energetic	  mutual	  influences	  between	  people,	  or	  between	  human	  subject	  and	  Nature.	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generative philosopher can sense and capture dynamical objects of pure structure, as 
well as quantum level information through her sensuous and cognitive apparatus, which 
is, besides from being rational and empathetic, highly intuitive. While philosophers 
such as Kant and Husserl were not able to explain the human capacity to transcend 
subjective macro level material confinements by reference to empirical research, only 
philosophical explanations could be given. This project, however, suggests that some 
properties of the transcendental philosopher be explained by bio-energetic theories, and 
that the transcendental state can reach into the extended sensuous apparatus, as well as 
into the less dense physical levels of material reality. Hereby, to seek new intangible 
objects by verbal formulation becomes an actuality and a genuine goal for the 
contemporary philosopher: we need to become gradually acquainted with those inner 
functions at work in synthesis with existing academic experience. 
 
One implication of the endobiological evolution is that phenosemiosis becomes part of a 
process of sub-conscious verbalization processes in the day conscious mind, however, 
also that the functions of the biological body at the energetic level shift. Thus, the direct 
implication of the ends made in Part II, Chapter III is that extended sentience might 
reside as a non-developed potential in a large amount of people, on equal terms as this 
thesis has argued in favor of the presence of a potential of the rational mind in the time 
of Descartes (and onwards). To develop a clear inner connection based on extended 
sentience demands of the research subject to be highly attentive towards her inner 
processes of pre-conscious thought semiosis, and towards the flux of non-ordered 
thought, more than merely being attentive to intellectual and intentionally directed, 
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logically based, thought practices based on intertextual navigation. This, again, 
underlines the importance of the explicitly present generative philosopher. 
An acceptance of such deeper levels of thought that bring us into contact 
with Nature at levels other than such of physical science or existing philosophy, re-
establishes classical philosophical strategies, however, inserts them in a transformed 
cultural setting that integrates technologies of augmented and mixed reality 
environments – a more evolved and detailed signification sphere. 
 
The ideal user that has been established while reading artworks, has functioned as a 
methodological tool, which has allowed me, the research subject and generative 
philosopher, to intellectually partition myself from the user of technoetic art 
installations, while simultaneously thriving upon subjective experiences with the self-
same artworks. It is obvious that there can be no clear-cut distinction between ideal user 
and research subject, and that that becomes a statement in itself: the generative 
philosopher and research subject can take many varied positions. The experimentation 
with more than one subjective position in one and the same thesis forms a central 
function and statement that enlightens the answer to our research question further. 
The treatment of the aesthetic experience in case study two led me to the 
conclusion that, if technoetic arts function as expressions of new knowledge, aesthetic 
reason becomes an important tool in the process of human knowing. Aesthetic reason 
represents a higher-order structure than rational reason, because it builds particularly on 
sense integration, integration of energetic events that concern the whole body with 
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cognitive properties into a intuitive notion of “truth”, the sign of which is a bodily 
feeling. The change in the hierarchical evaluation of biologically embedded sub-
conscious intelligence versus day conscious intelligence, where micro scales are no 
longer understood to be sub-ordinate to macro scale functions (at least at the energetic 
level) forms an ontological provocation that can change the causality lines within which 
we generate explanations more fundamentally than we might realise at this point. This 
realization is necessary, however, if is it really so that sub-conscious processes take 
precedence over day conscious properties, and are, by nature, also richer in information 
than the day conscious, interpreted versions of such. 
To realise this twist in our self-understanding as academic knowers, is also 
central in order to allow ourselves to generate skills where we can cooperate better with 
sub-conscious levels of intelligence and consciousness that work on terms that we do 
not decide ourselves, however, that do direct individual and collective behavioural 
patterns. 
 
Thomas Kuhn pulled off the curtain of the sub-conscious ontologies behind institutional 
practice in the 1960’ies. The paradigm shift that I am writing of in this project seems 
much wider than just a shift in institutional thinking. If there is any kind of truth to the 
thesis of the endobiological evolution, and in particular the accelerated pace of mind in 
individuals and collective signification spheres, then it is most probable that we will see 
researchers carry out research processes on a basis that is more fit with extended 
sentience and with properties of the ideal user, where ease in communication is attained 
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in the research network by resonance and synchronicity, and where complexities and 
ambiguities must be acknowledged through aesthetic reason. 
 
Another aim of the project has been to demonstrate how technoetic arts could be viewed 
as contributions to the process of knowledge generation, based on principles other than 
those that are considered strictly scientific, however, without dismissing science and the 
value of scholarly insight and skill. The consideration of art as knowledge is an 
institutional development that is very real today.57 If, however, it is indeed so that 
extended sentience and aesthetic reason become increasingly dominant properties of the 
human mind, ways of teaching, learning, and the role of the logical mind must come 
into question.58 This is particularly so, when it comes to general understandings of 
intelligence, and the role that such concepts play in educational systems, in business 
recruitment, and in political social strategies. In this arena, an overall artistic approach 
to knowledge could become of increased importance. 
 
16.1. The imagination: eye vision or extended sentience? 
As extended sentience, which involves a level of synesthesia at an emergent level above 
that of Gibson's perceptual systems, and which relates to wave consciousness, takes 
precedence over visual studies, it becomes blurry how to understand the imageries of 
the imagination. With Oschman, Bischof and Bradley, I have suggested that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  An	  illustrating	  example	  is	  Symbiotica	  Lab	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Western	  Australia	  that	  combines	  art	  practice	  with	  research	  within	  fields	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  But	  multiple	  institution	  based	  art-­‐science	  collaborations	  emerge	  at	  a	  frequent	  basis.	  58	  The	  idea	  that	  art	  and	  asthetic	  forms	  of	  reason	  are	  important,	  and	  will	  necessarily	  change	  educational	  systems	  is	  shared	  with	  Nicolescu,	  2002	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imagination has a level that functions more strictly on bio-energetic terms, which is, 
nevertheless, a kind of imagery that is based on principles of holography. In order for 
this level to be understood at the level of language games, this bio-energetic level of 
holographic information has to be translated into cultural images. This idea connects to 
the idea of top-down metaphor, presented in The Life Cycles of Metaphor, in Part III. 
This way of being in contact with one's body in the process of knowing is untraditional, 
both in ancient spiritual cultures, which did not have signification spheres that were in 
any way similar to those of contemporary Western signification spheres, and to current 
scientific cultures, which generally do not accept quantum based biology and 
explanations of consciousness based on quantum philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
16.3. The Sense of Being moved 
-Feeling is anticipatory of the future 
We have defined a concept of feeling, which is loaded with potential information, and 
which, by its nature of reaching into a higher density through wave consciousness, can 
therefore be anticipatory and promote syntropy in the organism. Feeling, then, 
represents a high degree of intelligence, which, if we regard nano- and micro levels to 
be of equal value to macro levels, could be understood to exceed the intelligence of the 
logical day conscious mind by far. As we have seen, there are two major consequences 
of this insight. One refers to the idea of information excess within the bodymind (not 
just in cultural semiotics). In our handling of this state of mind, we can refer to popular 
spiritual and psychological literature, which claims the importance of “being in the 
now” (Tolle, 1997). The theory of the importance of being in the now has gained a 
widespread popularity in Europe and USA, where many people find resonance in 
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developing mental skills that allow them to “be in the now” and to integrate skills of 
meditation in their daily lives. The importance in Tolle’s message, and its widespread 
resonance, can be viewed as a sign that a large group of people are experiencing altered 
states of consciousness, which are based on an increase in information, not only 
outwardly and culturally, but also inwardly and biologically. This brings with it a need 
for refinement and bettering of the processes of internal semiosis. Being in the now 
allows a focus on the present moment, where one needs to develop skills in order to sort 
out the complexities and overload of information, which would not be a similar problem 
in a structure that does not take increased amounts of information in (increase in ADHD 
diagnoses could be a sign of human beings generally taking more and more information 
in in the bodily structure; a condition which is, however, misinterpreted by the 
authorities involved). Because there is a level of evolution involved in phenosemiosis, 
which, in part, relates to the properties of the living matrix, the brain has to “process” 
much more information, or have higher semiosic tasks to carry out, which is why the 
moment supersedes memory. This could also be a reason why the heart is gaining an 
increased focus in questions of consciousness: in order for the body to process increased 
amounts of information, which leaves the brain based cognitive mind inadequate, the 
functions of the refined neuron networks of the heart must take over (the heart has a 
much higher number of neurons than the brain). In the theory of the necessity of 
experiencing the now, we can talk about attention in a shorter time span than attention 
to memory; where traditional understandings of memory would rely on a linear, 
narrative structure that creates cause and effect relations over a longer period of time. 
When talking of the now, we must make clear to ourselves that we are not talking about 
long and short-term memory: while referring to the biological equivalences of 
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consciousness, we are focussing on even shorter time spans, which can best be 
explained by Ho’s multiple biological spacetime scales (quantum jazz), which produce 
experience at a constant rate. And my contribution is the claim that evolution causes us 
to become increasingly aware of this level of consciousness: phenomenologically and 
theoretically. The level of wave interference, and the “feeling” that can be registered 
and interpreted from here, can be informative in ways that punctuate the division 
between past, present and future. These timelines all co-exist as potentialities and 
information that can make an actual difference in the system (of the embodied, human 
subject). 
In which way, then, can a feeling be informative of the future? It cannot 
tell concrete details. However, the experience and insight concerned with how one 
navigates on behalf of information given by feeling, can function as a background upon 
which interpretations can be made. In new situations, then, as for instance concerning 
the chock of the new when meeting an original art installation, the immediacy of feeling 
might be informative way past the moment of present concrete being, context and action 
as interpreted by the day conscious mind residing in the macrophysical world scale. 
 
16.4. The integrative approach as a methodology 
Since the project establishes its scope by integrating elements from a diversity of 
disciplines, and with the acceptance of paradigms that are not, currently, dominating 
scientific practice, and creates an overall syntax on behalf of a meta-level, extra-
scientific, transdisciplinary perspective that does, however, rest upon firm insight from 
existing science and philosophy, it is obvious that if central aspects of one of the 
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paradigms used changes drastically in the nearby future, this will affect the overall 
argumentation that the thesis does represent; since paradigms form pillars of the overall 
framework. I will claim, however, that this problem is unavoidable, and that the major 
role of generative philosophy is to present meta-level integrative frameworks in which 
new thoughts can be developed, tested and further negotiated. All disciplines are 
constantly evolving, which is why references to neuroscience, to take an example, are 
very general and simple. The most central disciplines that have been used as main 
pillars in this thesis, is cybersemiotics, biosemiotics, Oschman and Ho’s holistic 
biophysics, Bischof interpretation of biophysical theory of biophotons, Ascott's concept 
of technoetic arts, Ihde’s postphenomenology in cooperation with Longo’s 
epistemological turn, and, none the least, Wolf’s space resonance theory. All of these 
theories, as we have seen in particular in the speculative thought experiments, have 
wide implications of how we can understand the knowing human subject, at both first 
and third person levels. This is the reason why their implications have been extrapolated 
into the representation of thought experiments in Part III. The thorough considerations 
of these implications through thought experiments, furthermore present the active 
generative thought processes of our generative philosopher. Demonstrating the first 
person philosopher this explicitly is not, however, the same as indicating final truth to 
the argumentations presented. As follows from the semiotic point of view, all we can do 
is to generate significations. If they can have a pragmatic value, in this case by causing 
further negotiation and thought provocation in existing knowledge systems, they are 
successful. But final truth cannot be achieved, and in this respect, the generative 
philosopher is a humble creative player of thought; even if she has established feeling, 
which directs her to idiosyncratic aspects of truth. 
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In Brier, it is only in the light of a Shannon-Wiener concept of information that the 
critique presented in the framework gains its true value. Once we have accepted that 
information cannot just be statistical pattern fitting, however, and we become willing to 
play with the possible meanings of the concept, Brier’s main argument becomes 
problematic. Therefore, it is my opinion that Brier’s substantial thesis should not 
discourage the general use of terms such as information processing, which are not only 
valuable, but also necessary at the current state of academic meaning making. In a 
further critique of Brier, we could say that if neuroscience shows crucial findings that 
move in completely new directions, which he has not taken properly into account, or if 
other approaches, such as for instance Don Ihde's post-phenomenology present 
substantial alternatives, which break with one or several of the paradigmatic pillars that 
build up the framework, Brier’s overall framework will also be affected; because it is 
consistent with the basics of the paradigms that it nits together. The same goes for my 
thesis. However, as mentioned in part I, chapter 5, the goal is not to suggest a final 
solution. It is rather to suggest the work form of “transdisciplinary design”, in 
theoretical research also. It presents a paradigm that can give writing directions, when 
working with generative philosophy in our time. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Glossary 
 
Aesthetic Reason: where Aristotle's concepts “nus” (reason) and “aisthesis” (sensation) 
are combined, and a new level of reason that integrates bio-energetic levels of the body 
are all integrated into a new emergent concept. Aesthetic reason connects the macro 
level of physical organs such as heart and brain, where heart neurons begin to take 
precedence over brain neurons as according to the studies at the California Institute of 
Heart Math59 and the book chapter of Cristina Miranda de Almeida, concerning the 
central role of the heart.60 It also implies an ability to connect complex and ambiguous 
signs from syntheses that rely on an integration of biosemiotic, bio-energetic and 
intellectual levels, which can be registered through a central embodied and specified 
kind of feeling before a potential intellectual analysis is made. 
 
Agapastic evolution: A concept used by Peirce to refer to evolution by creative love 
(Peirce, 1923) 
 
Anancastic evolution: A concept used by Peirce to refer to evolution by mechanical 
necessity (Peirce, 1923). 
 
Biosemiotics: A newer paradigm within the field of biology and biochemistry, 
originally suggested by Thomas Sebeok (1976; 1989), who, on the basis of the 
philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, suggested that central biological processes could 
be viewed as semiotic, rather than mechanical. The field is growing, however not 
widely accepted within mainstream biology. Central contributors today are Jesper 
Hoffmeyer, Howard Patee, Kalevi Kull. 
 
Correspondence theory of truth: The correspondence theory of truth represents the 
idea that truth can be found in a relation where the observed is equal to the observers 
experience of it. A mutual connection between thought, language and the object in 
question is expected. This truth principle has been discussed philosophically from 
Aristotle and onwards. With Postmodernism, poststructuralism and social 
constructivism the concept of truth was placed into doubt, and since then it has been 
somewhat of a taboo for an academic to claim the existence of truth. The philosophy of 
Auguste Comte (Comte,1988) was aimed to discourage metaphysical conceptions of the 
correspondence between observer and observed, while establishing a view upon reality 
that was strictly material with measurable objects, since he viewed theological and 
metaphysical explanations as more primitive than those of positive science. In this 
project we question the positivistic version of the correspondence theory of truth against 
an Aristotelian approach, the last of which is embedded in a metaphysical understanding 
of reality; however, we are also questioning the very foundation upon which to judge 
that something is meta-physical (extra-physical). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  http://www.heartmath.org	  60	  De Kerckhove, Derrick  & Miranda de Almeida, Cristina (editors) (2014) The Point of Being, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishers, U.K, chapter VIII, pp. 219 – 311.	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Consistency: A concept of truth that relies on logical consistency in argumentation 
(Brier, 2005). Consistency can be represented by the inner structure of logical 
argumentation in an academic argument so that basic premises and conclusions are both 
valid and true, and connect logically to each other. It would, by nature, differ, exactly 
how consistency in argumentation is accounted for in paradigms that primarily 
emphasize meaning or factual truth respectively. The logic of meaning, as we have seen 
with the cybersemiotic paradigm, might differ considerably from the logic of fact. 
 
Cultural semiosis: Signs that are produced at the cultural level by humans, as opposed 
to biosemiosis, which is based on biological processes, and are not consciously 
produced by human beings. 
 
Cybersemiotics: Søren Brier's concept, relying on a transdisciplinary integration 
between central ideas from second order cybernetics and semiotics, including 
autopoiesis theory, Luhmann's social systems theory, and Wittgenstein's late theory of 
language games. The most basic ontology is represented by a Peircean phaneroscopic 
phenomenology (Brier, 2008). 
 
Day consciousness: The part of consciousness that is self-aware, and can intellectually 
observe itself. Using this concept automatically indicates that there is a large part of 
human consciousness, of which we are not self-aware; both in dream states, but also in 
consciously awake states. In general, consciousness is understood to operate, in part, on 
the basis of final cause; just like biosemiotic processes are expected to involve an 
element of final cause (Hoffmeyer, 2008a; Brier, 2008). Day consciousness is 
understood to deliver but a fraction of the consciousness that works in the overall mind 
and body structure. Day consciousness is a concept that I, the research subject, have 
produced and defined in order to make a clear demarcation between a particular kind of 
brain-based self-awareness and the many sub-conscious kinds of awareness represented 
in this project (in part by molecular biosemiosis and quantum level bio-energetic 
action). 
 
Day conscious experience: The level of experience that is, or potentially is, available to 
our day conscious minds, which exists by itself and involves a constant flux of 
information exchange, internally and externally, and which we can enter through an 
internal focus by functions of the intellect. It is hereby indicated that intellectual 
activity, such as academic analytical practice, represents but a fraction of the capacity of 
human consciousness, and therefore also of human potential knowing. Since the sub-
conscious levels of mind, including functions of the biological body, constantly gather, 
sort out, store and clear high levels of information, intellectual analysis must be viewed 
as subtractive. Theorists that emphasize the extensiveness of the sub-conscious as 
opposed to the intellectual mind are, among many, Antonio Damasio, James Oschman, 
Brian Massumi, and Brier to the extent that he emphasizes phenosemiosis as pre-
intellectual, pre-linguistic experience, together with language games, which are 
understood to inhere mechanisms that, to some extend, reign outside of the will of the 
individual. 
 
Digital virtuality: Virtual information that can be accessed through electronic and 
digital interfaces, which, in this project, is viewed as part of the artefactually real, and 
	   332	  
does not represent a reality realm by itself. 
 
Ego-subject: The term “ego subject” has deep connotations to the theory of 
psychoanalysis by Sigmund Freud, and his ego-theory (which was further developed by 
Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, David Rapaport, et. al.). It further connotes the more 
recent idea of second order cybernetics, where the individual is viewed as a “black 
box”. The black box theory emphasizes separateness between individuals, when it 
comes to questions of consciousness. The ego subject, in our context, is basically the 
human subject, understood as a confined entity, whose purpose in life is stripped of 
spiritual dimensions. It is furthermore an entity that strives for his or her own benefit, to 
satisfy personal needs, first and foremost, and who therefore is in competition with his 
surroundings. We find this idea of a human subject in economic theories (homo 
economicus), but also in theories of biological evolution (Dawkins 1989). The ego-
subject furthermore is in control of his surroundings by having full information. He is 
run by the rational day conscious mind (ego), where emotions are understood to be sub-
conscious (id), and where society places moral and normative strings on the individual 
that suppresses these unconscious emotions, experiences and desires (superego). In the 
academic thesis an ego-structure becomes apparent as an implicit writer, in part, by 
demonstrating intertextual competition through critical argumentation, by supposed 
separation from himself and others, and between himself and what he observes 
(objectivity). In this scheme, thought is by no means collective, and the strife for truth is 
often colored by subjective goals, such as career, earnings, and academic position 
within the competitive landscape. This approach affects academic intertextual syntax in 
the way that each central contributor defines himself in opposition to other central 
contributors, and therefore the syntax builds on mutual exclusivity in authorships and 
concerning central topics, and even terms in question (understood as according to binary 
oppositions rather than complementary pairs (Kelsoe & Engstrøm, 2006)). 
It is a claim in the project that rhetorical strategies and strategies of critical 
argumentation are, to a large degree, demonstrating an implicit writer, who is an ego 
subject, and that the transcendent, connective, non-separated human subject, who 
implements transdisciplinary strategies, based on multiple levels of reality (Nicolescu, 
2002) as part of the academic thesis will, over time, generate a different intertextual 
syntax that has more potential when it comes to the necessity of reducing the 
complexity of information excess in the academic system (too many productions 
presenting only slight variations in the topics treated), especially what concerns 
contemporary and future human sciences and philosophy as a discipline. 
 
Endosemiosis: A biosemiotic concept that relates to biological semiosic processes, 
which happen primarily internal to the organism (Üexkull, 2010). 
 
Episteme: Plato and Aristotle originally used the term to explain the experience of 
knowledge. Foucault, later on, gave the term new connotations by placing it in a cultural 
context relating to his own post-structuralist and postmodern schemes of discourse and 
power (Foucault, 2002). In this sense, the concept of episteme became concretized and 
related to society, rather than being an overall and widely abstract concept as in Plato 
and Aristotle. At the same time, Foucault's "epistemes" lead us to realize how 
academically derived knowledge, theories and vocabularies gain cultural influence and 
penetrate minds more generally than just presenting academic practice. Lars Qvortrup 
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(Qvortrup, 2003) uses Foucault's concept to point towards a certain epistemic 
"semantic" at the social level, in which theoretical discourses become central in people's 
experience, and, to use concepts from Jürgen Habermas (which is of course in no 
accordance with either Luhmann or Qvortrup), penetrates lifeworld and system 
simultaneously. This semantic is also a basic part of the power mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion, when it comes to the discourses, and their underlying paradigms and 
ontologies, which have been accepted. In this sense, epistemes become part of a general 
collective horizon. This level is, to Foucault, a sub-conscious level, just like Kuhn’s 
“scientific matrix” was understood to be sub-conscious to practitioners of the natural 
sciences in the 1960’ies. And it is at this level that we must operate, in order to begin to 
open up to the potential of new epistemes and a new semantics. 
 
Exosemiosis: A concept form biosemiotics, referring to processes of sign making where 
the organism communicates with levels external to itself, mainly by input into the 
structure, such as nutrition or sensuous input. (Hoffmeyer, 2008a; Brier, 2008) 
 
Extended Sentience: Extended Sentience relies on a broadened sensuous apparatus that 
integrates cognitive operations as part of being a sensuous creature. It not only 
integrates biosemiotic levels of endosemiosis, but also the bio-energetic properties of 
Oschman (2005). Reason based on Extended Sentience is different from brain-based 
reason, where emotions are either repressed (Freud, 1961; 2010), or function as a 
background for intellectual decision (Damasio, 1999), but nevertheless are regarded as 
inferior to brain based reason. Extended sentience, however, is superior to brain based 
reason, in part because it is faster. It connects closely to what we typically understand as 
“intuition” (Bradley, 2006), however it involves the full bodily structure in integrated 
wholes that constantly shift sensitively in accordance with inputs given from the 
external world. It is therefore in more accordance with what Massumi calls “affects” 
(Massumi, 2005) than with Damasio’s concept of “emotion”, and it does represent a 
kind of consciousness. A central positioning in extended sentience results in an 
extremely sensitive, yet highly informed, human subject, in opposition to the ego-
subject, who suppresses feelings, but is not related to the full-body sensorium of 
extended sentience. The research subject has coined this term. 
 
Human Subject: The human subject is questioned at a deep ontological and 
philosophical level that relates to philosophy, and to philosophy of science, and is part 
of an extra-institutional meta-discourse as opposed to academic practice. This pre-
scientific and speculative level of deep ontology implies that the project does not 
incorporate or relate to subjectivity theory that is understood primarily as academic 
practice, and which involves only weak degrees of transdisciplinarity, and effort to 
question and establish new borders between subject-object, and between subject-
intersubjective levels, and to integrate the effects of the symbiosis between new 
technologies and individual. 
 
Ideal User: The ideal user forms a yet unarticulated user, who emerges as a response to 
the affordances and symbolics (including the functionalities of the artwork) inherent in 
the interface of the artwork. The affordances have been implemented as a part of the 
design process on the basis of the artist(s) conceptual knowledge. In order to make 
assumptions of the user, using readings of artworks as a platform from where to extend 
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into hypotheses about a human subject who transgresses many of the confinements of 
existing conceptualizations of the human subject (the black box, the division of sense-
modalities, cultural semiotic systems, and none the less: subject-object divisions), we 
must have a theoretical frame in which to make these speculations. This frame is the 
ideal user. 
 
Internal semiosis: This terms points towards all processes that are mainly happening 
internal to the organism. In Brier (2008) 
 
Nature: The project has established a working concept of nature that forms a theoretical 
tool that places demarcation lines between nature, culture and human subject, instituted 
with the purpose of further intellectual investigation: Nature can be understood as 
anything, in any material or non-material form, that works dynamically, that is process 
based, that affects the four dimensional world that we inhabit, and that has not in itself 
been directed by the conscious will of one or more human beings. 
 
Phaneroscopy: Phaneroscopy is Peirce's version of a phenomenology. It builds on the 
central categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness, where anything manifested is 
thirdness, which, again, is a mediation between firstness and secondness. Firstness is 
what Peirce calls “pure feeling”, or “pure potential”, and secondness is resistance or 
mechanical necessity. If we see firstness as equal to consciousness, then consciousness 
is more primary than matter in Peirce’s deep ontology. (Brier, 2008) 
 
Phenosemiosis: This term is coined by Brier. It integrates an embodied phenomenology 
that incorporates central aspects from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied 
phenomenology with Peirce’s phaneroscopy and semiotics. Phenomenological 
experience thus becomes embodied, and it becomes semiotic. It functions as sign and 
through signs. In Brier, phenosemiosis is thought in its non-conceptual and pre-
linguistic form (Brier, 2008, p. 396). 
 
Pragmaticism: Peirce called his version of pragmatism “pragmaticism” in order to 
clearly depart from the pragmatism of William James. (Brier, 2008) 
 
Self observation:With Luhmann and second order cybernetics as a partial point of 
departure, it becomes increasingly evident that all observation is not only observation, 
but also self-observation. By developing a broader theoretical account of what might 
constitute prerequisites for knowing, self-observation becomes extended, while 
simultaneously implicitly integrated in any observation. This is also what complicates 
the confidence in objective approaches, and what, becomes part of what produces the 
post-objective observer. In this project, the understanding of what constitutes self-
observation is problematized and expanded with wide consequences for the 
understanding of the thesis proper, and its study of the relationship between the first and 
third person knower. 
 
Semiosic: This is semiotics used as an adjective. When academic terms are used as an 
adjective, this inclines that the concept is assimilated into the text's conceptual thought 
level. 
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Socio-communicative, autopoietic language games: This is Brier's (2008) integration 
of Luhmann's autopoietically based social communications (Luhmann) with 
Wittgenstein's concept "language games". 
 
Syntropy: The ability of nature to perfect itself. Albert Szent-György, 1977, and Luigi 
Fantappié, in Corpo and Vanninni, 2009, have both operated in original ways with 
approaches that emphasise syntropy rather than entropy or negentropy only. 
 
Tacit knowledge: A concept used by Michael Polanyi (among others) that implies 
knowledge that is not produced by traditional academic methods, and which might not 
even be intellectualized and articulated as such, however, makes an impact on human 
knowing. Tacit knowledge is also implicit in Giuseppe Longo’s argument, concerning 
what he calls “the epistemological turn”. Michael Polanyi has originally written a book, 
concerning “personal knowledge”, in which he argues for a post-critical approach to 
knowledge, and of which tacit knowledge is a part (Polanyi, 1974). 
 
Technoetic Art: The term “technoetic” is coined by Roy Ascott. It combines “techné” 
with “noesis”, which, in our modern context becomes the combination of technologies 
with studies of the “noetic”, which means the inner levels, or rather “consciousness”. 
Using this term emphasizes the centrality in taking issues of consciousness seriously, 
and it further emphasizes that our time is a time where it is particularly important to 
attain a focus upon the inner world, because contemporary technologies (computers, 
digital interfaces, synthetic biology, etc.), especially explored in artistic practice, seem 
to provoke such questions. (Ascott, 2003; 2008) 
 
Text: In this project, the concept of text is used in its broad hermeneutic form 
(Gadamer, 2004), where it is understood as any format that frames and orders a product 
of communication, whether this is a book, an interactive artwork, or even a biological 
organism, the last of which is suggested by Kalevi Kull (Kull, 2002). 
 
Theory/theoria: The concept of theory presented in this project refers to Aristotle’s 
theoria, which represents an active strive towards wisdom led by inner pleasure, since 
the highest good of man, to Aristotle, is to know (Aristotle, 1998). 
 
The socially real: A term originally suggested by Kate Forbes-Pitt (2012) under the 
inspiration of Roy Bhaskar’s three ontological domains, and Fleetwood's extension of 
these domains (2005), however, changed so that it can encompass Brier's idea of socio-
communicative autopoietic language games. 
 
The virtually real: Is not, as in Forbes-Pitt, aligned with digital virtuality. It is referring 
to a level of reality that is less dense than the three-dimensional physical reality 
suggested by classical physics that forms an ontological onset on behalf of which much 
current philosophical theory is conceptualized. It relates to Massumi’s “affects” that are 
reactions to information from the level of quantum potential, however, is expected to be 
more than mere potential, and to deliver real dynamical objects whose effects can be 
met in the three-dimensional world of particles and matter. 
 
The materially real: The materially real refers to material levels of physical Nature 
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that can, at the present time, be measured and observed by human senses and 
technological aids. 
 
The artefactually real: The artefactually real is the part of the physical-material world 
that is manufactured by human beings, including technologies and technological 
measuring apparatuses. 
 
The ideally real: The ideally real forms the cognitive intentional approach to the world 
inherent in human subjects, however, in we have extended Forbes-Pitt’s version, which, 
to a high degree, built on a further development of John Deely’s theory of the self. Our 
level of “ideally real”, is primarily related to Brier’s concepts of thought and 
phenosemiosis, together with the cognitive functions of autopoiesis and the 
Wittgensteinian language games. 
 
Thought Semiosis: Brier coined this term. In his description of thought semiosis, it 
represents the subtle interaction between the psyche and the linguistic system (Brier, 
2008, p. 395) 
 
Tychastic evolution: A concept used by Peirce that refers to evolution by chance. 
(Peirce, 1923) 
 
Umwelt: The term “umwelt” was originally suggested by Jakob Von Uexküll, and 
contrasted by the term “innenwelt”. The umwelt is the perceptually known part of 
nature to a species and to an individual – based on particularities in the perceptual 
system of that species and/or individual. The innenwelt is the subjective realm, the inner 
processes of modeling and languaging that takes place on behalf of perceptual 
information received by connecting to the umwelt (Deely, 2004) 
 
Wisdom: Wisdom builds on knowledge, and it relates directly to experience and inner 
knowing, as opposed to reason and analysis. It is not mainly aimed for utility (Aristotle, 
1998; David Bohm, 1980; Dorthe Jørgensen, 2002). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Articles published: 
-“Exploring the intelligent art installation as a space for expansion of the conscious 
mind”. In: Technoetic Arts. Volume 6, no. 3, pp. 251-258. UK: Intellect Journals. 
 
-“The Imaginary Real”. Technology, Imagination, Future (TIF-Journal). Volume 3, no. 
2, 2009, pp. 17-23. Yonsei, Korea: Yonsei University Press. 
 
-“The Sense of Being Moved”. Technoetic Arts. Volume 8, no. 2, 2010, pp. 229-236. 
Bristol, UK: Intellect Journals. 
 
-“On light – and the flux of information in nature and technologies.” In: Ascott-
Gangvik; Jahrman (eds.): Making Reality Really Real. Consciousness Reframed, pp. 28-
30. Trondheim, Norway: TEKS publication, November, 2012 (www.teks.no) 
 
-“Human Self-observation in the context of the intelligent Art Installation: Aristotle 
Revisisted”. Valencia, Spain: Institucio Alfons el Magnànim. In: “Colección Formas 
Plásticas”. In print. 
 
-“The Mental, the Virtual and the Real – a living looped interaction.” In: SKILLED ART 
– Talks about Art, Consciousness and Transdisciplinarity. Roy Ascott and Luis Miguel 
Girao (eds.). Publisher: University of Aveiro, 2012. 
 
-“A Cybersemiotic Approach to Technoetic Arts – new vocabularies in transdisciplinary 
research.” Digital Publication as a part of ISEA Istanbul, 14.-21. September, 2011. 
(http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/) 
 
-"On Extended Sentience and Cross-cultural Communicaton - how to generate new 
stories of the human subject". I: Contemporary Art and Investment. Issue 57, 2011. 
Volume 09, pp. 16-19. (Translated from English to Chinese) 
 
-"A short epistemological narrative on logos, telos and aesthetic reason". I: Technoetic 
Arts. Volume 9, Issue 2-3, 2012, pp. 181-189 
 
-"Instances of Consciousness – an essay on the signs of evolution". I: Cybernetics and 
Human Knowing, Volume 19, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 43-60 
 
 
Book Reviews: 
 
-From Papyrus to Hypertext: Toward the Universal Digital Library. In: Leonardo 
43(2),2010, pp. 186-187. The MIT Press. 
 
-The Freudian Robot. In: Cybernetics and Human Knowing. Volume, 18, Issue 1-2. 
2011, pp 185-189 
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-Cybersemiotics – why information is not enough. In: Semiotica, Volume 2012, Issue 
192, Pages 557–575, ISSN (Online) 1613-3692, ISSN (Print) 0037-1998, DOI: 
10.1515/sem-2012-0085, October 2012 
-Anker, K. E. (2012): “The Assumption of Agency Theory” (review). In Journal of 
Critical Realism, volume 11, no. 4. 
 
-Anker, K. E. : “From First to Third via cybersemiotics”. In: Semiotica. In print. 
 
 
Conference contributions: 
 
-Valencia, Spain. Sala Papallo, April, 2009: "Aristotle Revisited". conference: "Beyond 
Darwin – the co-evolutionary path of art, technology and consciousness". 
(http://www.salaparpallo.es/ficha_nnmm.html?cnt_id=1712) 
 
-Plymouth, England: Plymouth Universitet, July, 2009: "Aristotle Revisited". 
-München, Germany. Macromedia Institute, November, 2009: "The Sense of Being 
Moved". 10th annual conference under the title: "Consciousness Reframed." 
(http://www.planetary-collegium.org) 
 
-Guimaraes, Portugal, April, 2010: "The Material, the Mental and the Virtually Real". 
Conference: Skilled Art. (http://www.skilledart.eu/index.cfm?opt=3) 
 
-Trondheim, Norway, November, 2010: "On light – and the flux of informative events 
in natures and technologies." Conference: "Consciousness Reframed 11". "Making 
Reality Really Real". TEKS, Norway. (http://teks.no/?page_id=137&lang=no) 
 
-Stockholm, Sweden, May, 2011: "Consciousness – a multi-scaled flux of 
communication". Konference: "Towards a Science of Consciousness." Arranged by 
Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, Tuscon, Arizona, USA. 
(http://sbs.arizona.edu/project/consciousness/report_poster.php?p=C) 
 
-Shanghai, China, August 2011: "On Extended Sentience and Cross-cultural 
communication – how to generate new stories of the human subject." Fudon University, 
Shanghai. Conference: Transcultural Tendencies– Transmedial Transactions. 
http://tttt.artlinkart.com/en/speakers.html 
 
-Copenhagen, September, 2011: "A Cybersemiotic approach to technoetic arts: creative 
speculations on dry artificial text and wet biotext". Conference in the honour of Søren 
Brier's 60th birthday. 
 
-Lisbon, November, 2011: "Consciousness, life, and the potential of an endobiological 
evolution", Consciousness Reframed 12: Presence in the Mindfield. Presented by 
Artshare. ') 
 
-Keffalonia, Greece, Maj, 2012: "A short epistemological narrative on logos, telos and 
aesthetic reason." Ionian Center for the Arts and Culture. 
(http://technoetictelos.wix.com/conf) 
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-Tartu, Estonia: "Bio-logos: Asking for the logic of life through a study of artificial life 
art and biosemiotics." Biosemiotic Gathering, 2012. Tartu University, Estonia. 
(http://www.ut.ee/SOSE/conference/2012_biosemiotics/pdf/GatheringsProgram6.pdf 
 
 
Lectures given: 
 
-Phd-course on Cybersemiotics at Copenhagen Business School, August, 2012. Talk: 
Technoetic Arts and Cybersemiotics. 
 
 
Teaching: 
 
-September, 2011 till present: Philosophy of Science, Bachelor level. Lectures and 
Classroom teaching. At Copenhagen Business School (Bachelor students at three 
different educational tracks: Intercultural Market Communication. English and 
Organizational Communication, Economy and Mathematics. 
 
 
Composite Sessions: 
 
-2009: Valencia, Spain; Plymouth, UK; Münich, Germany 
 
-2010: Guimaraes, Portugal; Plymouth, UK; Trondheim, Norway 
 
-2011: Shanghai, China; Lisbon, Portugal 
 
-2012: Kefalonia, Greece 
 
 
Central conferences Attended: 
 
-September 24-26, 2009: “The Copenhagen Neuroaesthetics Conference”. Copenhagen 
University, Department of Arts and Cultural Studies. Denmark. 
 
-January 21-23, 2010: “The Artwork between Culture and Nature”. Statens Museum for 
Kunst. Copenhagen. Denmark. 
 
-June, 10-11: DASTS (Danish Association for Science and Technology Studies) Annual 
Meeting. Danish Pedagogical University. Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
-September 4-7, 2010: DRHA 2010: “Sensitivity Design”. 4-day conference, Brunel 
University, London 
 
-September 16-17, 2010: “The Humanities Between Constructivism and Biologism”. 
Copenhagen University. Department of Media, Cognition and Communication. 
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-October 15-17, 2010: Port 2010. “Biotopia”. Conference. Ålborg University and the 
Utzon Centre. 
 
-January 14th, 2011. 9.00 AM - 18.00 PM: Machine and Organism - on Synthetic 
Biology. Copenhagen University, Amager. 
 
-May, 2011: Re:New. The Unheard Avantgarde. IT-University, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
 
Workshops attended: 
 
-April, 10th, 2010. ”Healing and Biophysics” by Ignat Ignatov, head of Scientific 
Research Center of Medical of Biophysics, Sofia, Bulgaria. Held at the Copenhagen 
Reiki School in Hørsholm, Denmark. 
 
-September 29th, 2010. ”The Energy Crisis in Medicine”. By biophysicist James 
Oschmann. In Cooperation with the Stanley Rosenberg Institute and Quantum Health, 
Denmark. 
 
-September 30th, 2011: “The Sensuous Object”. Medical Museion, Copenhagen, 
Denmark. 
 
 
PhD Courses attended: 
 
-21.-25. March, 2011, Mon.-Fri. 9 AM – 4 PM: Philosophy of Science. By Professor 
Søren Brier. Kulturarvens Forskerskole. Copenhagen S. 5 ECTS 
 
 
Exhibitions and festivals attended: 
 
-July, 2009: “Future Lab” Museum in Linz, Austria. 
 
-October, 2009: “Scinterfaces”. Casino Luxembourg. Luxembourg City. 
 
-October, 2009: “Jeppe Hein”. Aaros Museum of Art. Århus. Denmark. 
 
-February, 2010: “Kinetic Art Fair”. London. 
 
-May: “Re:New”, Art Exhibition, Huset, Magstræde, Copenhagen 
 
-September, 2010: “Sensitivity Design”. Performances and installations, Brunel 
University, London. 
 
-October, 2010: “Biotopia”. Bioart in the Utzon Centre. Aalborg, Denmark. Arranged 
by curator, Morten Søndergaard. 
